..the evening news media dramatises a forthcoming government declaration of a‘Total Fire Ban’. Next day yep, dry and hot, then early afternoon wind picks up. Yep, having mapped target, and with no-one around, opportunity to be ‘Bushfire Hero’…
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7th Feb 2009, 1:30pm – a pine plantation near Churchill, West Gippsland:
Of the thousands of bushfires that burn Australia’s natural landscape each year, humans cause the vast majority, with somewhere around half of these being deliberately lit, that is, not by accident.
Bush Arson is a serious and heinous crime now systemic in bushfire-prone Australia, California and southern forested regions of Europe. It is committed usually by misfit serial offenders, yet despite the statistics, across all states in Australia from Tasmania to the Top End, the crime remains largely given lip service by governments.
Researchers at the Australian Institute of Criminology have assessed that there are many reasons why people light fires. While some want to relieve boredom by creating havoc and excitement, other arsonists crave recognition or attention. Some light fires out of anger or protest while others believe they are being altruistic by clearing what they see as dangerous fuel-loads. Sometimes there are multiple motives.
People who light fires for excitement will often stay around after the fire to view their handiwork, which suggests that fire crews should look around and talk to the people who are there watching. Knowing that some people light fires just so they can treated as a hero if they report the fire or put it out is also useful, especially for fire services screening new members.
Some of those people who light those fires do become members of fire services, and this needs to be a consideration in the firefighting recruitment process.
The 2009 Victorian Bushfires, collectively branded by the media as ‘Black Saturday’, involved far many more bushfires that the ones that ignited and reported by the media on Saturday 7th February 2009.
‘The number of fires that had not been extinguished rose from seven on New Year’s Day to 29 on 14 January. Then it doubled to 58 by 25 January and continued to steadily increase to 125 in the week before 7 February. By this time firefighting resources had been committed for a fortnight responding to new fires and attending to fires already contained or controlled.’
[Source: ‘The Number of Fires’ in Overview, Part One: ‘The January-February 2009 Fires’, Vol I: ‘The Fires and the Fire-Related Deaths’ p.4 citing the Department of Sustainability and Environment – Annual Report 2009 (TEN.201.001.0001) at 0047, in Final Report, July 2010, Vol. 1, p.20, by 2009 Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission, State Government of Victoria ]
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According to the Victoria Country Fire Authority, of the fires that were not readily contained on or before 7 February, 14 of those 47 became ‘major fires’. On 7th February alone however, the CFA indicated there were a total of 1386 incidents reported on 7 February — 592 grass and bushfires, 263 structure fires and 156 reported incidents that were false alarms.
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[Ed: Clearly the bushfire conditions were extreme (beyond the usual ‘Total Fire Ban’ severity), the number and distribution of bushfires were considerable and emergency resources were overwhelmed. So for bush arson to be committed on such a declared day was beyond arson; it was ‘pyroterrorism’. But the crime does not yet feature in the Crimes Act. It needs to be. The penalty needs to be equated to that which would be imposed upon a terrorist attempting or actually causing mass murder. It is past time that Australia’s lackadaisical and euphemistic term ‘fire bug‘ is cast to history. We owe this to the memory and respect of 173 people lost. What is significant is that of the 173 who died, most were due to either arson or powerline spark – both human caused].
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The bushfires associated with Black Saturday that were selected to be investigated by the Victorian Royal Commission were on the basis of fires having caused the death of the 173 people and/or where significant damage had occurred.
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2009 Bushfires investigated by the Royal Commission
The investigated bushfires numbered twelve and they were:
Kilmore East Bushfire
Murrindindi Bushfire
Churchill Bushfire
Delburn Bushfire
Bunyip Bushfire
Narre Warren Bushfire
Beechworth-Mudgegonga Bushfire
Bendigo Bushfire
Redesdale Bushfire
Coleraine Bushfire
Horsham Bushfire
Pomborneit–Weerite Bushfire
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[Ed: NOTE: We include the suffix ‘bushfire’ above, unlike the Royal Commission in its literature which abbreviates ‘bushfire’ just to ‘fire’, or even drops the reference to fire completely, bless their imported cotton socks].
2009 Victorian Bushfires – Overview Map
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It is instructive to emphasise that the eventual naming of these fires was based on the point of origin, however on the day it had proven problematic during the overwhelming speed and complexity of the multiple simultaneous bushfire emergencies.
The lead item in the Terms of Reference for the Victorian Royal Commission was sensibly to inquire into ‘the causes and circumstances of these bushfires‘.
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The Bushfires Deliberately Lit *
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Of the above 12 bushfires investigated, those known or suspected to have been caused by arson or otherwise in obscure firefighting-speak ‘undetermined‘ or ‘unknown‘ were:
Murrundindi Bushfire
Delburn Bushfire
Redesdale Bushfire
Upper Ferntree Gully Bushfire
Bendigo Bushfire
Churchill Bushfire
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*Various vague assessments as to cause included ‘suspicious’, ‘unknown’, ‘undetermined’, which in 2012 is unacceptable. Compare the term ‘undetermined‘ to any police investigation into an urban fire causing significant damage; such a vague dismissal would be publicly unacceptable. So in the absence of competent investigation, we shall presume bush arson. So half were caused by arson, which is in line with the Australian Institute of Criminology’s conclusions, above.
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The Murrindindi Bushfire
With bushfire conditions extreme (temperature 44.6°C, humidity 8%, wind 46kph, Bushfire Index 110 – off the scale), the bushfire started about 14:55 on 7 February 2009, to the north of a sawmill in Wilhelmina Falls Road, Murrindindi. The cause was assessed as ‘suspicious’.
After the bushfire had merged with the Kilmore East Bushfire some 168,542 hectares had been burnt. Forty people were killed, another 73 people were injured, 538 houses were destroyed or damaged, mainly in and around Marysville, Narbethong and Buxton. The commercial centre of Marysville was razed to the ground. Firefighting resources involved 195 CFA and 311 NEO personnel, supported by 45 CFA appliances, 22 Networked Emergency Organisation (NEO)* appliances and 3 aircraft.
* [Ed: Networked Emergency Organisation? – a rather new convoluted bureaucratic term given to the Royal Commission to collectively represent a mix of disparate government agencies quickly cobbled together to deal with an emergency outside the control of the Country Fire Authority volunteer base].
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The Delburn Bushfire
With bushfire conditions similarly extreme, albeit with a lower Fire Index of 52, this bushfire started as three separate ignitions in the Strzelecki Ranges on 28 and 29 January 2009:
The Ashfords Road Bushfire – discovered on 28 January at about 4.00 pm, 2.5 kilometres north-north-west of Boolarra.
The Creamery Road Bushfire – discovered at about 1.00 pm on 29 January, 2.5 kilometres east of Delburn.
The Lyrebird Walk–Darlimurla Bushfire – discovered at about 3.30 pm on 29 January, 4 kilometres north of Mirboo North near Darlimurla.
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[Ed: So each started under extreme bushfire conditions in the early afternoon]
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The causes of both the above Creamery Road Bushfire and the Lyrebird Walk–Darlimurla Bushfire were assessed as ‘suspicious’ and the Victorian Police have since laid criminal charges against the suspected arsonist.
The three separate bushfires were not contained and ultimately merged. Increasing wind and changes in wind direction caused spotting and resulted in the bushfire spreading quickly east towards the outskirts of the townships of Boolarra and Yinnar. The surrounding townships included Mirboo North (population 1,300), Boolarra (pop. 600), Yinnar (pop. 600) and Churchill (pop. 5,000). Fortunately there were no fatalities or casualties, but 44 houses were destroyed maily on the outskirts of Boolarra, and some 6,534 hectares burnt out. Firefighting resources involved 597 CFA and 699 NEO personnel, supported by 112 CFA appliances, 103 NEO appliances and 14 aircraft.
Delburn Bushfire 30th January 2009 from NASA satellite
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There had been a further three ignitions around the time (1) at the Delburn–Yinnar refuse transfer station, (2) at Ten Mile Creek Rd in a Hancock Victoria Plantation and (3) at Brewsters Rd, Yinnar. Each was either contained or burnt out without fire-fighting intervention.
.The 2009 Delburn Bushfire
A CFA firefighter runs out hose on Piggery Road at Boolarra 2nd February 2009.
(Photo by Greg Cahir)
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The Redesdale Bushfire
The Redesdale Bushfire started with similar bushfire conditions (temperatures reaching 44.7°C, humidity 7%, winds up to 50kph, Bushfire Index 87.2). The bushfire was reported at 3:11 pm on 7 February 2009.
According to the CFA, the ignition started in a creek bed on open farmland between the eastern bank of the Coliban River and the northern end of Summerhill Road, about two kilometres to the west of the township of Redesdale, about 95 kilometres north-west of Melbourne and 35 kilometres south-east of Bendigo. There were more than 100 houses in the bushfire area.
The cause of ignition of the Redesdale fire has been investigated but ‘not determined‘. Possible sources of ignition that have not been excluded are:
(a) ignition by a spark or hot exhaust system
(b) deliberate ignition
(c) ignition by farm operations
(d) ignition by a carelessly discarded cigarette butt
There was no evidence that any of these sources ignited the fire.
The bushfire burned towards the south-east for about 19 kilometres. It was the first of two bushfires in the region on that day, the second originating
in Maiden Gully, 8 kilometres north-west of Bendigo, around 4:20pm. Fortunately again there were no fatalities, but one reported casualty, 14 houses destroyed as well as more than 50 farm sheds and outbuildings, the Baynton church and a bridge, two olive oil plantations, a vineyard and two blue gum plantations, and 7,086 hectares were burned.
Firefighting resources required were 536 CFA and 127 NEO personnel, supported by 103 CFA appliances, 21 NEO dozers and 1 aircraft. Two CFA forward control vehicles were damaged in the course of the fire fight.
The Upper Ferntree Gully fire started on Saturday 7th February 2009 at about 3:40 pm in a suburban railway corridor through bushland between the Burwood Highway and Quarry Road. The bushfire conditions were extreme as with the entire State. By mid afternoon the wind had picked up and was gusting to 90kph, exacerbating the conditions.
The cause of the fire was not known. The fire initially spread by spotting south-east through scrubland between the Burwood Highway and Quarry Road near houses. By 4:30pm an air crane was requested and just after 5pm the Erikson Aircrane nicknamed ‘Elvis’ had made a number of rapid water drops on the fire, obtaining water from a nearby disused quarry, critically preventing the loss of houses and finally contained by 6pm. There were no fatalities or casualties and no houses were lost, but 4 hectares of regenerated scrubland was burnt.
Erickson S-64 Air-Crane Helitanker (N179AC)
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[To stop video and continue, click the pause button bottom left]
Repeat Offenders? – same place lit again in January 2012: a hot, dry, windy afternoon, familiar turf
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‘Members of the Upper Ferntree Gully cricket team were quick to report a grass fire that started near Quarry Rd. Firefighters from Ferntree Gully and Upper Ferntree Gully attended the blaze, which was reported about 7.15pm on Friday. Upper Ferntree Gully CFA captain Peter Smith said the fire started in vegetation-regeneration area near Quarry Rd.
“It was a grass and scrub fire at the old quarry of probably about a third of a hectare,” Mr Smith said. “Conditions were on our side but we wouldn’t have wanted it any hotter or windier.”
About five trucks responded to the blaze and Mr Smith praised the efforts of those who called 000.
“The people that spotted it were fantastic,” Mr Smith said. “They were local guys from the Upper Ferntree Gully Cricket Club I think, that helped us get in and assisted police.”
The cause of the fire is unknown and being investigated.‘
The Bendigo Bushfire started shortly after 4pm on Saturday 7th February 2009 in the tinder dry hilly bushland of Maiden Gully, 8 km north-west of central Bendigo. Bushfire conditions were extreme (temperatures up to 45.4°C, humidity 6%, winds up to 41kph and the Bushfire Index off the scale at 129). The ignition cause was assessed as ‘suspicious’ – the arsonist was classically upwind of the outskirts of targeted western Bendigo.
