Posts Tagged ‘NSW Rural Fire Service’

Blue Mountains hazard reduction same as arson

Monday, September 30th, 2013
Hawkesbury Heights Hazard Reduction 2013Hawkesbury Heights hazard reduction negligence
Well our fire “escaped”.  Sorry, we’re immune from prosecution.
[Photo by our Investigator along Hawkesbury Road, Blue Mountains, Australia, 20130921, photo © under  ^Creative Commons]
 

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Partners in crime:  big ego Blue Mountains National Parks with even bigger ego Blue Mountains RFS, have jointly stuffed up big this time.

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Hawkesbury Heights HR turned WildfireA hazard reduction north of the Hawkesbury Road from the previous weekend was left abandoned. 
A few days later the forecast wind picked up and voila:   HR come wildfire. Woops.
Sound familiar?   Warrumbungles (2013), Macleay River (2012), Grose Valley (2006), Canberra Firestorm (2003)
[Source:  Fairfax, ^http://www.smh.com.au/nsw/hazard-reduction-burn-started-major-sydney-bushfire-20130913-2tois.html]

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Hawkesbury Heights residents will recall last year’s escaped hazard reduction along the Springwood Ridge inside the Blue Mountains National Park.  It was left for few days, then the forecast prevailing sou’wester picked up on 30th August 2012.  The fire jumped containment lines then threatened the Bowen Mountain community to the nor’ east.

<<More than 30 firefighters from the NSW Rural Fire Service and National Parks and Wildlife Service have worked behind homes in the community of Bowen Mountain to contain this fire.  Crews backburned to establish containment lines around the fire with the assistance of helicopters and earth moving machinery.>>

Bowen Mountain Fire 20120830National Park ablaze thanks to government-sanctioned arson
[Source:  Blue Mountains RFS, ^http://www.bluemountains.rfs.nsw.gov.au/dsp_more_info_latest.cfm?CON_ID=18199,  Reference will probably disappear within days of publication.]

How much did that stuff up cost?  This is where donations to the RFS are going.

The Habitat Advocate reconstructs that the HR folly at Hawkesbury Heights two weeks ago probably unfolded as follows:

Blue Mountains National Parks decides that its a good idea to set fire to the Blue Mountains National Park along Shaws Ridge.  Shaws Ridge is over two kilometres from the Hawkesbury Road.  It has nothing to do with ‘asset protection’ to private properties.  So the Parks Service just calls it ‘strategic’ or an ‘ecological burn’ – good for the bush.

“Generally over an 8-12 year cycle it [vegetation] needs to be burnt, which allows it to regenerate.”     ~ Blue Mountains RFS district manager David Jones, 20130918.

The bush and its wildlife likes being burnt.  Parks Service’s gospel Fire Maps shows in bright red that this part of the protected Blue Mountains National Park (World Heritage Area) hasn’t been burnt for 8 years, so it must to be burned, just in case it burns!

So the fire cult’s mindset is fixated.  Parks Service includes the area to its annual hazard reduction burning programme and checks the weather forecast. The Bureau of Meteorology forecasts low winds but with expected changes later in the week.  She’ll be right.  The job will be over in a day.  Parks Service sees the low wind HR window and goes for it.

Parks Service musters up their fire friendly mates at the RFS down at Winmalee and Hawkesbury Heights and complicitous stations.  The HR is on!  So all the cracks had gathered to the fray.  All the tried and noted firies from the stations near and far mustered along Shaws Ridge fire trails.  For the firies love the smell of wood smoke along the fire trails and the old red Isuzu’s snuff the battle with delight.

Prescribed BurningHazard Reduction: Reducing the World Heritage Hazard
‘Cos see when there’s a real wildfire, Dad’s Army can’t cut the mustard

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The hazard reduction proceeds on the Sunday 8th September with hardly a breeze in hilly timbered terrain, using trucks only along ‘fire’ trails.  We won’t need choppers.  They’ll only blow the budget.   Sunday night falls, job done and the vols go home.  Monday a bit windy, then Tuesday really warm and the wind picks up, gusty to blazes.

The media reports as follows:

<<A hazard-reduction burn that got out of control sparked one of four major bushfires that ravaged western Sydney and the Blue Mountains this week, fire authorities have revealed.

NSW Rural Fire Service Deputy Commissioner Rob Rogers said the National Parks and Wildlife Service had been conducting a hazard-reduction burn near Hawkesbury Road in Winmalee last weekend, which flared up in Tuesday’s soaring temperatures and high winds.   [Ed:  Winmalee?  Close, but try Hawkesbury Heights further north.]

Rob Rogers:

“Basically it was burnt on the weekend, it was patrolled on Monday, there was smouldering activity. That fire then jumped containment lines [on Tuesday].”

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Rural Fire Starters
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National Park HR escapes againThe Parks Service and RFS secretively keep fire operational matters behind closed doors for fear of embarrassment and of being sued.
So our research investigator conducted a post-fire inspection on Saturday 20130921 and has estimated the above impact and scenario. 
Perhaps those in charge can prove us wrong? We invited them to.
[Source:  The Habitat Advocate, assisted with Google Maps]

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<<Just 10 minutes earlier the family had been told by firefighters to remain calm before a freak wind change sent the blaze roaring uphill towards their house.  “Evacuate” was the order.>>

[Source:   ‘I put my foot down and drove through the fire’: Mother tells how she fled with children in Winmalee’,  20130911, by Taylor Auerbach, The Daily Telegraph, ^http://www.dailytelegraph.com.au/news/nsw/i-put-my-foot-down-and-drove-through-the-fire8217-mother-tells-how-she-fled-with-children-in-winmalee/story-fni0cx12-1226716604185]

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Hawkesbury Heights Hazard Reduction out of controlTackling the Winmalee Hazard Reduction come Wildfire on Hawkesbury Road. 
Heroes extinguishing the neglect of their Parks Service cousins.
 