The bushfire burned through gently rolling country bordering the city’s western suburbs, where there are numerous former gold diggings that are now public open space interspersed between suburban blocks. One person died as a result, plus there were 41 reported casualties. Some 58 homes were destroyed and 341 hectares burned out.
Firefighting resources required were 152 CFA and 111 NEO personnel, which were supported by 30 CFA appliances, 31 NEO appliances and 3 aircraft.
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The Churchill Bushfire
2009 Churchill Fire Map Overview
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The Churchill Bushfire started at 1:30pm on Saturday 7th February 2009, 3km south-east of the Churchill fire station, from two separate ignitions respectively one at the intersection of Glendonald Road and the other at Jelleffs Outlet. The recorded ‘000’ call received from the public, not coincidently, at 13:32, two minutes later.
Like the other bushfires on that day, the climate background was characterised by a decade long El Niño drought, making the native vegetation tinder dry and so extremely flammable. It was a declared Total Fire Ban across Victoria. The Forest Fire Danger index was off the scale recorded at 103 at Latrobe Valley AWS at 4pm, the temperature reached 46.1°C an humidity at just 8% at the Latrobe Valley automatic weather station around 4pm, the humidity just 8%. The maximum winds recorded before the wind change were north-north-westerly
at 44 kilometres an hour at Latrobe Valley Automatic Weather Station at 15:43, before a south-westerly wind change came through.
Before 7th February, the Country Fire Authority and the Department of Sustainability and Environment had already been providing support in response to three separate bushfires which had started on 28th and 29th January and which had coalesced into one and became the Delburn Bushfire. It had been contained by 3rd February. Like the Delburn Bushfire, thge Churchill Bushfire was started on the one day by two separate ignitions by an arsonist. So then was the Churchill Bushfire a copy cat arson episode? Were the two somehow connected? Did both arsonists know each other?
At the time, the cause of the Churchill Bushfire was recorded as ‘suspicious’. It was in fact deliberately lit in two locations, outside the township of Churchill along a roadside next to and upwind of a pine plantation owned by Hancock Plantations Victoria at the foot of Walkers Hill. The tinder dry conditions fanned by a steady breeze meant the ignitions took hold quickly.
The recorded 000 call received from the arsonist himself at 13:32, two minutes later. Actual fire-fighting response was not documented in the Royal Commission report. It could well have been some hours before the blaze was fought. The following photos of the Churchill Fire are purportedly from the nearby township of Morwell looking south. They show the early minutes after the ignitions.
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The very start of Churchill Bushfire
Photo taken looking south from Hunt Street, Morwell
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‘Composition: vertical-panorama of the smoke from the Churchill Fires that have jumped containment lines near me’
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[Source of photos: ‘Nchalada’s Photostream’, Flickr, ^http://www.flickr.com/photos/nchalada/page2/, accessed 20120827, Ed: Due to their controversial nature, the many photos on this Flickr website may not be accessible for long.]
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During the afternoon and early evening the fire travelled rapidly, affecting Jeeralang North, Balook, Le Roy, Koornalla, Callignee, Callignee North, Callignee South, Hazelwood South, Hazelwood North, Traralgon South, Devon, Yarram and Carrajung South. The final statistics confirm that firefighting resources deployed involved 409 CFA, 167 NEO personnel and 33 Hancock Victorian Plantations firefighters, supported by 76 CFA appliances, 29 NEO appliances and 4 waterbombing aircraft.
Although the fire was at its most destructive on 7th February, it was not reported as controlled until 19th February. Eleven people died as a result of the fire, plus an additional 35 casualties, 156 houses were destroyed, and more than 36,000 hectares were burnt.
About 1000 hectares of Bluegum plantations and 1700 hectares of Radiata Pine plantations owned Hancock Victorian Plantations by were burnt in the fires. An untold number of livestock and wildlife were also burned to death. In the nearby Delburn Fire, an arrest has been made but the outcome of that trial is not yet known at the time of publishing this article.
‘Residents of fire ravaged Gippsland towns have been warned to remain alert despite cooler temperatures today. So far 27 homes around Boolarra and Mirboo North have been lost in the fires. (Ed: The Delburn Bushfire)
More than 400 firefighters from as far as Mildura are currently battling the 6300 hectare blaze with 113 fire trucks, 14 helicopters and 12 bulldozers. About 40 Boolarra and Mirboo North residents have spent the past two nights in emergency accommodation at Monash University in Churchill, after fire swept through their town on Friday.
More than 100 residents attended a community meeting in Churchill this morning to discover whether their properties had survived the weekend.
CFA spokeswoman Rachel Allen warned locals the blaze was far from being classified as safe, despite drizzle predicted and a top temperature of only 29 degrees. “Obviously the threat has diminished somewhat because of the cooler temperatures, but it as important now as it was a few days ago to keep yourselves aware,” Ms Allen said.
Peter McHugh from the Department of Sustainability and Environment agreed, saying the fire threat “was far from over,” and that residents need to remain vigilant for flying embers.
Mr McHugh said possible electrical storms predicted to hit the area later today are a cause of concern for emergency services.
The Delburn fires have claimed 27 homes, 59 sheds, 5 cars and a piggery since they began on Wednesday. Another home is also believed to have been lost yesterday, but fire crews have so far been unable to access the property, just outside Mirboo North. Almost 40 homes are still left without power, while water supply has been restored to Boolarra.
Department of Primary Industries staff are now counting livestock losses around the Boolarra area, and the number is believed to be substantial.
Latrobe City CEO Paul Buckley said it would take at least a year to rebuild Mirboo North and Boolarra.
“When the fires hit Toongabbie about three years ago that took six months to rebuild, and this one is much, much worse,” Mr Buckley said.
Boolarra evacuees housed in Monash University student accommodation units have shared their horror stories of the blaze that engulfed their town.
Tania Martin, 35, praised the efforts of her partner Dave Caldwell, 40, for saving both theirs and their neighbours’ house.
Ms Martin and her son Storm, 10, left their Boolarra home late Friday while Mr Caldwell stayed behind to defend the properties.
“I think he is an absolute hero,” Ms Martin said. Mr Caldwell worked for hours pumping water on both houses as flying embers showered all around him from the fire less than 100 metres away. But Mr Caldwell said the real heroes are the firefighters who have been working around the clock.
“Those guys and girls, you should watch them heading over the hill straight for the fire. It’s unbelievable,” Mr Caldwell said. “They are made of the right stuff, they are.”
Val Kingston, 68, and her husband recently moved to Boolarra from Melbourne for a “tree change.” “And now all the trees are gone,” Ms Kingston said.
Ms Kingston said leaving Boolarra lat Friday had been difficult. “It was the saddest sight I have ever seen looking over my shoulder as I drove away. I just thought “there goes my town.”
Ms Kingston praised the efforts of Monash University residential staff. The University purchased fans for the units where evacuees have set up makeshift homes. They have also provided tea and coffee and icy poles for the kids. “We can’t thank them enough,” Ms Kingston said.
A further 20 firefighters from Mildura and 18 firefighters from Ballarat arrived in Churchill this morning to relieve exhausted colleagues who have been stationed on the fire front for the past two days.
The Churchill fire was threatening communities in south Gippsland late on Monday, fire authorities said. The 33,000 hectare blaze was threatening the community of Won Wron just north of Yarram, in south Gippsland at 5.30pm (AEDT) on Monday.
Residents of nearby Carrajung on the east side of Carrajung-Woodside Road were also expected to be impacted directly.
The Country Fire Authority also issued an urgent threat message at 4.15pm (AEDT) to residents near the Thomson Road area, Churchill, who were being directly hit by the fire. A CFA spokesman said the fire threat had increased as freshening winds picked up.
The death toll from the fires, which police believe were deliberately lit, in the area continued to rise. Nineteen people have now been confirmed dead in the region after the Churchill fires devastated the towns of Callignee, Hazelwood, Jeeralang and Koornalla in southwest Gippsland.
Nine people died in Callignee, one person was killed in Upper Callignee, four people died at Hazelwood, one at Jeeralang and four at Koornalla.
The Churchill fires south of the Princes Highway have so far burnt about 33,000 hectares, while the Bunyip Ridge fire, north of the highway, has razed 25,000 hectares.
Containment lines are also being established on the western and eastern flanks of the Bunyip blaze. Residents of Gembrook have also been warned to be vigilant, although the town is not currently under threat.
In the north of the state, fire around Dederang escalated significantly late on Monday afternoon, also threatening the towns of Beechworth and Yackandandah. The fire was spotting ahead of the main fire and ash and embers were threatening communities in Gundowring, Gundowring Upper, Glen Creek, Kergunyah South, Mudgeegonga and Running Creek. Authorities said some fires could take weeks to contain.
At least 750 homes have been destroyed and more than 330,000 hectares burnt out. The latest death toll is 131, which surpasses the toll from the 1983 Ash Wednesday bushfires, in which 75 people died in Victoria and South Australia, and the Black Friday bushfires of 1939, which killed 71.’
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Misfit Profile of a Bush Arsonist
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Brendan James Sokaluk, was in April 2012 found guilty of all 10 counts of arson causing death by the Victorian Supreme Court in Melbourne for deliberately lighting the Churchill Bushfire on 7th February, 2009. Sokaluk was an ex-volunteer firefighter with a local brigade of the Victorian Country Fire Authority (CFA) from 1987 to 1988, some twenty years prior.
Brendan SokalukNot the smartest bush arsonist, but then could he be?
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Sokaluk, then aged 39, claimed that his old sky blue Holden HJ sedan had apparently broken down on the road near where the fire started, next to a pine plantation where the Churchill Black Saturday fire had begun just minutes earlier.
He was the only outsider on the road. To the residents of Glendonald Road busily packing up their possessions and preparing to flee the raging fire, Brendan Sokaluk stood out. Dressed in shorts and sandals, he was frantically trying to restart his broken-down Holden, which was partially blocking the gravel road.
Once home, Sokaluk climbed on to the roof of his house so he could look back towards Glendonald Road and watch the fire burn.
Sokaluk told several lies to cover his tracks. He told one person he was on his way to a wedding, while to others he said he was visiting a friend in the area. As he was driven back to Churchill by a resident, Sokaluk was overheard telling his father on the phone that he had been in the area to visit a friend to get his chisel set back.
Days later Sokaluk was arrested on the following Friday 12th February on a local street while working delivering the local Latrobe Valley Express newspaper. Sokaluk was interviewed by police for about three hours both at the scene of the fire and in an interview room at a local police station. Police interviewed him and on the following day, Saturday 13th February, they returned him to Glendonald Road and to nearby Jelleff’s Outlet, where the fire had started and where the landscape was now blackened and burnt out.
What emerged was that on the morning of 7th February, Sokaluk had picked up his father Kazimir in his distinctive sky blue Holden HJ and the pair drove to Morwell and Traralgon, visited auto and hardware stores, had lunch at KFC and bought lottery tickets. Kazimir Sokaluk said Brendan’s car was playing up and “running rough” but against his advice his son said he was “going up into the trees” because it was cooler there. Sokaluk also said he wanted to get a chisel set back from a friend named Dave who lived in that area. Another excuse was to access his apparent junk metal collection along Glendonald Road.
The police attempted a re-enactment and the field interview was recorded by video. Sokaluk admitted to police that he had started the blaze, but declared it had been an accident after he dropped cigarette ash out of his car window. He explained that the previous Saturday he had been driving slow, dawdling along in his car. “Looking for animals and stuff,” he said. Asked if he is familiar with the area, he replies: “It’s different `cause it’s not green no more. It’s all burnt out.” The detective asks “How do you know this area?” Sokaluk replied it was where he threw his piece of paper out the window.
“Part of my cigarette thing fell on the floor, so I got a bit of paper out to grab it and stuff… I thought it was dead and I’ve chucked it out the window, but I didn’t know it had lit up. I thought it was out when I threw the paper out the window.” Sokaluk told them. “I had no intention of this all to happen. Now I have to put up [with it] for the rest of my life and it makes me sad.”
The cigarette ash explanation was pivotal in what was a largely circumstantial case. But Sokaluk strenuously denied deliberately starting the fire. But then Sokaluk had told several lies to cover his tracks. He was a serial liar. Yet, without witnesses, evidence, a confession, proving bush arson is inherently difficult.