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<<A fire burning in the area of Hawkesbury Road at Winmalee has already claimed one property, with more than 100 firefighters working to contain the blaze.  Five firefighters have suffered from smoke inhalation and two received minor burns battling the fire in Winmalee.>>

[Source:  ‘Bushfire burns Winmalee home, others at risk in Blue Mountains’, 20130910, Sydney Morning Herald, Photo by Nick Moir, ^http://www.smh.com.au/nsw/bushfire-burns-winmalee-home-others-at-risk-in-blue-mountains-20130910-2ths1.html]

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<< Firefighters have contained a blaze that has burnt through more than 1000 hectares of bushland west of Sydney.  The fire, at Winmalee in the Blue Mountains, has been burning since Tuesday fanned by high temperatures and strong winds, plunging the region into emergency.  Firefighters were still water bombing the burning bushland on Thursday.

The Rural Fire Service on Friday said the fire had been contained.

RFS spokeswoman Laura Ryan:

“It was brought fully under control last night just before a community meeting at Winmalee High School.  Firefighters (unpaid) would today work to extinguish the blaze, but said it was too early to say how long that would take. Firefighters will be working hard to get every bit of that fire out.”

The RFS and NSW Police say they have launched investigations into the cause of the bushfire, with some locals raising concerns that recent hazard reduction burns in the area may be responsible.     [Ed:  NSW Police need not investigate far beyond the operational records of the Blue Mountains National Parks and Wildlife Service, with internal documents circulated to the RFS]

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Winmalee and Yellow Rock residents at the local high school
More than 350 Blue Mountains residents pack the Winmalee High School on Thursday night 12th September, fearful whether they could lose their homes to Hazard Reduction.
[Source:  ^http://news.ninemsn.com.au/national/2013/09/13/07/00/winmalee-bushfire-contained-rfs]

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<< A Rural Fire Service organised community meeting held last week at Winmalee to discuss the fire situation in Winmalee and Yellow Rock was well attended.

Winmalee and Yellow Rock residents aired their bushfire concerns at a community meeting organised by the NSW Rural Fire Service (RFS) at Winmalee High School last Thursday night.

Despite the meeting only being publicised that day, the school hall was nearly full with 350 residents.  At least 10 people in the room did not receive an RFS emergency safety warning text message to take shelter.

Blue Mountains RFS district manager David Jones said he would, “feed that back up the line … it may be a service provider issue, I’m not sure, that may be part of it” and that he would look further into the issue.

A Yellow Rock resident asked what hazard reduction burns would take place in Yellow Rock in the near future.

Supt Jones said the weather conditions last week hadn’t been suitable to maintain control of a backburn.

“It’s a one-way, one-road in and its never received the recognition it deserves on that basis in terms of protection,” the Yellow Rock resident said.  “I would hate to see a real emergency situation develop here at Yellow Rock.”

Supt Jones said he’d look at the RFS organising a meeting with Yellow Rock residents in the near future to address these issues.  Supt Jones said residents could have a fire mitigation officer assess if hazard reduction was needed in their area by lodging a hazard complaint with the RFS.

“Generally over an 8-12 year cycle it [vegetation] needs to be burnt, which allows it to regenerate,” he said.

National Parks and Wildlife Service (NPWS) Upper Mountains area manager Richard Kingswood said there weren’t many days a year suitable for conducting hazard reduction burns — only 10 days in the Upper Mountains and a few more in the Lower Mountains, although last autumn and spring had provided more opportunities. He said in the last financial year NPWS had initiated 38 burning operations over 50,000 hectares, which was more than usually occurred.

Another resident asked why, with safety concerns with overhead powerlines, they couldn’t go underground, especially as the highway was being widened.  An Endeavour Energy spokesman said cost was an issue.  “It costs about 10 times more to put mains underground.”

Others were concerned about issues around road blocks, where children as well as adults were allowed to walk past roadblocks to return home, yet people couldn’t get their vehicles through. It didn’t make sense from a safety perspective, the resident said.>>

[Source:  ‘Concerns aired at Winmalee fire meeting’, 20130918, by Ilsa Cunningham, Blue Mountains Gazette, ^http://www.bluemountainsgazette.com.au/story/1782194/concerns-aired-at-winmalee-fire-meeting/]

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Hawkesbury Heights Hazard ReductionHawkesbury Road well and truly hazard reduced
[Photo by our Investigator along Hawkesbury Road, Blue Mountains, Australia, 20130921, photo © under  ^Creative Commons]

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<< More than 1200 firefighters were involved in battling the four major fires on Tuesday along Hawkesbury Road in Winmalee; in Marsden Park in the Blacktown area; near Tickner Road in Castlereagh; and Richmond Road at Windsor.   Fourteen helicopters and 350 trucks from the Rural Fire Service, Fire and Rescue NSW and the National Parks and Wildlife Service were involved in the firefight.

Just before 1.30pm on Tuesday, the temperature in Sydney was 31.6 degrees.   Mr Rogers said strong wind also made fire conditions worse, with gusts reaching 90 kilometres an hour, which was much higher than forecast.

He said RFS firefighters helped in the hazard-reduction operation in Winmalee, which was under the supervision of the NPWS, and he apologised to anyone who experienced property damage.

“Combined with the winds, how dry it is, the temperature and the steep terrain, fire takes hold very, very quickly.”

He said the RFS also was investigating whether a hazard-reduction burn escaped and forced the closure of the M1 (formerly the F3) Motorway on Thursday.

“You would have to obviously be suspicious that it did come from a hazard-reduction, given that it was in a very close proximity to it. That’s something that we’re going to be looking at very, very closely,” he said.>>

<<Fire authorities have issued an emergency warning for a bushfire threatening homes in Castlereagh in Sydney’s west, and alerts for other out of control bushfires in Blacktown and Hawkesbury.

NSW Rural Fire Service Deputy Commissioner Rob Rogers said National Parks and Wildlife Service had been conducting a hazard reduction burn near Hawkesbury Road in Winmalee last weekend. The fire flared with Tuesday’s soaring temperatures and high winds.

..He apologised to anyone who experienced property damage from the Winmalee fire.   ”..It appears on first look that it’s a case of the weather was worse than was predicted, the fire jumped out, it took hold really..quickly.”  >>

Even though the fire ripped through Hawkesbury Heights, the National Parks and Wildlife Services has released a public notice asking any Winmalee residents who experienced property damage or loss have been urged to contact NPWS on 1300 361 967 for sympathy and counselling.

New South Wales Rural Fire Service (paid) Deputy Commissioner Rob Rogers has said that his (unpaid) RFS firefighters helped in the hazard-reduction operation in Winmalee, which was under the supervision of the NPWS, and he apologised to anyone who experienced property damage.

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Hawkesbury Heights property damaged by bushfireRFS:  Sorry about that
Property loss at Hawkesbury Heights (Wheatley Road?) but who pays?
Owner:   “we won’t need hazard reduction for a while.”
[Source:  ‘Bushfire wake-up call’, 20130918, by Shane Desiatnik,
^http://www.theleader.com.au/story/1782048/bushfire-wake-up-call/]

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[Sources:  ‘Hazard reduction burn started major Sydney bushfire’,  by Megan Levy, 20130913, ^http://www.smh.com.au/nsw/hazard-reduction-burn-started-major-sydney-bushfire-20130913-2tois.html; and ‘Burn-offs and arson suspected as cause of two bushfires’, by Megan Levy and Peter Hannam, 20130914, ^http://www.smh.com.au/nsw/burnoffs-and-arson-suspected-as-cause-of-two-bushfires-20130913-2tq15.html]

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National Parks and Wildlife Advisory Council Report

(42nd meeting held on 28-29 May 2013)

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<< Council noted the following details regarding the current status of fire management activity by NPWS:

  • The 135 000ha annual target has been met with a total of 176 000ha now treated.
  • Almost 3 times more area treated than the average for last five years.
  • 6-7000ha hazard reduction activity planned over the next week.
  • Opportunity to increase positive community profile for NPWS.
  • Statewide strategy with performance indicators in place at state and regional levels. >>

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[Source:  New South Wales Government, NSW National Parks and Wildlife Service, ^http://www.environment.nsw.gov.au/resources/about/NPWAdvisoryCouncMay2013.pdf]

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National Parks and Wildlife ServiceIn Parks we Trust

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In New South Wales the National Parks and Wildlife Act became law on 1 October 1967.  The legislation created a single agency, the National Parks and Wildlife Service, to care for, control and manage the original nineteen parks and any new ones created in the future.

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Further Reading:

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[1]    ‘NPWS Fire Fighters Recognised for Service as NSW Gets 10 Year Fire Plan‘, 20130422, NSW Government, ^http://www.environment.nsw.gov.au/resources/MinMedia/MinMedia13042201.pdf

>Download Document  (PDF, 2 pages, 36kb)

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[2]    ‘National Parks and Wildlife Advisory Council Report‘, 42nd meeting held 20130528-29, NSW Government, ^http://www.environment.nsw.gov.au/resources/about/NPWAdvisoryCouncMay2013.pdf

>Download Document  (PDF, 1 page, 29 kb)

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[3]   ‘Fire Management Manual, 2012-2013‘, NSW National Parks and Wildlife Service, NSW Government, ^http://www.environment.nsw.gov.au/resources/firemanagement/final/OEH20120645FireMgmtManual.pdf

>Download Document  (PDF, 223 pages, 1.0 MB)

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[4]   ‘Blue Mountains National Park Plan of Management‘,  May 2001, NSW National Parks and Wildlife Service, ^http://www.environment.nsw.gov.au/resources/parks/pomfinalbluemountains.pdf

>Download Document  (PDF, 108 pages, 750 kb)

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[5]   ‘Greater Blue Mountains World Heritage Area – Strategic Plan‘, January 2009,  Department of Environment and Climate Change (NSW) with funds supplied by the Australian Government, ^http://www.environment.nsw.gov.au/resources/parks/StategicPlanNPWS.pdf

>Download Document  (PDF, 58 pages, 5.4 MB)

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[6]   ‘National parks and forest conservation‘, 2006, by Brett J. Stubbs, School of Environmental Science and Management, Southern Cross University, Lismore, New South Wales ^http://fennerschool-associated.anu.edu.au/environhist/links/publications/anzfh/anzfh1stubbs.pdf

>Download Document  (PDF, 8 pages, 150 kb)

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RFS negligence immune from prosecution, why?

Monday, December 17th, 2012
McIntyres Hut Bushfire in Brindabella National Park, New South Wales, 8th January 2003
It was manageable then, but negligently left to burn for days by the Rural Fire Service

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On 8th January 2003, reported lightning strikes had ignited remote fires in the Brindabella National Park inside New South Wales and in Namadgi National Park in the Australian Capital Territory (ACT).

Ten days later, the McIntyres Hut Bushfire along with the Bendora Bushfire, the Stockyard Spur Bushfire and the Mount Gingera Bushfire, coalesced and burnt out of control into the south-western suburbs of Canberra.

It tragically became The 2003 Canberra Firestorm.

  • Four people perished
  • 435 people were injured, many suffering horrific burns
  • 487 homes and 23 commercial and government premises were destroyed
  • 215 homes, commercial premises, government premises and outbuildings were damaged
  • Mount Stromlo observatory (an institution of international renown) was destroyed
  • An inestimatable number of animals (livestock and wildlife) were killed
  • Almost 70% of the ACT, some 157,170 hectares were burnt

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Canberra Firestorm looms
[Source:  SOSNews.org, ^http://www.sosnews.org/newsfront/?p=236]

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The ACT Coroner Maria Doogan conducted an inquiry into the cause, origin and circumstances of the bushfires and inquests into the four deaths associated with those fires.  On December 2006, her findings: ‘The Canberra Firestorm‘ concluded that “failure to aggressively attack  the fires in the first few days after they ignited” was a key factor that led to the firestorm.