Prosecutor Ray Elston Senior Counsel argued that Sokaluk deliberately drove to bushland and started a fire on a day that had temperatures that reached nearly 45C. He was calculating enough to lie about his reasons for being in the area, to try to cover his tracks and to point the finger at others. Sokaluk tried to disguise his crime by claiming to police that it was an accident, lying about his reasons for being in the area and trying to point the finger at others, including making a false anonymous report to Crime Stoppers from his home computer blaming a Department of Sustainability and Environment worker for the fire.
Police managed to piece together Sokaluk’s movements on Black Saturday almost to the minute from phone records, witness accounts, shop receipts and CCTV footage. At 1.16 pm Sokaluk was in the IGA store in Churchill where he bought cigarettes before heading off into the Jeeralang Hills. Within 15 minutes a fire erupted in the hills and witnesses said that in tinder dry conditions the inferno tore through the bush seawards towards Yarram.
The Crown called 80 witnesses and its case was a mosaic of evidence that pointed to the guilt of Sokaluk. Mr Elston told the jury the accused had no reason to be in the area that day and if he was going to see Dave, who was home, he never got there.
“Why did he travel on a dirt road to get out there?” Mr Elston said to the jury in his summing up. “Why did he drive off that dirt road on to a graded track on the south side of Glendonald Road? A short distance from where the fire started Sokaluk’s car broke down and he was spotted at the side of the road by a Churchill CFA truck and then later picked up by a couple who drove him back to town.
Mr Elston told the jury:
”When the accused man arrives at that intersection there is no fire. ‘No one else is suggested to be present. When he leaves it’s ablaze. All causes save for deliberate ignition of this fire have been eliminated. ‘There is only therefore one irresistible conclusion to draw from the totality of the material, with respect, we suggest, and that is the accused man set those fires at two points.”
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Neighbours saw Sokaluk on his roof watching the progress of the fire and for some never explained reason he later walked back into the fire area. A resident found him in his back yard and told him to shelter in his house a few minutes before the returning fire storm passed. The jury saw a pathetic picture of Sokaluk with a garden hose in his hand taken by the resident.
It was not until after he was charged with 10 counts of arson causing death that experts diagnosed him with autism spectrum disorder. Until then his family had believed his disability was result of a difficult birth. People in the Churchill area thought Sokaluk was a weirdo and called him” beanie boy” and other names and as soon as locals learned he was in the area where the bushfire erupted he became the prime suspect.
Sokaluk’s barrister Jane Dixon SC during the trial painted a picture of a harmless individual, a “simpleton” whose autism set him apart from others in the community – a “lights out and no-one home” type of personality. “He’s a bit of a misfit really, but nevertheless he muddled along in his own way, muddled along OK with a bit of help from his mum and dad, comfortable enough with his own company, his dog, his hobbies, his obsessions.”
After leaving school, where he had been bullied, Sokaluk worked in a series of jobs before becoming a gardener at Monash University. He did that job for nearly 18 years. Sokaluk spent his days watching kids TV and collecting scrap metal with his dog. Neighbours would hear Sokaluk playing Bob the Builder and Thomas the Tank Engine tapes as he worked in his shed, where he liked to tinker with scrap metal and other junk he had found dumped in the area. Sokaluk’s neighbour Patricia Hammond would sometimes talk to him over the back fence. He would talk to his dog as if he was talking to a child, she said during the trial.
Justice Paul Coghlan of the Victorian Supreme Court sentenced Sokaluk stated in his summing up: “The event was terrifying for all involved in the fires, whether directly or otherwise,” he said. “For the victims, these were and are life-changing events and no sentence that I impose can compensate for their loss.”
Yet Justice Paul Coghlan of the Victorian Supreme Court sentenced Sokaluk to a non-parole custodial sentence of just 14 years. That is one and half years for each human death, excluding the millions of dollars in property damage and the horrific cruel burning to death of all people and animals, the other irreversible damage and tragedy – 156 homes with their personal possessions and memories, the livestock, 36,000 hectares of land, all the agricultural equipment and infrastructure, the forgotten wildlife.
Sokaluk is one of Australia’s worst mass killers as Justice Coghlan concluded. Sokaluk should never be released. Yet his lawyers have already said they are likely to appeal. So who are the real villians? Sokaluk’s barrister Jane Dixon, SC, argued her client had autism and was a simple man and a misfit who was incapable of concocting a web of lies or deceit. Cold comfort to the victims. It was early afternoon on an extreme bushfire day. Sokaluk was upwind of and next to a pine plantation. Sokaluk knew what he was doing.
Had he done it before but not been caught?
Why did he leave the CFA?
Had he been dismissed?
In the CFA one is taught how to light fires for prescribed burning. What triggered his arson?
Was it the devastation and attention that the Delburn Bushfire had created? It too was the cause of local arson.
What was the news reporting like at the time?
Did the media sensationalising serve to encourage Sokaluk as a dormant arsonist to copycat?
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As aptly described by the Herald Sun’ Norrie Ross:
“He was a killer who brought death and devastation to his own community and left a vile legacy for LaTrobe Valley that will never be forgotten or erased.”
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Royal Commission’s Findings into Bush Arson
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One of the Royal Commission’s identified research gaps and priorities emanating out of its analysis was the extent of ‘Deliberately Lit Bushfires‘ and the ‘Causes of Fire-setting Behaviour‘. [Source: ‘Final Report – Summary’, July 2010, Vol. 1, p.20, by 2009 Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission, State Government of Victoria ]
Following from this, the Royal Commission made two specific recommendations to address what it terms ‘Deliberately lit Fires’. Those two recommendations read as follows:
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ROYAL COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION 35
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Victoria Police continue to pursue a coordinated statewide approach to arson prevention and regularly review its approach to ensure that it contains the following elements:
High-level commitment from senior police
A research program aimed at refining arson prevention and detection strategies
Centralised coordination that includes comprehensive training, periodic evaluation of arson prevention strategies and programs, and promotion of best-practice prevention approaches
A requirement that all fire-prone police service areas have arson prevention plans and programs, according to their level of risk.
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ROYAL COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION 36
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The Commonwealth, states and territories continue to pursue the National Action Plan to Reduce Bushfire Arson in Australia, giving priority to producing a nationally consistent framework for data collection and evaluating current and proposed programs in order to identify and share best-practice approaches.
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[Source: ‘Final Report – Summary’, July 2010, Vol. 1, pp.30-31, by 2009 Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission, State Government of Victoria ]
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Misfits in Fire Fighting
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It is disturbing that Sokaluk’s lawyer went to considerable effort and persuasion to try to have Sokaluk acquitted on mental illness grounds. Despite the adversarial nature of our legal system, the ego and public profile of lawyers should not be encouraged in spite of justice. Why was Sokaluk entitled to be represented by expensive and exclusive Senior Counsel? The bastard was at best entitled to Legal Aid. What was the total cost to Victorian taxpayers for his legal defence case? Why was the cost not made public?
Sokaluk was not just an arsonist. The scale and impact of his crime escalates him to being a pyroterrorist. But in Australia, the law lags reality. The maximum penalty for arson is 25 years custodial sentence, yet bushfire arson carries a maximum penalty of just 14 or 15 years. Sokaluk received just 14 years – the maximum penalty for arsonists are charged with criminal damage by fire or similar offences under the Bushfire Act or a manslaughter charge if someone dies as a result of the fire.
What is the rationale behind that discrepancy? It is archaic colonial legislation that sends a message that the value of Australia’s natural environment matters not. But when the bush burns, sometimes it lead to 173 human lives destroyed, as well as widespread calamity and wildlife extinctions.
Sokaluk’s 14 years custodial sentence translates to just 15 months in prison for each human he killed by fire. His sentence ignores his inflicting 35 human casualties, 156 houses destroyed, and more than 36,000 hectares of native forest and plantation forest burnt. Solaluk’s penalty is a judicial disgrace. The slap on the wrist penalty sends an sick and enticing message to dormant serial arsonists, that no matter how bad the fire you may light, at worst you get just 14 years. Solaluk should rot in prison. Yet legally technically, Sokaluk could have received the maximum penalty under the Victorian Forests Act of 1958 for ‘Lighting – intentionally or negligently and where authority should have been obtained – or maintaining a fire in the open air in a state forest or national park; failing to prevent the spread of a fire; leaving a fire without taking reasonable precautions to prevent it spreading or causing injury’.
The maximum penalty? 2 years
Australia’s arson laws and penalties are obscenely excusing of mass murder by being burned alive, horrific burn injuries, considerable and absolute property loss, large scale livestock loss by being burned alive, widespread wildlife habitat killing by being burned alive, livelong trauma, ruination of families and communities, immense suffering, widespread habitat destruction, and the irreversible destruction of a region in every sence of the meaning.
Yet Australian backward politicians dismissively treat bush arson akin to the playing with matches of a fire bug.
In the United States, ‘pyroterrorism’ is becoming seriously recognised. It is deemed to be the willful destruction of a Nation’s forests, farms and cities, through the use of fire. On 28th March 2005 the US Homeland Security held a press conference and revealed that they now had an anti-pyroterrorist taskforce. On April 1st, George W. Bush announced that “Anyone caught deliberately setting forest fires as an act of pyroterrorism will be dealt with the same way we treat other terrorists. Pyroterrorists are getting smarter and learning how to create bigger, more unstoppable forest fires… or there are copycats who want to do the same thing.
The Australian Institute of Criminology has concluded that half of Australia’s 20,000 to 30,000 vegetation fires each year are deliberately lit, costing the community $1.6 billion per year. So what is the Australian Government doing about this home grown terrorism? Nothing!
Many bushfire arsonist are disturbingly drawn from the very agencies entrusted to fight fires. But where are the statistics and what is being done about it?
How many misfits serve in volunteer fire fighting across Australia? How many have been psychologically tested as suitable? How many are subject to IQ tests before joining? None? How many dormant Sokaluks does Australian rural fire-fighting have in its ranks?
The Australian Government at federal and delegated state level neglectfully relies upon a low-cost volunteer base that is drawn from a goodwilling Australian culture, but which is dangerously under-resourced, underfunded and recipient of propaganda that perpetuates this.
Consequently, Australia’s non urban fire-fighting is so desperate for volunteers that dormant Sokaluks are unscrutinised, undetected and yet with their bushfire fighting training are trained to become the most deadly bush arsonists of all.
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Armageddon aftermath of Sokaluk’s 2009 Churchill Bushfire Arson– he’ll be out in just 14 years
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‘Police in Victoria are refusing to confirm reports that the major suspect in their investigation into the marysville bushfire is a member of the Country Fire Authority. Earlier this month detectives said they were closing in on the arsonist responsible. The Marysville fire claimed more than 30 lives. Fairfax Media has reported that the CFA fire-fighter is now considered the major suspect and has been questioned and released with investigations continuing. The CFA won’t comment except to say it’s working closely with the Phoenix Taskforce investigating the fires.’
‘A CFA volunteer was jailed for 22 months today for starting a series of bushfires that had to be fought by his comrades in the local brigade. Justice Michael Tinney told Damian Lisle, 36, that any of the fires had the potential to cause catastrophic loss of life and property in one of Victoria’s highest bushfire danger areas, the Herald Sun reports.
Lisle drove around Mt Evelyn throwing lit pieces of paper from his car just days after the first anniversary of Black Saturday in which 173 Victorians lost their lives. Judge Tinney said Lisle started fires in dead-end streets near houses and in bushland and he did not hang around to see what happened. “You lit these fires and you left. Thereafter it was in the lap of the gods,” Judge Tinney said in his County Court sentence.
Lisle pleaded guilty to nine charges that on February 17, 2010, he intentionally caused a bushfire, and to counts of attempting to escape from custody and drink driving. Judge Tinney said Lisle had a history of mental and alcohol problems and at the time of his offending he was suspended from the Mt Evelyn CFA and facing the sack from his job as an assistant supermarket manager. After he was caught, Lisle told police he had drunk eight stubbies and added: “I remember being angry. I don’t know what about.”