Coroner Doogan was also scathing of the ACT’s Emergency Services Bureau (ESB) for:

  1. Failing to attack the fires that had been burning for 10 days before they reached the capital.
  2. Failing to warn residents of the danger early enough, saying this exacerbated the property losses and caused panic and confusion on the day of the firestorm.

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But responsibility for fire suppression inside the Brindabella National Park also lay with the NSW National Parks and Wildlife Service.

Today ACT Supreme Court Chief Justice Terence Higgins has found that the New South Wales Government (Rural Fire Service) was negligent in the way it tackled the January 2003 blaze.

One of the plaintiffs suing the NSW Government, Brindabella landowner Wayne West said today “We have won the case on negligence, the judge has made a decision the fire should have been fought and could have been fought in a different manner, and we win the case at common law.’’

Mr West, along with plaintiffs represented by insurance giant QBE Insurance, have been suing the NSW Government for gross negligence.

But the NSW Rural Fires Act 1997 confers immunity from liability if the Rural Fire Service acted “in good faith”.   This means that even though the Rural Fire Service is guilty of gross negligence, it and its members are immune from prosecution for negligence, becase they can hide behind the NSW Rural Fires Act.

So Chief Justice Higgins has ruled in favour of the NSW Government.

“The result I have reached is that the plaintiffs’ claim must, as a matter of law, be denied,” Chief Justice Terence Higgins said today in an 86-page judgment.

“However, but for the express limitations on the liability which otherwise would attach at common law, those plaintiffs who suffered loss or damage would have been entitled to compensation for their losses.  Effectively, they are deprived by statute of what would, under the general law, be regarded as just compensation.”

“The legislature has, however, spoken so as to exempt NSW from such liability, and the courts must apply the law as parliament has decreed it.”

The judge agreed with the plaintiffs that the NSW Rural Fire Service embraced an “inadequate and defective strategy.  “The question is, however, whether the adoption of that strategy, albeit negligent, was ‘so unreasonable that no authority could properly consider the act of omission to be a reasonable exercise of its functions’.”

The judge identified failures in strategic planning, but made no criticism of the front-line firefighters “at any level”.

Mr West said while the ultimate decision was “devastating” the case was never about the money.

“That fire was allowed to burn, there could have been action taken to prevent the fire escaping or being enticed to escape.  The fires shouldn’t have burnt the houses and [caused] the injuries and the four lives in Canberra, that’s what we were here for from day one.’’

When asked what lessons should be taken from the firefighting response Mr West replied:

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“Get in the fire immediately and look at the fire – don’t look at it 50 kilometres away.”

Bushfire Progress – click on image
(The top red patch is the McInture Bushfire inside NSW)

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Alan Conolly, representing the QBE clients, said they would read the judgment and consider their options.

“There’s always, in a case as big as this, there’ll be issues we have to look at, and at the moment we first have to read the judgment and advise our clients,” he said.

West has immediately flagged a decision to challenge this decision and to take that fight to the ACT Court of Appeal.

“We have only fallen over in the courtroom today on an Act the [NSW] government put in place…the state doesn’t have a duty of care to an individual, and that’s where we fell over today”, West said.

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[Source:  ‘West to appeal after losing 10-year court battle’, 20121217, by Louis Andrews (journalist), Canberra Times, ^http://www.canberratimes.com.au/act-news/west-to-appeal-after-losing-10year-court-battle-20121217-2biea.html]

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ACT Bushfire Memorial (Duffy)

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Editor’s Comment:

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The general community has right to expect that government, as the public authority, must be at all times properly diligent in performing its duty it owes to its dependent community.  This is perhaps no more so than its implied fiduciary duty to protect the community from harm.   Outside the military, the emergency services duty of government – be it police, ambulance, fire, disaster response – stands at the forefront of this fiduciary duty because this is where the risk and consequence of harm to the community is greatest.  This is the basis of community trust in government  and the rule of law, otherwise as a society we resort to ‘every man for himself’ chaos.

Under Division 1, Section 63 of the Rural Fire Act 1997, there is a prescribed duty of the public authority (the Rural Fire Service) to prevent bush fires, and this necessarily includes taking:

any other practicable steps to prevent the occurrence of bush fires on, and to minimise the danger of the spread of a bush  fire on or from any land vested in or under its control or management.

Allowing the known McIntyre Fire to burn for multiple days without diligent suppression response has been found by the ACT Coroner and the ACT Supreme Court to have been negligent.  Since this fire was situated on Crown Land in New South Wales, the New South Wales Rural Fire Service owed a fidicuary duty of care to the community to ensure resource capability, to diligently suppress and properly extinguish the fire, which it fundamentally failed to do. 

The Rural Fire Service owed a higher duty of care to the community to properly extinguish the fire, than with other concerns such as cost mitigation by avoiding the cost of aerial suppression.    It is a breach of that duty of care when a public authority under-resources and under-performs emergency management response.  It is shameful that governments continue to hide behind legislation and volunteers when the risk and consequences of bushfire and wind changes are known.  The community has a right to entrust government capability and to trust legislation to serve the bests interests of the community, not the convenience of government bureaucracy.

The McIntyre Fire started off some distance from human settlement and would have been operationally treated as a defacto hazard reduction.  It is past time that the high duty of fire fighting to protect life and property extends to protecting the valuable ecological integrity of the community’s national parks.  The interface between life, property and national parks has become intertwined and all it takes is a change of wind for bushfire risk to morph from being ‘contained’ to being ‘catastrophic’.