Each of the arson counts faced by Lisle carries a maximum of 15 years jail. Judge Tinney said members of the Mt Evelyn brigade told the court that his crimes had a significant impact on CFA morale. The judge said the fact that Lisle was a CFA volunteer and had fought bushfires made him more aware of the danger to life and limb and both general and specific deterrence were important factors in sentencing.
During a court appearance at Melbourne Magistrates’ Court Lisle jumped the dock and tried to escape and the judge said two people were injured trying to restrain him. He set a maximum term of three years and 10 months.’
‘A CFA volunteer has been charged over a series of fires north of Melbourne, including one on Christmas Day. A man will appear in court today charged with lighting a series of bushfires north of Melbourne.
Jarred Brewer, 19, of Darraweit Guim, near Wallan, has been charged with five counts of intentionally starting a bushfire and 16 counts of improper use of emergency services.Brewer was arrested yesterday following a joint operation between Seymour detectives and the arson squad that began in May last year. The charges relate to fires in bush at Wallan and at nearby Mount Disappointment.
Mr Brewer faced Broadmeadows Magistrates’ Court briefly yesterday afternoon before he was remanded until today. Police prosecutor Sen-Constable Renee Azzopardi told the court Mr Brewer had been charged over fires at Mt Disappointment on November 12 and Christmas Day and two fires at Wallan on January 15.
Sen-Constable Azzopardi said he is also alleged to have made 16 calls to 000 reporting fires. At the Christmas Day fire a 20L fuel container and matches were allegedly found.At one of the fires at Wallan investigators believe the fire was started using fire starters. Mr Brewer was allegedly captured on CCTV footage at Safeway in Wallan shortly before the fire with a shopping bag. The court was told that store records showed a BBQ gas lighter and a bag of fire starters were purchased at that time.
Sen-Constable Azzopardi said local emergency services believed their resources were deliberately stretched so that Darraweit Guim fire brigade could be turned out to fires. The court heard that Mr Brewer attended a fire station at one point and became abusive to fire fighters when they wouldn’t allow him on a truck. Court documents reveal that Mr Brewer has also been charged with lighting fires at Wallan on October 10 and November 16.’
Today marks the third anniversary of the 2009 Victorian Bushfires. People reading this do so because they are interested in understanding and seeking answers, and so do I. This is one reason why I write. (Editor)
After a Royal Commission and much government promising, the test of faith is do people in regional Victoria feel safer from the risk of bushfire and confident that the subsequent actions by government at all levels are better prepared to mitigate a repeat of 2009?
The first two terms of reference of the Royal Commission into the 2009 Victorian Bushfires were to investigate:
1. ‘The causes and circumstances of the bushfires which burned in various parts of Victoria in late January and in February 2009 (“2009 Bushfires”).’
2. ‘The preparation and planning by governments, emergency services, other entities, the community and households for bushfires in Victoria, including current laws, policies, practices, resources and strategies for the prevention, identification, evaluation, management and communication of bushfire threats and risks.’
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The underlying premise of the entire investigation was not about attributing individual blame per se, although some of that has been attributed two a few individuals, but to understand why the devastation was of such a scale and impact, with a view to learn from the tragedy and to better prepare for the future. Loved ones cannot be returned, but from their loss our society needs to learn and protect itself from a repeat. It has happened before. This editor was in Melbourne during the 1983 Ash Wednesday bushfires. It must not happen again.
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Causes of the 2009 Victorian Bushfires
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People rightly wanted to know the direct causes and circumstances of the fires, about emergency management of the fires, bushfire detection, the warnings given or not given, about bushfire preparedness.
Well the final report of the Royal Commission grouped the causes of the bushfires according to their separate geography as follows:
1. Delburn Fires cause: “suspicious“
2. Bunyip Fire cause: “suspected lightning“
3. Kilmore East Fire cause: “electrical failure“
4. Horsham Fire cause: “electrical failure“
5. Coleraine Fire cause: “electrical failure“
6. Pomborneit–Weerite: “electrical failure“
7. Churchill Fire cause: “suspicious“
8. Murrindindi Fire cause: “suspicious“
9. Redesdale Fire cause: “undetermined“
10. Narre Warren at Harkaway cause: “accidental“; at Lynbrook: “not determined“
. “Most of the major fires that burned in late January and in February 2009 started as a direct or indirect result of human activity.”
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Main Cause: Overhead Electricity Arcing of a neglected SP AusNet Asset
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Failure of electricity assets owned and neglected by SP AusNet was responsible for five fires—Kilmore East, Beechworth–Mudgegonga, Horsham, Coleraine and Pomborneit–Weerite.
The causes of four fires—Murrindindi, Churchill, Delburn and Bendigo—are thought to be suspicious (i.e. arson). One fire—Harkaway—was started accidentally. Only the Bunyip fire is thought to have been the result of natural causes (lightning), although fire investigators have been unable to definitively reach this conclusion. The causes of both Lynbrook fires and the Upper Ferntree Gully and Redesdale fires are not known.”
[Source: 2009 Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission, Final Report, July 2010, Volume 1, Chapter 15.1 Conclusions – Fire causes, p.226]
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These conclusions are far from satisfactory, given the considerable resources and expertise made available to the Royal Commission, and that its number one task from to identify the exact causes of the fires. Why are the conclusions so vague? Is it symptomatic of the inadequacies of CFA bushfire monitoring and investigation skills? What were the delays between the estimate ignitions and the respective onground investigations?
It is easy to become bamboozled by the complexity of the many separate bushfires and their respective causes, the contributing factors and varying responses, and particularly since the Royal Commission final report is so long and unwieldy. I don’t think anyone questions that the bushfire conditions were characterised by many years of drought producing tinder dry bushland and extreme heat and low humidity on the day, which all produced an ‘unprecedented‘ extreme bushfire risk.
But of all the bushfires that occurred in the lead up to and on the day of 7th Februray 2009, the single bushfire that caused the most destruction and tragic loss of life was the Kilmore East Fire. The Kilmore East Fire started about 85 kilometres north of Melbourne and ended up burning easterly across the Hume Highway through the shires of Whittlesea, Nillumbik, Mitchell and Yarra Ranges extending south east 70km.
It burnt through the towns of Wallaby Creek, Humevale, Strathewen, Kinglake, Kinglake West, Clonbinane, Steels Creek, Chum Creek, St Andrews, Dixons Creek, Yarra Glen, and Strathewen. Then the wind changed southerly and raged the fire on to Pheasant Creek, Yabamac, Flowerdale, Hazeldene, Castella, Break O’Day, Glenburn and Toolangi.
The fire burnt an overall area of 125,383 hectares, roughly 70 km long and 20 wide, as shown on the following fire map.
Kilmore East Fire (dark red area) Click to see enlarged map(320kb) – arrows show when and where the fire wind changed
The adjacent fire (pink area) was the Murrindindi Fire which was started by arson (deemed “suspicious” by the Royal Commission)
(Source: VBRC Final Report Vol. 1, Chapter 5, p.71)
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Of the 173 reported human deaths of the 2009 Victorian Bushfires, 119 (most) were as a consequence of the Kilmore East Fire, which had initially been ignited by a powerpole electrical failure. Another 232 casualties were reported and some 1,242 houses were destroyed by the Kilmore East Fire.
Ultimately, the Victorian Government here is accountable for its delegated arrangements to provide essential services such as electricity supply to the people of Victoria. That Victorian Government under Premier John Brumby and its various prior policies under different political persuasions, chose to outsource electricity provision to a private operator, no less diminishes the Victorian Government’s fuduciary duty for that supply and all its component standards including reliability and least of all, safety. Morally and legally in Australia, no government can outsource its fiduciary duty and then wipe its hands of that fiduciary duty. Both then Victorian Premier Brumby and then Prime Minister Rudd must fall on their swords.
The Kilmore East Fire ignited at midday on 7th February 2009 from electrical arcing at the top of a rocky hill between two gullies near Saunders Road in Kilmore East. A Single Wire Earth Return (SWER) electricity line (the conductor) ran across the gullies. The area where the fire started was undulating pasture interspersed with native vegetation alongside cleared and standing forestry plantations. The conductor formed part of the Pentadeen Spur power line.
The fire started after the conductor between two power poles failed and the live conductor came into contact with a cable stay. This contact caused arcing that ignited vegetation near the base of one of the poles. An electrical fault was recorded at 11:45am. The conductor failed as a result of fatigue on the conductor strands very close to where a helical termination was fitted to the conductor at the pole. The conductor was about 43 years old. A line inspection carried out in February 2008 had failed to identify the incorrectly seated helical fitting.
An ill-designed and jammed helical termination
(Click to enlarge and bloody frame if you want!)
(Source: VBRC, Exhibit 525 – HRL Technology Report – Kilmore East Fire)
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Within two minutes, a fire tower observer at Pretty Sally tower, Peter Coleman, spotted a column of white smoke at 11:47am about 30 to 40 metres high coming from behind a hill in the direction of Saunders Road, Kilmore East. The fire was reported to the CFA two minutes later at 11:49am.
The volunteer Victorian Country Fire Authority (CFA) Clonbinane Brigade fire truck initially responded, but requested additional resources as it was of an uncontrollable size and was spotting ahead of the fire front into bushland. A decision to escalate the bushfire emergency to an Incident Management Team (IMT) was put in place at 4:30pm, some four and a half hours later in unprecedented extreme bushfire risk conditions and just as the now firestorm was impinging upon the communities of Humevale and Kinglake West – over 20km from the ignition.
[Source: 2009 Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission, Final Report, July 2010, Volume 1, Chapter 5.6 The Kilmore East Fire – Conclusions, pp.75-84]
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In relation to those bushfires collectively attributed by the Royal Commission as being caused by ‘electrical failures‘, the Commission’s recommendations were:
Replace ageing powerlines with safer bundled or underground cables
High-risk areas should have all lines replaced within 10 years and inspected within 3 years
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Specifically the Royal Commission’s recommendations were:
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Recommendation # 27:
Progressive replacement of all single-wire earth return power lines in Victoria with aerial bundled cable, underground cabling or other technology that delivers greatly reduced bushfire risk. The replacement program should be completed in the areas of highest bushfire risk within 10 years and should continue in areas of lower bushfire risk as the lines reach the end of their engineering lives the progressive replacement of all 22-kilovolt distribution feeders with aerial bundled cable, underground cabling or other technology that delivers greatly reduced bushfire risk as the feeders reach the end of their engineering lives. Priority should be given to distribution feeders in the areas of highest bushfire risk. .
Recommendation #28:
Electricity distribution businesses to inspect all SWER lines and all 22-kilovolt feeders in areas of high bushfire risk at least every three years.
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Recommendation #29:
Electricity distribution businesses to review and modify their current practices, standards and procedures for the training and auditing of asset inspectors to ensure that registered training organisations provide adequate theoretical and practical training for asset inspectors. .
Recommendation #30:
Electricity distribution businesses adopt measures to reduce the risks posed by ‘hazard trees’ .
Recommendation #31:
Municipal councils include in their municipal fire prevention plans for areas of high bushfire risk provision for the identification of hazard trees and for notifying the responsible entities with a view to having the situation redressed. .
Recommendation #32:
Electricity distribution businesses to disable the reclose function on the automatic circuit reclosers on all SWER lines for the six weeks of greatest risk in every fire season, adjust the reclose function on the automatic circuit reclosers on all 22-kilovolt feeders on all total fire ban days to permit only one reclose attempt before lockout. .
Recommendation #33:
Electricity distribution businesses to fit spreaders to any lines with a history of clashing or the potential to do so fit or retrofit all spans that are more than 300 metres long with vibration dampers as soon as is reasonably practicable. .
Recommendation #34:
The State amend the regulatory framework for electricity safety to strengthen Energy Safe Victoria’s mandate in relation to the prevention and mitigation of electricity-caused bushfires and to require it to fulfill that mandate.
[Source: 2009 Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission, Final Report, July 2010, Volume 1, Summary & Recommendations, pp.29-30]
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The test of faith is do people in regional Victoria feel safer from the risk of bushfire and confident that the subsequent actions by government at all levels are better prepared to mitigate a repeat of 2009?
[This article was initially published by Tigerquoll on CanDoBetter.net on 20090703 under the title ‘Victorian Bushfires: CFA ill-prepared and reliant on obsolete firefighting technologies‘].The charred shell of a $350,000 CFA fire-tanker near Belgrave Heights, Dandenongs Victoria in the aftermath of the 2009 Victorian Bushfires
(Photo: Craig Abraham, The Age, 20090225)
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The above fire tanker was fortunately able to protect three firefighters from an out-of-control bushfire as it burnt over them.
But in 1998, a burn-over incident during a bushfire at Linton, near Ballaarat, tragically killing five CFA volunteers.
A report by ABC journalist, Jane Cowan, 20090701, ‘Bushfire lawyers blast CFA’s Rees‘ states that lawyers assisting Victorian State Premier John Brumby’s Royal Commission into the 2009 Victorian Bushfires have in an interim report concluded that the Victorian Country Fire Authority (CFA) was ill-prepared for what has been labelled by the media as ‘Black Saturday‘ (7th February 2009).
The lawyers have criticised CFA chief fire officer, Russell Rees, as having been “divorced from fundamental aspects of the responsibilities” as chief officer, including the provision of public warnings and the protection of life and assert that Mr Rees “should have made himself aware of predictions forecasting the path of the fires.”
Criticism has also been made about the reliance by the CFA on obsolete fire fighting technologies. Bushfire consultant assisting the Commission, Tony Cutcliffe, has stated “We still have people running these organisations who are predominantly devoted to a firefighting technology that is no longer in vogue let alone being attuned to the needs of behavioural management and leadership.”
What is most disturbing of all is that hereon the CFA looks to continue business as usual.
The CFA says it has full confidence in Mr Rees and expects him to be at the helm again this summer. Mr Cutcliffe has expressed his concerns that:
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‘Whatever changes are made, as it stands now the same management team that presided over the system which failed to cope on Black Saturday will be required to implement the new regime. If the calamity of what happened to Victoria last summer won’t force an overhaul of firefighting in Australia, what will?
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The CFA’s old-school firefighting culture dies hard:
The CFA remains an emergency response organisation almost totally dependent on a disparate weekend volunteer base (not the fault of the volunteers who are effectively unpaid public servants);
The CFA’s bushfire notification system is wholly reliant on public calls to 000;
The CFA’s fire fighting response system is centred around urban fire trucks that cannot access remote ignitions and so must wait until accessible from a roadside, when the fire is by then often out of control.
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Taking fire trucks into the bush to fight fires is deadly as the above photo shows;
The CFA remains a public authority with carte blanche to allow and deliberately cause immense irreversible damage to Victoria’s remaining ecolgical habitat, yet with no ecological expertise in its management or ranks;
The CFA is grossly underfunded by state and federal governments.
Some questions:
Given that unprecedented extreme weather was forecast and known to the CFA, what commensurate planning, preparation and response did the CFA deploy and when?
What improvements in fire fighting practices have been implemented by the CFA since the 1983 Ash Wednesday fires to avoid a repeat?
Where are the statistics showing the fire fighting performance in respect to each reported ignition, namely:
Elapsed time from estimated ignition time to detection time (CFA becoming aware of ignition)?
Elapsed time from detection time and on site response time (CFA arriving at the fire site/front with fire fighting equipment)?
Elapsed time from response time to suppression time (fire extinguished by CFA)?
These are the three core fire fighting performance metrics.
The 2009 Victorian Bushfire Royal Commission is following its terms of reference in assessing the specific facts and specific causes of the fires and logically as expected is starting to lay blame.
What’s the bet many findings are similar to those of previous bushfire investigations?
If the Royal Commission finds that the current system and structure of Victoria’s (read ‘Australia’s’) volunteer firefighting organisation was at fault, then this is a constructive outcome.
Only at such a legal level will change be forced on the system and culture. Previous internal debrief meetings and investigations (e.g. the 2003 Esplin Enquiry) have managed to have lessons from bushfire disasters ignored and fire fighting practices remain relatively unchanged.
If fire fighting is becoming more effective then how can such tragedies be continuing and growing in scale? How much more 20-20 hindsight is needed by the so-called ‘experienced’ fire fighting leadership before we can observe tangible improvements in fire fighting performance?
It’s all same old same old.
Given the dire inadequacies of this organisation, the culture has forced to become one of absolute defeatism – the only way it believes it can deal with bushfires is to slash and burn as much of the natural burnable landscape as possible, so that there is nothing left to burn. It’s as crackbrained as backburning through Belgrave Heights in order to save Belgrave.
Change cannot be brought to the CFA within the CFA. Change must come from Brumby and Rudd.
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(Ed: While Victorian Premier John Brumby has since been dismissed by election, PM Kevin Rudd currently remains as Australia’s Labor Foreign Minister. But Rudd has been discredited by this tragedy due to the grossly substandard emergency response, recovery, rebuilding and lack of proper emergency investment. His tangible disregard for victims deserves him to be sacked. Rudd has set the foundation for bushfire emergency history to repeat itself, all the while those who suffered still suffer; all the while Australia’s native wildlife are pushed by human ecological abuse and negligence closer to extinction, yet in absence of government care and funding. Australia’s Liberal-Labor governments remain immoral ecological extinctionists, comparable in ecological terms to the Cambodian Khmer Rouge).
This article was initially published by Tigerquoll 20090622 on CanDoBetter.net in the aftermath of the devastating Victorian bushfires that climaxed on 7th February 2009:
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Last ditch huddling together in cars didn’t work(Chum Creek)
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The Victorian Premier Brumby’s Royal Commission into the January-February 2009 bushfires is a mere incident review. If Victoria is to be protected from firestorms in future, it should undertake a root cause analysis, including the numerous past investigations into bushfires, with a view to achieving a cultural shift in rural fire fighting methods, resourcing and emergency management and into ecology management, housing approvals in bushfire prone areas, building design in bushfire prone areas, bush arson criminology and into serious resourcing of rural fire management.
A familiar media icon of Victorian television news for over a decade – he and his family, like those around him, had a right to a safe lifestyle in beautiful rural Victoria
(This editor grew up watching Nine News, as part of our family routine for many years, and I remain still personally affected by his awful tragedy).
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Indeed, given the repeated history of bushfires across Australia and the repeated uncontrolled nature of many of these leading to extensive property damage, the loss of thousands of livestock, widespread ecological destruction, the human lives lost and injuries, and the massive costs incurred every year, the scope of the enquiry should be escalated to a national level.
But the Victorian Commission’s terms of reference focuses on the immediate causes and circumstances of the 2009 Victorian Bushfires. It focuses on the immediate management, response and recovery. This is a start, but the real start occurred in 1939 with the shock of Black Friday. It lead to the Stretton Enquiry, but many large and damaging firestorms have occurred since – so the Stretton Enquiry showed that lessons were either ignored or the application of those lessons were ineffective. The Esplin Inquiry of 2003 identified striking parallels between 1939 and 2002-3 bushfires. Now we have the 2009 Bushfires, but each investigation is disconnected from the previous one, almost as if to intentionally ignore history and any prior lessons learnt. Interstate and overseas, many major bushfires and their subsequent investigations have amassed research, insight and lessons. Why limit the investigation to one event?
Victorian Premier’s complicity in under-preparation, and precious nothing’s been done since
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Incident investigation will uncover causes and flaws and will likely make specific recommendations in the hope of preventing similar incidents. But root cause analysis goes beyond identifying the symptoms of a problem. But the Commission has not started with identifying the problem.
Let’s say that that at the core is the problem of preventing ignitions becoming firestorms.
What are the causes of uncontrolled ignitions in the bush?
Where are they typically lit?
How are ignitions detected by fire authorities?
What is the time lapse between ignition and detection?
What is the time lapse between detection and response and eventual suppression?
Which causes and interventions would mitigate the risk of these ignitions developing into uncontrollable firestorms?
Are the ignition detection tools adequate?
Are the communications tools adequate?
Do we have the right tools and trained personnel in the right places to effectively respond?
Is the entire detection, response and suppression system sufficiently integrated to deal with multiple ignitions in extreme conditions across the State at the same time?
How would this be achieved?
What budget would be required to have such resources and technology in place to achieve this standard?
Is the problem indeed too big for Victoria by itself to adequately deal with and so is the problem in fact a national one?
How would a satisfactory solution be achieved without causing other problems like ecological damage and local wildlife extinctions?
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Then implement the recommendations and scientifically monitor their effectiveness. But the Commission is looking at what caused the specific ignitions, what damage the specific bushfires caused and specific responses. It will conclude what specifically should have been done in these specific incidents. It will lead to a blame game that will solve nothing. Subsequent ignitions if not predicted, detected, responded to and suppressed to prevent firestorms, will likely have different circumstances in different locations.
So how will the problem have been solved by this Royal Commission?
How will the Victorian Royal Commission prevent bushfire history repeating itself?
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What a useless fabricated enquiry, another one in the litany of government rural community betrayal!
The Powerful Owl (Ninox strenua) is Australia’s largest owl, yet in Victoria it has become a threatened species due to human destruction of old growth forest habitat; particularly the destruction of hollow-bearing trees used by this owl for nesting, roosting and home for its natural prey – possums. ‘Powerful Owls are adversely affected by the clearfelling of forests and the consequent conversion of those forests into open landscapes, but the species may persist in forests that have been lightly or selectively logged.’
Since European settlement, 65% of Victoria’s forest cover has been cleared (Woodgate & Black 1988). Only 5% of freehold land remains forested. This past permanent loss of habitat has likely led to an overall reduction in owl numbers and fragmentation of the original continuous population into a series of small residual populations, each of which is at risk of becoming locally extinct.
‘It is estimated that hollows suitable for owls do not form, even in the fastest-growing eucalypts, until they are at least 150-200 years of age (Parnaby 1995). Of 21 nest trees observed by McNabb (1996) in southern Victoria, about 50% were senescent and all ranged between 350-500 years of age, based on data collected by Ambrose (1982).
Over much of its range, the lack of suitably large hollows is considered to be a limiting factor to successful breeding and population recruitment. The Powerful Owl is, therefore, vulnerable to land management practices that reduce the availability of these tree hollows now or in the future. The loss of hollow-bearing trees has been listed as a potentially threatening process under the Flora and Fauna Guarantee Act (SAC 1991).
In addition, prey density may be an important determinant in territory size and breeding success, particularly considering that only the male hunts during the breeding season. Seebeck (1976) estimated that about 250 possums (or their equivalent) would be required per year by a family group and recent studies have estimated around 300 prey items for a breeding pair rearing two young (Webster unpubl. data.). Key prey are also dependent on hollow trees.’
In its final recommendation the Scientific Advisory Committee (SAC 1994) has determined that:
‘the Powerful Owl is significantly prone to future threats which are likely to result in extinction, and very rare in terms of abundance or distribution.’
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The short-term conservation objective is to prevent further decline by ensuring that good quality habitat for at least a population target of 500 breeding pairs of Powerful Owl is maintained on public land in Victoria.
‘Impact of Bushfire on Sooty Owls and Powerful Owls’
[Source: Rohan Bilney, Report on Sooty Owls and Powerful Owls for the Supreme Court proceeding number 8547 of 2009 – Environment East Gippsland v VicForests, pp.12-13]
Greater Sooty Owl(Tyto tenebricosa)
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‘Fire is likely to kill individual owls and small mammals, and remove potential habitat in the short-term, potentially resulting in long-term impacts.
‘How owl populations adapt or respond to fire is largely unknown’
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‘Fire can consume hollow-bearing trees, while also stimulating hollow formation, but as hollow formation can take decades, frequent fires are likely to result in a net loss of hollow-bearing trees from the landscape (Gibbons and Lindenmayer 2002). This is likely to cause detrimental effects to all hollow-dependant fauna (Catling 1991; Gibbons and Lindenmayer 2002; Garnett et al. 2003).