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Further Reading:

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[1]    ACT Coroner Report into the Canberra Firestorm 2003, published December 2006, >Read Report,  (PDF, 400kb)  ^http://www.courts.act.gov.au/resources/attachments/The_Canberra_Firestorm_%28VOL_I%29.pdf

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[2]   ACT Supreme Court Decision:  ‘WAYNE WEST & ANOR v THE STATE OF NEW SOUTH WALES [2012] ACTSC 184 (17 December 2012),  >Read Decision, (PDF, 2.5MB), ^http://www.courts.act.gov.au/supreme/

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[3]   Related article on this website:   2006 Grose Valley Fires – any lessons learnt?

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2006 Grose Valley Fires – any lessons learnt?

Wednesday, January 18th, 2012

On Sunday 13th November 2006  two separate bushfire ignitions were believed to have been started by lightning just west of the Grose Valley of the Greater Blue Mountains World Heritage Area, according to the Rural Fire Service (RFS).  One ignition was located outside the small rural village of Hartley Vale in a valley referred to as Lawsons Long Alley, while the other was in rugged bushland at Burra Korain Head about 4 km east of the village of Mount Victoria.   Ten days later catastrophe…

Pyrocumulus cloud as the Grose Valley goes up in smoke on 23rd November 2006

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‘Two bushfires that were believed to have been started by lightning strikes on Monday are burning in the Blue Mountains National Park. A fire burning 2 km north of Mount Victoria has burnt out about 1100 hectares of private property and parkland and is burning on both sides of the Darling Causeway. The Darling Causeway remains closed to traffic and motorists are advised to use the Great Western Highway and Bells Line of Road as alternate routes.

A second fire burning about 5 km north of Blackheath in the Grose Valley has burnt out about 500 hectares of parkland. Waterbombing aircraft are slowing the progress of the fire as it is burning in difficult and inaccessible terrain.’

[Source: New South Wales Rural Fire Service Blue Mountains website, Fire Name: Lawsons Long Alley, Time Message Issued: 1700, Date Message Issued: 16/11/06, ^http://lists.rfs.org.au/mailman/listinfo/bluemountains-info]

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At the time the RFS reported that the ‘fire is not threatening any properties or homes at this stage‘, but it was this reassurance that lulled the fire fighting effort into a false sense of security.  Over the coming days the fires were not earnestly suppressed but instead allowed to burn out of control as neither were ‘threatening any properties or homes at this stage‘.  Famous last words.  Worse was that a series of broadscale backburns were started by the RFS at Hartley Vale, Blackheath and along Bells Line of Road – each of which at times got out of control.

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Comparison with 2003 Canberra Firestorm

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Three years prior, four ignitions that had been purportedly been sparked by lighting on 8th January 2003 were allowed to burn out of control in remote bushland outside Canberra, Australian Capital Territory (ACT), and starting outside the ACT in NSW.   At the time, those fires were deemed not to be threatening any properties or homes at that stage too.  Ten days later, the four fires – McIntyre’s Hut Fire, the Bendora Fire, the Stockyard Spur Fire and the Mount Gingera Fire all coalesced into what became known as the 2003 Canberra Firestorm in which four people perished.

McIntyre’s Hut Fire 20030108 – distant, isolated and remote at this stage.
Ten days later it became the 2003 Canberra Firestorm

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Three years hence, the two bushfires west of the Grose Valley after seven days had coalesced into what has become known as the 2006 Grose Valley Fires that ended up incinerating 14,070 hectares of wild bush habitat, including the iconic Blue Gum Forest down in the Grose Valley inside the Greater Blue Mountains World heritage Area .

Both catastrophic bushfires were ultimately the responsibility of the RFS in New South Wales to suppress in order to prevent them becoming uncontrollable firestorms.    The RFS failed catastrophically on both occasions with RFS Commissioner Phil Koperberg at the helm.  The lessons from the 2003 Canberra Firestorm had not been heeded.

An aerial view of a fire-devastated Chauvel Circle in the suburb of Chapman on 21st January, 2003 in Canberra,
where 15 of 20 homes in the street were destroyed by fire.
Four people were killed and 419 homes destroyed when the fires being fought on five fronts swept through the nation’s capital.
(Photo by Daniel Berehulak, Getty Images)

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According to the report of the official enquiry into the 2003 Canberra Firestorm by ACT Coroner Maria Doogan,  she states:

‘During the inquiry it was submitted that the severity of the firestorm could not have been foreseen.  I do not accept this. Australia has a recorded history of extreme fire events dating back to at least 1851.  As discussed in Chapter 7 (of the Coroner’s Report), CSIRO fire expert Phil Cheney predicted several years ago a conflagration of the type experienced in January 2003.  He made his prediction on the basis of information in the report of one  of the seven inquiries that have been held since 1986 to examine various aspects of the ACT’s emergency services.

‘The point to make here is that experiences in life, be they good or bad, serve no useful purpose if we fail to learn from them.  It is hoped, therefore, that the many lessons that can be learnt from this catastrophe in the ACT are in fact learnt and result in positive action, not just supportive words and shallow promises.’

[Source: ‘The Canberra Firestorm: Inquest and Inquiry into Four Deaths and Four Fires between 8 and 18 January 2003’, Vol 1, Ch1, pp.2-3., by ACT Coroner]

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Blue Mountains Council’s response to the 2006 Grose Valley Fires

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The 2006 Grose Valley Fires coalesced into a conflagration on Thursday 23rd November 2006 down in the World Heritage Grose Valley.  Many in the local Blue Mountains community were outraged that this could have been allowed to have occurred.  Public demands for answers finally led Blue Mountains Council two months later on Tuesday 30th January 2007 to agree to support the call of ‘concerned residents’ for the New South Wales Government to undertake a thorough, independent review of the Grose Valley Fires.