‘Sooty Owls typically occupy habitats subject to infrequent fire regimes such as wetter forest types, possibly due to higher densities of hollow-bearing trees in such landscapes. Frequent fire regimes also simplify habitat structure, which can cause deleterious impacts on terrestrial mammals (Catling 1991; SAC 2001), which includes increased predation rates by feral predators due to the loss of habitat refuge (Wilson and Friend 1999). Overall, it therefore seems likely that owls and small mammals will be negatively impacted by frequent fire regimes. It is likely, however, that it will be the impacts of fire on prey densities that dictate how the owls respond to fire.
Brown Mountain ancient old growth logged, incinerated, razed by VicForests
(Photo by Environment East Gippsland)
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‘Most species are not adapted to fire per se, but adapted to a particular fire regime, which include fire aspects such as intensity, frequency, seasonality and scale (Bradstock et al. 2002). Due to variations in the life history requirements of species and their ability to survive fire, particular fire regimes can advantage some species, while being deleterious to others (Bradstock et al. 2002; Gill and Catling 2002; Keith et al. 2002). Due to the varying ecological responses to fire, it is important for biodiversity conservation that we not only understand species responses to particular fire regimes, but to ensure that appropriate fire regimes are maintained across the landscape. As prescribed fire is used as a management tool for reducing fuel load to minimise fire risk, it is important that its effects on biodiversity are well understood.
‘Unfortunately, knowledge on how native species respond to particular fire regimes is poorly understood, especially for fauna (SAC 2001, 2003; Clarke 2008). So, in the absence of this crucial ecological information it is virtually impossible to implement appropriate fire regimes which will result in minimal negative ecological impacts, let alone enhance biodiversity. Fire, both prescribed burning and wildfire, can present a threat to owls if conducted at inappropriate seasons, frequency, intensity or scales. It is therefore difficult to quantify the threat. The threat of inappropriate burning at high fire frequencies is likely to be mainly concentrated around human assets and populations, while fires in more remote forested areas will be subject to less frequent fires (DSE 2004). Fire also affects the entire owl population because all habitats occupied by owls is flammable.
‘Victoria has experienced three catastrophic fire events in the past 7 years, and combined with prescribed burning, approximately three million hectares have been burnt in this time.‘
‘This equates to approximately 2/3 of potential Sooty Owl habitat in Victoria. How populations of Sooty Owls and many other forest dependant fauna have been affected by these fires remains poorly understood or unknown. The ability for forest fauna to recover is therefore being hampered by further prescribed burning, and recovery is also hampered by reduced fecundity caused by a decade of drought, and for the owls, low prey population densities.’
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The ‘Bushfire Fighting Principle’ corrupted by blinkered economic rationalism
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The traditional principle of bushfire management is to put out bushfires…one would think. Yet this simple concept has been hijacked, bastardised and corrupted by successive governments as a consequence of systemic under-resourcing. Government under-resourcing has contributed to the deadly human toll in recent years.
The corrupting of this core bushfire management principle has morphed into a blanket one-size-fits-all defeatist policy of broadscale prescribed burning – burning the bush before it burns. The bushfire management tradition of ‘suppression‘ has been economically rationalised and politically supplanted by the proactively sounding notion of ‘prevention‘.
In Victoria, the fundamental job of putting out bushfires has bureaucratically morphed into a ‘Code of Practice for Fire Management on Public Land’, with its two general principles…
.Fire management planning on public land must address the threat of wildfire, guide the use of prescribed burning, and provide for the achievement of integrated land management objectives such as human safety and environmental management.’ (Clause 50)
‘Fire management activities must be undertaken in a participative manner where the responsibility for reducing the likelihood and consequence of wildfire is appropriately shared between public and private land holders and managers.’ (Clause 51)
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What happened to the fundamental principle of bush fire fighting?
To put out bushfires!
Instead, vast areas of remaining native bushland and forests across Australia are being deliberately burnt to the point where critical faunal habitat is sterilised – only the trees remain, while the rich underlying vegetation, demonised as ‘hazardous fuel‘ is incinerated and repeatedly prevented from regrowth. Wildlife habitat has become a fuel hazard targeted for burning by the very custodians charged with wildlife conservation. And out of the Victorian Royal Commission into the Black Saturday bushfires, the anticipated kneejerk response by bushfire agencies to commence Prescribed Burning Armageddon against the bush has started as many genuine conservationists have feared.
And what has been the full realised cost of the 2009 Victorian Bushfires – valuing human lives, human injuries, ongoing trauma, livelihoods, wildlives, livestock, private property, natural assets, on top of the direct operational response cost, the indirect costs of contribiting agencies, the donations raised, capital costs, the opportunity costs, the investigation costs, the Royal Commission costs? No one has come up with a figure. These values were outside the Victorian Royal Commission’s terms of reference – so what real value was it? Economic rationalising of emergency management is costing lives and contributing to species extinctions.
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Victorian Government Policy of Bushfire Lighting
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The Victorian Government’s delegated custodian on natural areas across the State is the infamous Department of Sustainability and Environment (DSE), with a reputation for lighting most of the bushfires it euphemistically labels as ‘prescribed burning’ wherein it finds unburnt bushland and prescribes its own burning regimes. When such custodial agencies restore the word ‘conservation‘ back into their title, some respect may return.
DSE’s ‘Code of Practice for Fire Management on Public Land‘ was revised in 2006. It relies upon background premises that since “much of the Australian continent is fire-prone”, that “fire occurs naturally”, that “many species of vegetation and wildlife have adapted to living within the natural fire regime” and that “Victoria’s Indigenous people used fire as a land management tool for thousands of years”. The Code justifies that “Victoria’s flora, fauna and the ecosystems they form are adapted to fire of varying frequencies, intensities and seasonality.” Victoria’s Flora and Fauna Guarantee Act 1988 has objectives to ensure “Victoria’s native flora and fauna can survive, flourish, and retain their potential for evolutionary development”. Now the integrity of this Act is under threat. Perversely DSE’s Code of Practice argues that deliberate burning of bushland and forest habitat will help Victoria’s native flora and fauna to survive, flourish, and retain their potential for evolutionary development.
Crap!
DSE stretches its rationalising propaganda further, claiming that excluding bushfire can have “negative consequences for Victoria’s flora and fauna“. And this is where the hijacking, bastardisation and corrupting turns from mythology into unsubstantiated falsehood and misinformation. No document exists to zoologically prove that native fauna will suffer such negative consequences if it does not have a bushfire range through its habitat. As a result, the Code of Practice implies that bushfire is ok for all Victorian bushland and forests – DSE conveniently convinces itself that the urgent moral imperative for DSE to suppress bushfires is extinguished. So now it lights more fires than it puts out.
The Code also premises that “often these wildfires can be difficult to suppress”. Well no wonder with an grossly under-resourced, firetruck-centric volunteer force.
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‘DSE holds fire management workshop in Bendigo’
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On 22nd June 2011, DSE staged a workshop of stakeholders to discuss some recommendations of the Royal Commission into Victoria’s February 20o9 bushfire tragedy. According to the website ‘Friends of Box-Ironbark Forests’, in attendance were representatives from the CFA, local government, The Wilderness Society, Bendigo Field Naturalists Club, Friends of Kalimna Park, North Central Victoria Combined Environment Groups [NCVCEG], Apiarists Association and DSE attended a workshop on June 10 to learn about the process for implementing the findings of the Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission. Though Friends of Box-Ironbark Forests (FOBIF) was not invited to this workshop, we were represented by members of some of the other groups.
Once again DSE’s Code of Practice for Fire Management on Public Land (COP) is to again be reviewed and updated, except its premises have not changed, so what’s the point? The following notes taken on the issue of Fire management Zones/Prescriptions is telling of how disconnected DSE is from wildlife habitat conservation:
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‘Fire Management Zones (FMZ) have been reviewed recently. An interim zoning is to be released soon. With little time left the group briefly discussed the merits of fire management zones, and how they might relate to the risk model. It was highlighted that the residual fuel load is an important aspect, but further detail as to how was not provided.
NCVCEG made the point that the current diagram used by DSE to represent the relationship between ecological outcomes and fire management outcomes across the four FMZ is misleading, encourages poor planning, discourages biodiversity management in zones 1 and 2, and neglects to recognise that fire management outcomes may be achieved in all zones, especially where integrated planning and alternative practices (to prescribed burning) are established.
In relation to FMZ the Apiarists pointed out that Box Ironbark forests generally have very low fuel levels in comparison to heavily forested regions where many lives were lost during the fires in 2009. The merit of burning areas used for honey production was questioned and the long term impacts of severe burning on Box Ironbark forest ecology was raised.’
Yet at the same time DSE points out that… ‘biodiversity is in decline‘
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In its ‘Victoria’s Biodiversity Strategy 2010–2015: Consultation Draft‘ DSE reminds us that two hundred years of (immigrant deforestation), severe droughts, major bushfires and the impact of climate change, has severely affected Victoria’s species and ecosystems. DSE professes:
Victoria is the most cleared and densely populated state in Australia. Victoria has the highest proportion (48%) of sub-bioregions in Australia in poor condition, with four out of Australia’s five most cleared bioregions found in western Victoria (CES 2008).
Approximately half of Victoria’s native vegetation has been cleared for agricultural and urban development, including 80% of the original cover on private land. Victoria is losing native vegetation at a rate of some 4,000 hectares per year, mostly from endangered grasslands (DSE 2008).
Victorian landscapes are the most stressed in the country (NLWRA 2001). One third of Victoria’s major streams are in poor or very poor condition. Two thirds of wetlands have been either lost or degraded and nearly half of our major estuaries are significantly modified. Flows at the Murray mouth are estimated to be a quarter of what would naturally occur (VCMC 2007).
44% of our native plants and more than 30% of our animals are either extinct or threatened (CSIRO 2004). The highest number of threatened species in any one region in Australia occurs in north western Victoria.
Exotic species represent about 30% of the Victorian flora with 1,282 species considered naturalised and a further 214 species considered incipiently naturalised in Victoria. This has increased from 878 naturalised species in 1984. It is estimated that an average of 7.3 new plant species establish in Victoria per year, and this number is increasing by a rate of 0.25 plants per year. Approximately 90% of the native vegetation in Melbourne is impacted by weeds, with more than 50% considered severely degraded. There are 584 serious or potentially serious environmental weeds in Victoria with 129 very serious (CES 2008).
Over 100 marine species have been introduced to Port Phillip Bay.’
The Victorian landscape has undergone massive changes in the past 150 years. As a consequence of environmental degredation and destruction of indigenous flora and fauna:
Over 60% of the state has been cleared, and much of what is left is seriously degraded by weed invasion;
Of the two thirds of the state which is privately owned, only 5% retains its natural cover;
Soil erosion and salination have become serious problems;
Over 35% of our wetlands have been drained;
Close to 80% of rivers and wetlands have been substantially modified;
Almost all native grasslands have been eliminated or modified;
Many other vegetation communities are almost extinct, or critically endangered;
Over 900 exotic plant species have been established in Victoria, many of which are weeds, and scores of noxious exotic animal species are now widespread;
23 native mammal species have become extinct in Victoria.
DSE acknowledges that the ‘clearing of native vegetation (across Victoria) and habitat has also led to the loss or decline in wildlife species. Habitat fragmentation has meant that wildlife are more at risk from predators, harsh environmental conditions, and human influences (e.g. roads) as they move between remnant patches. Isolated patches support fewer and lower densities of wildlife, increasing the chances of population extinction in individual patches as a result of the impacts of chance events upon genetically simplified populations. Habitat loss and degradation also increases the susceptibility of wildlife to severe environmental conditions, such as fire and drought, and broader processes, such as climate change and changing rainfall patterns.’
DSE acknowledges that ‘while maintaining or restoring ecosystem function will help to reduce the rate at which species decline, we already have a legacy of species that are at risk due to past ecological disruption, and a latent ‘extinction debt’. Victoria’s past land management actions have resulted in the loss of species and created and ongoing risk of future losses. Many existing threatened species occur in remnant or fragmented landscapes where the work required to recover them is intensive, expensive and long-term. In extreme cases it is necessary to remove part of the remnant population to captivity until critical threats have been mitigated.
DSE acknowledges that ‘effective threatened species recovery requires:
Effectively dealing with threats to reduce the rate at which species become threatened;
Conducting recovery efforts in situ by managing the processes that degrade their habitat or directly threaten them, including, where required, support from ex situ conservation programs;
The best available knowledge and an adaptive management approach, including adoption of the precautionary principle when required;
Co-operative approaches to recovery, with an effective and efficient mix of incentives and regulations; and
Planning and regulatory frameworks to provide clear and consistent policy, process and outcomes.’
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Yet in the same breath DSE goes on to reinforce its ‘fire is good for wildlife‘ propaganda – ‘a substantial proportion of Australia’s unique biota is dependent, to varying degrees, on fire and the variety of fire regimes for its continued existence and development.‘
[Source: DSE’s ‘Code of Practice for Fire Management on Public Land‘, Clause 2.3.8 ‘Challenges relating to fire management’]
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‘Fuel reduction burns threaten species’ – or Black Saturday incompetence an excuse for broadscale State Arson
‘Conservationists are concerned that fuel reduction burns in East Gippsland will threaten endangered species and reduce biodiversity.
On March 16, fire managers from the Department of Sustainability and Environment (DSE) ignited a fuel reduction burn in the Dinner Creek catchment of Waygara state forest, approximately 14 km West of Orbost. The fire quickly gained intensity, aided by a temperature of 30 degrees Celsius. It burnt most of the environmentally sensitive vegetation within the fire zone along four kilometres of the Dinner Creek.
DSE Fire Manager for the Orbost Region, Steve de Voogd, said that the Dinner Creek fuel reduction burn grew hotter than intended. The fire was meant to burn 2206 hectare of coastal forest and leave a mosaic of burnt and un-burnt areas within the fire’s containment lines.
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According to Mr de Voogd, the DSE is now under community pressure to reduce the risk of wildfire through fuel reduction burning, and that must take precedent over ecological considerations.
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“Although there is probably room for more fire ecology planning, it is incumbent on the DSE to take action because the consequences of doing nothing may be worse,” Mr de Voogd said.
Most of the hollow bearing trees in the burn zone, which were home to a number of endangered species protected under state and federal law, were destroyed.
Dr Rohan Bilney, an expert on Australian forest owls and spokesperson for the Gippsland Environment Group, said that the program intended to burn large areas of coastal forest without adequate ecological planning, monitoring or research, which threatened crucial habitat and food sources for the forest’s owls species.
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“The coastal forests of East Gippsland are the strong hold of the Masked Owl, a species listed as threatened under two laws: the Victorian Flora and Fauna Guarantee Act and the Federal Environmental Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act. Most of East Gippsland’s Masked Owls live in the coastal forests now being subjected to intense broad area fuel reduction burns by the DSE,” said Dr Bilney.
Masked Owl (Tyto novaehollandiae)
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The Masked Owl Action Statement, prepared under the Victorian Flora and Fauna Guarantee Act, estimates only 150 pairs of Masked Owl exist in Victoria. Of that total, 100 pairs are found in East Gippsland and most are concentrated in the coastal forest.
DSE Manager of Biodiversity in East Gippsland, Dr Steve Henry, said that the current DSE fuel reduction fire strategy allows for large fires but burning on such a scale leaves few options for the protection of important ecological values.
“If there are some areas that contain specific environmental attributes that we want to protect, we could exclude them from fire with a bulldozer line. However that is expensive and often very destructive on most of these large burns. The main management technique used is the way in which the lighting pattern of the fire is done, sometimes that is not as effective as we would hope,” he said.
Mr Henry said that funding constraints have not permitted the DSE to conduct detailed ecological studies of the coastal forests, including the effect of fire on the environment.
A post-fire ecological survey is currently being conducted by the DSE in selected fuel reduction areas.
The Dinner Creek fire was just one of 48 fuel reduction burns planned by the DSE for the region during 2009-2010. Like other fuel reduction burns, the DSE must comply with the Victorian Code of Practice for Fire Management on Public Land.
The primary objective of the Code is to protect of life and property, while minimising negative impacts on natural and cultural values, and abiding by threatened species legislation, are also included.
The Code of Practice also states that the DSE must prepare a Fire Ecology Strategy that includes input from ecological experts and full consideration of all available scientific research.
If little ecological research exists, fuel reduction burning can be conducted under the rational that it may reduce the future risk of wildfire.
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In the absence of scientific data, the DSE will continue to plan fuel reduction burns from computer desktops, utilising the ad hoc data collected as part of the Environmental Vegetation Class mapping projects of the late 1990s.
While political pressure continues to increase, the DSE fire policy will remain focused on protecting the community against the spectre of Black Saturday.’
Burn it in case it burns, because we don’t have the resources for wildfire suppression
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‘Climate change, fires and logging -the deadly combination for Victoria’s species’
‘Two hundred years ago the Sooty owl was abundant and fed on about 18 species of ground prey in Gippsland. Today they have only two or three to chose from. Other species are under similar pressure.
Many of our native animals have become sparser in numbers and their range has shrunk. Some, like the Southern Brown Bandicoot (Federally listed but not State listed), are now isolated in small “island” populations which are dangerously close to extinction mainly due to threats of fire and predation. Fires destroy understorey cover, making it easy for foxes and dogs to wipe out small populations of ground dwelling animals.
The 2003 fires and the recent December ’06 fires have destroyed the habitat and ground cover over about 2 million hectares of Victoria’s forested country. This has had a horrifying impact on ground mammals, birds and hollow dependent species.
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Scientist and Quoll expert, Dr Chris Belcher, has calculated that this species’ Victorian numbers were reduced by 33 – 45% as a result of the ’03 fires. The December ’06 fires would have reduced this again to even more precarious numbers.
The isolated colony of Long Footed Potoroos discovered around Wonangatta (or Wongongara?) will most likely have been killed as a result of the recent fires.
The Helmeted Honeyeaters had five small and isolated populations left but the 1983 fires wiped out four of them. Yellingbo is still likely to burn and our faunal emblem will be extinct on this planet.
Bandicoots are very fire sensitive. There are small and vulnerable populations scattered in Gippsland. In 1994, fires burnt 97% of the Royal National Park and Bandicoots no longer survive in this area. The safety of thick ground cover does not return for years, meaning foxes and dogs heavily predate any survivors.
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East Gippsland is the last stronghold for many of our rare and endangered fauna. It is a wetter environment and has much higher floristic diversity and therefore animals.
Climate change will now make fires more frequent and intense in SE Australia (CSIRO). Governments must adapt management of natural areas to account for this reality as it is for agriculture, water and energy.
The greatest pressure on Eastern Victorian species has been in the Critical Weight Range from 35 gms to 5 kg. Many ground dwelling animals are extremely susceptible to fire. Potoroos, Quolls, Bandicoots, native rodents (the rare New Holland Mouse, Smokey Mouse etc).
The predation rate after a fire is huge and patches of unburnt forest within the fire zones are absolutely essential to help populations survive predation, recover and disperse in time. These areas are critical to protect from further disturbance.
The recovery of species after a fire is now very different from 200 yrs ago. Populations are more isolated, salvage logging further destroys their chances, there is less diversity of prey species for the higher order predators like owls and quolls to turn to if gliders and possums are impacted by fires (or logging the hollow-rich forests).
Logging ecologically diverse forests favours the return of biologically poor tree communities such as silvertop and stringybark. The forests with mixed gum and box throughout can have 20-50 times higher animal densities. Significant vegetation changes due to massive landscape disturbance such as clearfelling, makes endangered species recovery from fire even more unlikely.
In the 1990s, East Gippsland supported seven times more threatened species than other areas in Victoria. This made the region seven times more important for our endangered species’ survival. Since the fires of 03 and 06, it is not unreasonable to suggest that East Gippsland is the last refuge and last chance for these species to survive extinction. Extinction can happen very quickly.
Species which are fairly general in their roosting, nesting and feeding needs can often survive (as they have in other areas of the state) but the many specialist species which rely on large areas of diverse and thick forest are highly likely to vanish forever.
This is why the hasty and unscientifically mapped areas of newly reserved forest require careful refinements. The needs of the state’s threatened species must be made the priority. Independent biologists and on-ground local knowledge (not VicForests) must be used to finalise the new reserve boundaries, with the long-term impact of the recent fires as a major guiding factor.
The Bracks Government suggested there be no net loss of resource as an adjunct to the mapped reserve areas. This is an impossible and irrational qualification as fires can take out large percent of the forest and therefore wood resources in one season. Commercial use of forest should be allocated only after biologically essential considerations have been adequately addressed.
Another point made in pre-election promises was to make sure the new areas are mapped and industry changes are resourced so as to adhere to the terms and spirit of the RFA. This then should see the government honour its long overdue commitment to carry out research into the impact of clearfelling on threatened species, to identify sustainability indicators, carry out five yearly reviews and ensure threatened species are protected. None have been honoured in the last 10 years!
The recent court ruling regarding the EPBC Act should also give the state government substantial opportunity to begin to alter protection measures for Federally listed species in East Gippsland.
The conscience of this government cannot put the very limited future of several sawmills ahead of a large number of entire species. Continued logging of intact original forests must not be the overriding priority. The ability for species to cope with the escalating impacts of climate change and fires from 2007 onwards has to now be put ahead of politics and union threats. These species survived well in Australia for over 40,000 years. The clearfell logging industry has been around for less than 40 years. Political priorities have an even shorter lifespan.’
Ash Wednesday Bushfires in 1983 – approaching Anglesea on Victoria’s Great Ocean Road, Australia
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This article was initially published by Tigerquoll 20090622 on CanDoBetter.net in the aftermath of the devastating Victorian bushfires that climaxed on 7th February 2009, quickly branded by the media as ‘Black Saturday‘:
Ultimate responsibility at the time – Victorian Premier Brumby and Australian Prime Minister Rudd
(and tomorrow is Armistice Day when nearly a hundred years ago people questioned…
‘Ultimate Responsibility‘)
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The Victorian Premier Brumby’s Royal Commission into the January-February 2009 bushfires is a mere incident review. If Victoria is to be protected from firestorms in future, it should undertake a root cause analysis, including the numerous past investigations into bushfires, with a view to achieving a cultural shift in rural fire fighting methods, resourcing and emergency management and into ecology management, housing approvals in bushfire prone areas, building design in bushfire prone areas, bush arson criminology and into serious resourcing of rural fire management.
Indeed, given the repeated history of bushfires across Australia and the repeated uncontrolled nature of many of these leading to extensive property damage, the loss of thousands of livestock, widespread ecological destruction, the human lives lost and injuries, and the massive costs incurred every year, the scope of the enquiry should be escalated to a national level.
But the Victorian Commission’s terms of reference focuses on the immediate causes and circumstances of the 2009 Victorian Bushfires. It focuses on the immediate management, response and recovery. This is a start, but the real start occurred in 1939 with the shock of Black Friday. It lead to the Stretton Enquiry, but many large and damaging firestorms have occurred since – so the Stretton Enquiry showed that lessons were either ignored or the application of those lessons were ineffective. The Esplin Inquiry of 2003 identified striking parallels between 1939 and 2002-3 bushfires. Now we have the 2009 Bushfires, but each investigation is disconnected from the previous one, almost as if to intentionally ignore history and any prior lessons learnt. Interstate and overseas, many major bushfires and their subsequent investigations have amassed research, insight and lessons. Why limit the investigation to one event?
Incident investigation will uncover causes and flaws and will likely make specific recommendations in the hope of preventing similar incidents. But root cause analysis goes beyond identifying the symptoms of a problem. But the Commission has not started with identifying the problem.
Let’s premise that at the core is the problem of preventing ignitions becoming firestorms.
What are the causes of uncontrolled ignitions in the bush.
Where are they typically lit?
How are ignitions detected by fire authorities?
What is the time lapse between ignition and detection?
What is the time lapse between detection and response and eventual suppression?
Which causes and interventions would mitigate the risk of these ignitions developing into uncontrollable firestorms?
Are the ignition detection tools adequate?
Are the communications tools adequate?
Do we have the right tools and trained personnel in the right places to effectively respond?
Is the entire detection, response and suppression system sufficiently integrated to deal with multiple ignitions in extreme conditions across the State at the same time? How would this be achieved?