It is important to note that at the time there was a Labor Government in New South Wales, which was ultimately held responsible for both the 2003 and 2006 bushfire emergency responses.

The following is a copy of the official meeting minutes of Blue Mountains Council’s Ordinary Meeting of 20070130, two months after the 2003 Grose Valley Fires:

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‘A Motion was moved by Councillors (Terri) Hamilton (Independent) and (Daniel) Myles (Liberal):

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1. That the Council gratefully acknowledges the efforts of all the volunteers, professionals and agencies that worked together to control the recent Grose Valley Fire.

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2. That the Council, in order that improvements in fire management can continue for the Blue Mountains and other parts of NSW, as a matter of urgency, writes to the Premier of New South Wales, the Hon Morris Iemma, stating it supports the call of concerned residents on the New South Wales Government, which appeared on page 13 of the Blue Mountains Gazette of 6 December, 2006, as follows:

“1. Undertake a thorough, independent review of the Grose Valley Fire, involving all stakeholders with particular attention to the following questions:

  •  Were fire detection and initial suppression timely and adequate?
  •  Were resources adequate, appropriate and supported?
  •  Were the adopted strategies the best available under the circumstances?
  • Could other strategies of closer containment have offered lower risk to the community, better firefighter safety, higher probabilities of success, lower costs and less impact on the environment?
  • Was existing knowledge and planning adequately utilised?
  • Is fire management funded to the most effective way?

2. Ensure adequate funding is available for post-fire restoration, including the rehabilitation of environmental damage.
3. Fund more research to improve understanding of fire in the Blue Mountains landscape and methods for fire mitigation and suppression.
4. Improve research and training in strategies for controlling fires in large bushland areas.
5. Improve pre-fire planning to support decision-making during incidents.
6. Improve systems to ensure that local fire planning and expertise is fully utilised during incidents, and that the protection of the natural and cultural values of World Heritage areas and other bushland are fully considered.”

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3. That the independent review includes addressing the questions raised by Blue Mountains Conservation Society:

a. The Blue Mountains City Council therefore supports the following adopted position of the Blue Mountains Conservation Society and would like the review to address the following questions:

i.    In what circumstances are back burning from the “Northern Strategic Line” and the Bells Line of Road appropriate?
ii.   What can be improved to ensure that lightning strikes or arson fires are contained as quickly as possible?
iii.  What can be done to better manage fire risk in the Grose Valley in terms of preparation and suppression to minimise damage to people, property and biodiversity?
iv.  What is needed to allow remote area fire teams to be able to work at night when conditions are more benign?
v.   How can funding of bushfire management and suppression be changed to reduce overall costs to the community. (Federal funding of suppression under section 44 means funding for trail maintenance and planning is limited.)

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b. If practicable, would the review also address the following?

i.    The World Heritage Area contains a number of threatened species and ecological communities that, in addition to the direct threats associated with climate change, are particularly vulnerable to increased fire frequency and intensity.
ii.   The effects on biodiversity of the fire regimes in the Grose Valley over the last 40 years, where there has been a succession of large intense wild fires without sufficient interval between them.
iii.   Climate change predictions suggest a probability of more frequent and more intensive fire events, with significant implications for fire management and integrity of ecosystems.
iv.   The Blue Mountains City Council also supports and requests involvement in the forum being organised by the Director of the Central Branch of the National Parks and Wildlife Service, Bob Conroy, on the 17 February 2007.

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4. That the Council emphasises that the requested review should be of a scientific and technical nature.

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5. That a copy of this letter be forwarded to the Minister for Emergency Services, the Hon Tony Kelly, the Member for the Blue Mountains, the Hon. Bob Debus, and the New South Wales Opposition Leader, Peter Debnam.

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Upon being PUT to the Meeting, the MOTION was CARRIED, the voting being:

FOR:

  1. Fiona Creed  (Liberal)
  2. Terri Hamilton (Independent)
  3. Pippa McInnes (Greens)
  4. Daniel Myles (Liberal)
  5. Kerrin O’Grady  (Greens)
  6. Lyn Trindall (Blue Mountains First

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AGAINST:

  1. Mayor Jim Angel   (Labor)
  2. Kevin Frappell   (Labor)
  3. Alison McLaren  (Labor)
  4. Adam Searle  (Labor)
  5. Chris Van der Kley  (Liberal)  and Chair of Blue Mountains Bush Fire Management Committee
The Hartley Vale backburn 20061115 escaped up Hartley Vale Road and over the Darling Causeway (above) toward the Grose Valley to the right
(Photo by Editor 20070204, free in pubic domain, click to enlarge)

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Editor’s Note:

Ahead of the Blue Mountains Council voting for the above motion, two Labor Councillors, Clr Chris Van der Kley (also Chair of the Blue Mountains Bush Fire Management Committee) and Clr Kevin Frappell (Labor) moved an alternative motion, however it was lost upon voting. This proposed alternative motion was labelled an ‘amendment’ but it was significantly different in detail.  The proposed amendment excluded calls for an independent review (per the first item in the original motion). 

This proposed amendment also excluded asking the six key questions put by the concerned residents such as ‘Were fire detection and initial suppression timely and adequate?‘, ‘Is fire management funded to the most effective way?‘, etc. 

This proposed amendment also excluded that part of Item 1 which recommended strategic improvements to bushfire management such as ‘Ensure adequate funding is available for post-fire restoration, including the rehabilitation of environmental damage‘ and ‘Fund more research to improve understanding of fire in the Blue Mountains landscape and methods for fire mitigation and suppression‘, etc.

This proposed amendment  instead drew upon the view of the leadership of the Blue Mountains Conservation Society at the time that considered an independent enquiry would equate to criticism and assigning blame and so be politicised.    This did however include advocating “an interagency and technical review process, to tease out the lessons learned.”