What budget would be required to have such resources and technology in place to achieve this standard?
Is the problem indeed too big for Victoria by itself to adequately deal with and so is the problem in fact a national one?
How would a satisfactory solution be achieved without causing other problems like ecological damage and local wildlife extinctions?
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Then implement the recommendations and scientifically monitor their effectiveness.
However, the Commission is looking at what caused the specific ignitions, what damage the specific bushfires caused and specific responses. It will conclude what specifically should have been done in these specific incidents. It will lead to a blame game that will solve nothing. Subsequent ignitions if not predicted, detected, responded to and suppressed to prevent firestorms, will likely have different circumstances in different locations. So how will the problem have been solved by this royal commission?
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What about the affected people up in the Bush?
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Horror, shock, helplessness, anger, loss – loved ones, family, next door neighbours, familiar faces gone. Then there’s financial loss, bank issues – sympathy first but then demands, threats and ambivalence. This is whole livelihoods. It is devastation. The initial trauma (community and personal), plus the ongoing trauma (community and personal).
Governments do the obligatory media spin, but as months pass they move on to other priorities. But the people don’t – whether they end up staying or going, the trauma stays.
This was absolutely catastrophic! Catastrophic! No-one can prepare or recover as easy as Government claims. What is ‘moving on’?
This is War Reparations league! A war hit here and ordinary people were simply living their ordinary lives in the bush. Another token bushfire enquiry without bushfire reform is repugnant, ignorant and callous. How will the Victorian Royal Commission prevent bushfire history repeating itself?
If our society could cope before, we may accept fate. But knowing the extreme risk in February 2009 and now, fate is no excuse. It is wrong for government to pursue bushfire management nonchalant business-as-usual in Victoria… in Australia.
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Footnote
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My uncle and aunt lost their family home down at Angelsea during the 1983 Ash Wednesday bushfires. They weren’t insured. Though they escaped with their lives, they lost everything else. Thereon they were never really quite the same. They became refugees in their home community.
Anglesea Dreaming – a recollection of one’s youth and holidays
This article was initially published by Tigerquoll 20090620 on CanDoBetter.net in the aftermath of the devastating Victorian bushfires that climaxed on 7th February 2009, quickly branded by the media as ‘Black Saturday‘:
.Children’s play equipment sits in front of a house destroyed by bushfire in Chum Creek North Healesville, Victoria, Australia
[Photo: ABC]
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Pursuing the ‘bunker solution‘ is a dead end that no government will underwrite – think of the risk of failure!
What has been avoided in this Victorian bushfire debate are the fire fighting statistics. Where are the fire fighting operational metrics showing the time between ignition and detection and response and suppression?
Is anyone considering the fundamental task of effective bush fire fighting as a key cause of this disaster? The operational metrics, if indeed collated, would be alarming to the general public. The unprecedented extreme risk of uncontrollable wildfires was known to fire fighting operations management, yet no extraordinary resources were deployed in advance. Hours, not minutes, lapsed between ignitions, detection and responses. As a consequence, suppressions via a tired old truck-centric response methodology was demonstrably grossly inadequate. CFA responses were absolute failures in the tactical response to the February 2009 Victorian Bushfires. The whole show descended into an incompetent stuff up which resorted to the worst case scenario – ‘every man for himself’.
Only vigilante fire response had a chance of working. Acceptable may be in 1909, but not in a sophisticated 2009 supported by millions in annual funding and research. The response at strategic management level was ‘Keystone Kops‘. The field response was like a tragic Gallipoli – a strategic blunder with good men sent in with too little, too late.
The Marysville community like others didn’t deserve official response approach of ‘too hard basket’ and abandonment. The result was incineration entrapment.
This is the lesson of the incompetence of the CFA, DSE and Emergency Management Australia. An ignition started in the bush is not an uncontrollable tsunami. But in conditions like that in January 2009 in Victoria, an ignition and more so multiple ignitions become equivalent to a tsunami if conditions, delay and inadequate resources are a combined factors.
The systemic failure to deal with ‘before-the-fact’ (ignition) causes is just as vital in being effective at bush fire fighting. I am not talking about slashing and burning the Aussie bush like an ‘Agent Orange’ sortie over Vietnam to eliminate all threat and wildlife habitat. I am talking about grossly negligent housing approvals in extreme bushfire areas, about grossly negligent property owners building houses out of flammable materials and doing squat about bushfire preparedness, about governments at all levels that fail to prepare bushfire prone populations and that fail to effectively communicate emergency drills to protect their lives, and that fail to provide sufficient resources to stop bushfires killing people.
Police are only this week interviewing residents around Bendigo to try to identify the suspected arsonist of that fire – five months later as a one-off investigation. Why did Brumby wait 5 months to investigate? I wager the arsonist involved could have been detected well in advance had a co-ordinated permanent bush arson squad been established long ago complete with specialist criminologists, psychologists, experienced bush fire investigators, criminal investigators, etc and enough resources to allow them to do their job.
I have no time for political band-aids or government responses that invariably involve millions that do not address the root causes of the problem. The bush itself, as habitat to millions of Australian animals must first be respected as the mutual innocent victim. Bushphobic responses by fanatics calling for scorched earth blanket responses will only fuel greater ecological catastrophe.
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‘With firefighters on high alert in Victoria, some people in bushfire risk zones have decided to install fire bunkers on their properties. But there are no regulations controlling the structures and there are concerns some of the fire shelters could be death traps.
Garrie Ferguson, who lives in the bushfire-prone Adelaide Hills, has started selling reinforced concrete water tanks as bushfire bunkers.
“If at the end of your street you only have one way in, one way out, you either run the fire in your car and risk getting killed, you either go back to your house and risk burning in there,” he said. “Or risk the chance of hopping in underground to something that’s very well protected and try and outride it in there.”
For under $3,000 Mr Ferguson can install a concrete tank that fits six people and comes with metres of underground piping that holds reserve air. He has sold 14 bunkers in the past two weeks.
“I do actually have a member of the metropolitan fire service that has bought one as well,” he said.
But Mr Ferguson cannot guarantee that people will be safe. “I can’t guarantee anything at all. Somebody might put 12 people in it, use the oxygen supply and die,” he said.
Another option that some people are turning to, is to install a shipping container into the side of a hill.
Robert Caulfield from the Australian Institute of Architects warns against the temperatures that can be generated inside the containers and the possibility of running out of oxygen.
“It’s quite possible we could end up with fireproof shelters with people absolutely cooked inside it or get suffocated,” he said. Mr Caulfield says during the bushfires three weeks ago shelters with steel roofs and similar features became glowing hot.
“It really needs a rigorous test on these sorts of things because once you get something generating that sort of heat it will also actually set up convection currents inside it, it can start fires inside the unit and so forth,” he said.
The institute is now calling for an urgent review and testing of the products being sold as fire bunkers.’
‘In its second interim report the Commission expressed its concern about the lack of regulation for bunkers, the risks of misplaced reliance on bunkers, the demand for bunkers, and the widespread availability of bunker products. It tackled the clear and pressing need for a minimum standard to regulate the design, siting and construction of bunkers by recommending that the Australian Building Codes Board (ABCB) develop a standard as a matter of priority.
The Commission also made recommendations designed to ensure that, in Victoria and nationally, bunkers are regulated under building legislation and the standard developed by the ABCB is referenced as the minimum standard for construction of bunkers.
On 30 April 2010 the ABCB released a performance standard for private bushfire shelters; the standard is available free on the ABCB website. The ABCB advised the Commission that the 2011 edition of the Building Code of Australia will include bunkers and will reference the standard. In the meantime, the Commonwealth and the ABCB will continue to encourage all jurisdictions to adopt the bunker standard by means of interim regulations. On 28 May 2010 the Victorian Government adopted the standard through an amendment to the Building Regulations. The Commission commends this swift action to finalise and adopt the standard.’
‘The bushfires Royal Commission will make early recommendations for building standards as Victorians rush to install bunkers and rebuild their homes in high- risk areas. Commission chairman Bernard Teague has just announced the commission will not wait until the release of its final report next year to make the recommendations.
Commissioner Teague said evidence in relation to building standards indicated changes needed to be made before the next bushfire season. He said recommendations would focus on the regulation of bushfire bunkers, changes to the new building standard and a revision of the Standards Australia handbook. Further hearings will be held on Friday, October 30 and recommendations are expected to be released before the end of the year. Last month the commission heard bushfire survivors rebuilding homes in ravaged areas were making risky decisions as officials wrangled over the best building standards.’
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Comment by ‘Les’ 20090926:
‘As a base standard the existing bunkers or dug outs at Surrey Rd, Powelltown, or the intersection of Warburton to Woodspoint Rd and Rd 7 Upper Yarra, or on top of Mount Ritchie off Rd 10 in the O’Shannasy, should be looked at (being) maintained! As to the base level add 10% to February 7th, and budget to maintain them, problems occur when Government Agencies start cutting maintenance costs because nothing has eventuated for 5 years.’
Once again in the lead up to Christmas in Australia, State governments and their media PR cohorts remind us of “extreme temperatures”, “low humidity”, “forecast high winds”, “declared total fire bans” and even “catastrophic bushfire conditions”.
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So what’s new? – hot Australian Summers are not really newsworthy.
Perhaps to create news, readers were again stirred with the fear and dread of bushfire risk and reminded of previous Summer bushfire catastrophes – “State Warned of heatwave and black Christmas” (Sydney’s Daily Telegraph page 1 headline, 23-12-05].
But media talking up bushfire risk must surely stir dormant bush arsonists, as if overtly tempting drugs to addicts?
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Take the following newspaper quotes of recent days (SMH, AAP, Telegraph):
“It will be a bad fire day with the wind hitting late afternoon in Sydney and moving up to Port Macquarie with a bang on Saturday night.”
“The worst is yet to come”
“Essentially, now any fires that might start would be very very hard to bring under control.”
“Authorities fear scorching temperatures.. will fuel further fires.”
“The weather is providing perfect firestorm conditions.”
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…like a red rag to a bull.
Then sure enough, starting from Christmas Eve (with no reported lightning) we hear of the spate of bush fires started across NSW, of multiple ignitions forming into a fire front near Woy Woy, a suspicious grass fire next to the old Canberra brickworks, and of many other bushfires across NSW and interstate.
Long respected is the media code of ethics not to report suicide deaths because experience has sadly shown that such publicity encourages copy-cats.
Yet invariably each year preceding Christmas, some media stir up this supposedly ‘inevitable’ bushfire threat. Such emotive language risks fuelling serial arsonists, drawing recidivists out of hibernation to prove media forecasts correct.
Arsonists read newspapers. The media are part of the solution – headline the convictions not their crimes.
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[This letter by the editor was first published in the Blue Mountains Gazette 20060118.]
2009 Churchill Fire on Black Saturday – deliberately lit at 1:30pm
2009 Victorian Bushfires – Overview Map
Delburn Bushfire 30th January 2009 from NASA satellite
The 2009 Delburn Bushfire
A CFA firefighter runs out hose on Piggery Road at Boolarra 2nd February 2009.
(Photo by Greg Cahir)
Erickson S-64 Air-Crane Helitanker (N179AC)
2009 Bendigo Fire Map Overview
2009 Churchill Fire Map Overview
The very start of Churchill Bushfire
Photo taken looking south from Hunt Street, Morwell
‘Composition: vertical-panorama of the smoke from the Churchill Fires that have jumped containment lines near me’
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Plantations being incinerated in Churchill Bushfire
[Source: Hancock Watch, ^http://hancockwatch.nfshost.com/docs/09feb.htm]
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Brendan Sokaluk
Not the smartest bush arsonist, but then could he be?
Ignition Points of the 2009 Churchill Bushfire
[Source: ‘Brendan Sokaluk – the boy who played with fire’, by Patrick Carlyon, Herald Sun, 20120321, ^http://www.heraldsun.com.au/news/true-crime-scene/brendan-sokaluk-the-boy-who-played-with-fire/story-fnat7jnn-1226305557238]
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Armageddon aftermath of Sokaluk’s 2009 Churchill Bushfire Arson – he’ll be out in just 14 years
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