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The Amendment (although lost in the Council voting) is important for the record and read as follows:

1. That the Blue Mountains City Council gratefully acknowledges the efforts of all the volunteers, professionals and agencies that worked together to control the recent Grose
Valley fire.

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2. That the Blue Mountains City Council supports the recent position adopted by the Blue Mountains Conservation Society in relation to the Grose Valley fire in November
2006.   We note and support the position of the Society when it says,

“The circumstances of the bushfire are complex and it is not in anyone’s interest for criticism or blame to be apportioned. However, there is much to be gained by looking at what was done and how it can be improved. The Society does not therefore support a large public inquiry and its attendant politicisation. Instead, the Society advocates an interagency and technical review process, to tease out the lessons learned.”

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3. That the Blue Mountains City Council therefore supports the following adopted position of the Blue Mountains Conservation Society and would like the review to
address the following questions:

  1. In what circumstances are back burning from the “Northern Strategic Line” and the Bells Line of Road appropriate?
  2. What can be improved to ensure that lightning strikes or arson fires are contained as quickly as possible?
  3. What can be done to better manage fire risk in the Grose Valley in terms of preparation and suppression to minimise damage to people, property and biodiversity?
  4. What is needed to allow remote area fire teams to be able to work at night when conditions are more benign?
  5. How can funding of bushfire management and suppression be changed to reduce overall costs to the community. (Federal funding of suppression under Section 44 means funding for trail maintenance and planning is limited.)

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If practicable, would the review also address the following?

  1. The World Heritage Area contains a number of threatened species and ecological communities that, in addition to the direct threats associated with climate change, are particularly vulnerable to increased fire frequency and intensity.
  2. The effects on biodiversity of the fire regimes in the Grose Valley over the last 40 years, where there has been a succession of large intense wild fires without
    sufficient interval between them.
  3. Climate change predictions suggest a probability of more frequent and more intensive fire events, with significant implications for fire management and
    integrity of ecosystems.
  4.  That the Blue Mountains City Council also supports and requests involvement in the forum being organised by the Director of the Central Branch of the National Parks and Wildlife Service, Bob Conroy, on the 17 February 2007.

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Upon being PUT to the Meeting, the AMENDMENT was LOST, the voting being:

FOR:

  1. Mayor Jim Angel   (Labor)
  2. Kevin Frappell   (Labor)
  3. Alison McLaren   (Labor)
  4. Adam Searle   (Labor)
  5. Chris Van der Kley   (Liberal, and Chair of Blue Mountains Bush Fire Management Committee)

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AGAINST:

  1. Creed   (Liberal)
  2. Hamilton   (Independent)
  3. McInnes   (Greens)
  4. Myles   (Liberal)
  5. O’Grady  (Greens)
  6. Trindall   (Blue Mountains First)

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[Source: Blue Mountains Council’s Ordinary Meeting, 20070130, Minute No. 7, File Ref. C01095. Subject: ‘Grose Valley Fire’, pp.15-16]

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Editor’s Analysis:

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  1. Similar failure by the RFS and the National Parks and Wildlife Service (NPWS) to muster all available necessary resources to suppress and extinguished both the Lawson’s Long Alley and Burra Korain Head fires, demonstrated that lessons from the 2003 Canberra Firestorm had not been learnt.  Critical time was lost in the initial days of the ignitions at both to effectively suppress the fires while they were of a small size and weather conditions relatively favourable to enable suppression.
  2. The RFS strategy to apply excessive broadscale backburning on multiple fronts at at Hartley Vale, Blackheath and Bells Line of Road exacerbated the complexity and scale of both fires and in the most part contributed to the conflagration of all the fires down in the Grose Valley on 23rd November 2006
  3. The shortcoming of not mustering all necessary resources to suppress and extinguish bushfires, irrespective of whether a fire is immediately affecting property and homes or not, is flawed, negligent and only heightens the inherent risk of a bushfire escalating out of control.  The risk of a bushfire escalation into uncontrollable firestorm is heightened as time allows for the prospect of worsening bushfire weather conditions – increased wind, wind gusts,  wind direction, temperatures, and lowering humidity – contributory factors in both the respective Canberra and Grose Valley Fires.  There is no indication that this operational culture has changed.
  4. That a bushfire is situated in inaccessible terrain is not an excuse for bushfire management not to muster all airborne and RAFT resources to suppress and extinguish it as soon as feasibly possible
  5. After local community realisation that the bushfire had overrun the Grose Valley including burning through the iconic Blue Gum Forest on 23rd November, an informal collection of local ‘concerned residents‘ formed numbering 143 and co-ordinated by Blue Mountains resident Ian Brown.  By Wednesday 6th December, within days of the fire finally being suppressed (3rd Dec), this informal group had collectively paid for a full page letter in the Blue Mountains Gazette newspaper costing $2,131.40(page 13). The letter was entitled ‘Burning Issues – fire in the Grose Valley – A statement funded and supported by concerned residents‘.   The context was that detailed in Council’s carried motion above.
  6. Blue Mountains Council’s response was simply a manifestation of the “supportive words and shallow promises” whom ACT Coroner Maria Doogan had cautioned in the Coroner’s Report into the 2003 Canberra Firestorm.  No effective Council follow up to its supportive words was undertaken.  Sure per Council’s carried motion, Council’s then acting General Manager, Dave Allen, sent off the letter with supportive words to the NSW Premier Morris Iemma, on 20th February 2007, but Council took no other review or enquiry action.
  7. In the Central Blue Mountains, there are three government agencies responsible for bushfire management  – the New South Wales Rural Fires Service, the National Parks and Wildlife Service as part of the NSW Department of Environment (what ever its frequently changing title)  and Blue Mountains Council.  Collectively these three bodies have co-operated under the Blue Mountains Bush Fire Management Committee, which was/is chaired by Blue Mountains Councillor Chris van der Kley.) and is responsible for planning in relating to bush fire prevention and coordinated bush fire fighting, as well as responsible for advising the Commissioner on bush fire prevention; mitigation and coordinated bush fire suppression.  Included on the Committee is also the Commissioner of the RFS, and a nominated representative respectively from the NSW Fire Brigades, Forests NSW, NPWS, the Local Government Association of NSW, the Shires Association of NSW, the NSW Rural Fire Service Association, NSW Police, a nominee of the Minister for the Environment (then Bob Debus), a representative of the Nature Conservation Council of NSW, a person appointed by the Minister on the recommendation of the NSW Farmers Association, a representative of the Department of Community Services and a representative of the Department of Lands. In March 2008, the Blue Mountains Bush Fire Management Committee (BMBFMC) staged a series of community workshops on the Plan’s review process.   The Plan was approved on 14th December 2000 with a required review every five years.  So by the Grose Valley Fire, the Plan was a year out of date and by March 2008 the Plan was three years out of date.
  8. It is not surprisingly that the above proposed amendment to the Council letter to the NSW Premier excluded calls for an independent review.  Those who proposed the motion and who voted for it  were either all Labor Party members or in the case of Liberal Councillor Chris Van Der Kley, Chair of the Blue Mountains Bush Fire Management Committee who was operationally involved.  An independent enquiry and the proposed strategic improvements to the bushfire management establishment would have likely revealed operational and government failings and recommended changes to the RFS structure, strategies, and management and importantly to its culture.  The amendment was rejected anyway due to Labor having insufficient votes on Council.
  9. On Sunday 13th November 2006  two separate bushfire ignitions were believed to have been lit by lightning just west of the Grose Valley of the Greater Blue Mountains World Heritage Area by the RFS.  Following a back burn/hazard reduction burn that had got  out of control up Hartley Vale Road and crossed the Darling Causeway, on Wednesday 15th November the RFS declared a formal escalation to a Section 44 bushfire emergency.  This four day delay in detection and suppression is unexplained by the RFS.
  10. Despite the calls by the concerned residents (with Blue Mountains Council’s supportive words) for the ‘NSW Government to undertake a thorough, independent  review of the Grose Valley Fire, involving all stakeholders, so such independent review was done.
  11. The local Labor member for the NSW Seat of Blue Mountains at the time and NSW Minister for the Environment was Bob Debus MP, who categorically refused requests for either an independent review or a public review into the management of the Grose Valley Fires.
  12. The Blue Mountains Conservation Society (BMCS) similarly rejected calls for a public enquiry, stating “the circumstances of the bushfire are complex and it is not in anyone’s interest for criticism or blame to be apportioned. However, there is much to be gained by looking at what was done and how it can be improved. The Society does not therefore support a large public inquiry and its attendant politicisation. Instead, the Society advocates an inter-agency and technical review process, to tease out the lessons learned.”  It needs to be pointed out that key committee members of the BMCS were/are also active members of the RFS, which raises the issue of and actual or perceived conflict of interest.
  13. There were two reviews of sorts, none independent and none public.
    1. On Tuesday 19th December 2006 there was apparently an ‘Inter-Agency Review‘ which took place at Katoomba behind closed doors by members of bushfire management and operating personnel involved in the fire fighting. Despite requests by this Editor, no minutes or reports of that meeting were ever forthcoming.  The meeting was internal and secret.
    2. On Saturday 17th February 2007, there was a ‘Grose Valley Fire Forum‘ held at Mount Tomah organised by Director of the Central Branch of the National Parks and Wildlife Service, Bob Conroy, and the Blue Mountains World Heritage Institute.  Only selected participants were permitted to attend – mainly from the bushfire management, fire experts and selected members of the Blue Mountains Conservation Society.  A copy of the report of that forum will be publicised on this website shortly.
  14. Following ongoing community concerns about the lack of transparency, no evidence of any lessons being learned from the Grose Valley Fires and even of a cover up into some of the operational decisions, in January 2007 Bob Debus MP announced a suggestion of there being an Environmental Summit to be staged in the Blue Mountains to provide the first public forum into important environmental issues affecting the Blue Mountains region, notably to discuss the Grose Valley Fire.  Well, by the time the summit eventuated it was over a year later and held on the weekend of 23rd and 24th February 2008.   By then Bob Debus had moved to federal politics (though still representing the Blue Mountains via the Seat of Macquarie.  The summit was chaired by the RFS Commissioner responsible for the 2006 Grose Valley Fires, Philk Koperberg (now local Labor MP) and even the bushfire Incident Controller of the 2006 Grose Valley Fires, RFS Superintendent Mal Cronstedt, was in attendance.  However, the summit was now called a conference and the agenda had expanded to many issues including Energy, Social Systems, Natural Systems and Water.  Discussion about bushfire was restricted to a two hour workshop and so available time to the Grose Fire to one or two questions which copped only official spiel.  It was a classic Labor tactic or stalling on accountability until the community gives up or forgets.
  15. Since 2006, the Blue Mountains community still doesn’t know whether in the 2006 Grose Valley Fire or currently:
  • Fire detection and initial suppression was/is timely and adequate?
  • Whether bushfire management resources were/are adequate, appropriate and supported?
  • Whether in the Grose Valley Fire the adopted strategies were the best available under the circumstances?
  • Whether other strategies of closer containment could have offered lower risk to the community
  • Whether currently it has better firefighter safety, higher probabilities of success, lower costs and will cause less impact on the environment?
  • Whether existing knowledge and planning is adequately utilised?
  • Whether bushfire management is funded to the most effective way?
  • Is adequate funding available for post-fire restoration, including the rehabilitation of environmental damage?

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Another three years hence, in the Blue Mountains we have witnessed from afar the catastrophic Victorian ‘Black Saturday’ Bushfires of 7th February 2009.

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Another three years hence in 2012, have we learnt anything? 

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