NSW National Parks and Wildlife Service setting fire to native habitat while the weather is calm. What fauna, it’s an ‘Ecological Burn’?
This week’s hazard reduction burn in Barrington Tops NP, north of Dungog
[Source: Photo by Andy Boleyn, ^http://newcastleonhunter.com/2012/08/npws-burning-down-the-tops/]
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It’s that time of year across Australia, when bush arson is deemed acceptable (even noble) , so long as it is ‘prescribed‘ by government, even when it often gets out of control.
Australia’s native habitat is deliberately set fire to by Australian Government agencies every year, just in case it burns, which means that frequently they can’t put it out.
Dropping petrol bombs by immoral helicopter pilots ..”hey man, this is like Nam all over again!”
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None of the arson rationale respects native wildlife, as with illegal bush arsonists. There is little difference on wildlife impact as to who sets fire to their habitat – illegal or government sanctioned. In the above burn, Acting NPWS Barrington Tops Area Manager Peter Beard, justifies setting fire to wildlife habitat thus:
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“Hazard reduction burn aims to protect lives and property, whilst maintaining the biodiversity of the World Heritage-listed park.”
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Yet it is carried out without any thought or knowledge about the ecological impacts upon ground dwelling fauna populations or upon flora species that are fire sensitive nor the complex and fragile co-existences. Where are the independent scientific wildlife counts before and after each prescribed arson sortie? Where is the qualified wildlife ecologist’s report that made public that says burning this forest is not harmful?
The fire lighting is not even mosaic. It is blanket, broadscale and indiscriminate. Aerial incendiaries are dropped along the ridge top by helicopter casuing multiple ignition points so that the fire takes hold.
Aerial ‘habitat reduction’ occurs across National Parks and World Heritage Areas – no habitat is sacrosanct. It is euphemistically branded ‘Biodiversity Burning’ – fire is good for wildlife – watch them run, watch the Echinas and Wombats burn!
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It is one of many hundred being conducted across New South Wales native landscapes by the National Parks and Wildlife Services as well as by the Rural Fires Service and with assistance from regional fire brigades. Another 25 burns covering 6000ha are planned in the next week, including burns in In Ku-ring-gai Chase National Park and the Blue Mountains World Heritage Area.
Rather through unrelenting government propaganda, all Australian native vegetation is demonised as a ‘threat‘, a ‘hazard‘ and as ‘fuel‘ – just like the Christian church has for centuries demonised non-believers as heathens.
National Parks are deemed by Australian governments as a ‘hazards’!
It is a town park mentality – a bit of greenery for people to enjoy at weekends.
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It doesn’t take much effort by a layperson to access a computer, download Google Earth and zoom into New South Wales, then to realise that the native vegetation that remains is dotted in islands within vast landscapes of denuded cleared farmland, and then to respect that if the native wildlife exist anywhere, they are in these vegetation islands.
This is Destination New South Wales..about 90% deforested, or burned, or farmed, or mined, or housed or else deserted
“There are some amazing natural attractions in New South Wales. From the coast to the country you’re spoilt for choice. All over this state you can meander at your own pace and discover a whole world of extraordinary natural wonders. With close to 900 ^NSW national parks, forests and reserves, the State features the most diverse nature experiences in Australia ranging from rainforests, marine parks, a city within a national park, outback landscapes, mountains, islands and World-heritage listed areas.”
Then for these islands of native vegetation to be deliberately set fire to can only contribue to native wildlife extinctions. It doesn’t take more than a lay person to realise this by deduction. Yet wildlife extinction is exactly what these senseless fatalistic government bush arson culls are doing every year. Setting fire to wildlife habitat is wildlife desecration, just like an invading army razing a village.
Rural fire agencies throughout Australia are no different in mindset to paid professional urban fire brigades – their mandate is to serve only to protect human life and property – but all native vegetation and wildlife is demonised as a liability and dismissed as only a risk to human life and property. The key distinction between rural fire fighters and their urban counterparts is that the urban fire fighters are paid professionals. Governments save billions by not paying rural firefighters and by not training them to the skill level of urban firefighters – yet operationally their job is exactly the same. Volunteers have been conned by governments to being cheap fingers in the dyke, so that taxes can be channelled elsewhere instead of properly into emergency management.
When there is a wildfire under extreme bushfire weather conditions, the ill-equipped, under=prepared and under-resourced bushfire agenecies know full well, that they cannot reliably detect, reach or suppress ignitions most of the time. They are depressing forced to rely upon the vagrancies of wind changes to dictate the impact of wildfires and the fate to lives and property.
So that is why government is so keen to prescribe preventative fighting fire with fire. If the bush is burned so that there is litte to burn then when a wildfire erupts in hot, dry and windy conditions the risk is less.
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.. one has to destroy the village to save it!
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Oddly this mindset is not allowed to apply to plantation forests – because they are deemed ‘economic assets’ and so therefor evaluable and therefore worth protecting from fire.
Of course, after every major fire involving loss of human life, such as in Victoria in 2009, all the politicians come out crying “shocking, shocking, shocking”, promising expensive enquiries, promising more resourcing, and that it will never happen again. All the while, politicians full well know that when the media cameras lose interest, it is cheap volunteer business as usual, because by the time the next wildfire, they will be happily lifestyle pensioned out – polly gold card privileges and all.
The Victorian Bushfires of 2009 that caused the deaths of 173 people were in the main caused initially by either powerline neglect and arson. The fire brigade was not prepared for a catastrophe despite the bushfire danger index forecast days before to be well off the scale. The underprepared, under-resourced Dad’s Army preparedness contributed to the 173 deaths.
Instead, all Australian and State governments have blamed the Australian wildlife habitat for being the fuel like and ‘accessory before the fact’. It was the victim.
So hazard reduction is now ramped up Australia wide. In New South Wales hazard reduction this year is the NSW Government’s response strategy, costing $62 million “to boost wildfire preparedness“. Under the NSW NPWS ‘Enhanced Bushfire Management Programme’, NPWS aims to double the number of hazard reduction hectares each year, for the next five years. NSW Environment Minister Robyn Parker said hazard reduction work is part of an ongoing State-wide operation.
If there is unburnt bush, it will be targeted for burning! Burn it before it burns, god damn! If the Rural Fire Starters had access to B52s and Agent Orange, they sure the would deploy both, such is the inculcated bushphobic mindset.
“NPWS crews are already taking advantage of favourable spring weather to carry out 12 burns covering more than 2,500 hectares of national park in the past fortnight.”
The NSW Government is doing everything it can to reduce the risk of fire, including in our national parks – particularly with a drier, hotter summer than we’ve recently experience predicted.”
Broadscale Hazard Reduction ‘So when summer comes we should be right – there’ll be nothing left to burn!’‘Job Done!‘
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It is a wicked species-anhilating strategy that most in the broader community ignorantly accept as justified, because government propaganda threats say so and because few folk have the wisdom or courage to dare question the propaganda.
Woops, the prescribed burn got out of controlThat’s ok its only Fraser Island World Heritage – it’ll grow back!
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Last weekend, a 12-year-old boy was charged with lighting a bushfire at Watannobi on the Central Coast around lunch time. Just like the fire fighters he must be watching and learning from, the bushfire was lit using multiple ignition points so that it took hold. Sure enough, the blaze quickly escalated. In the end some eighty hectares of native vegetation and grassland were burnt before the fire was contained in the mid afternoon.
He may be charged now, but no doubt he is recruitment material for the local Rural Fire Starters when he gets older.
But unlike the State-sanctioned arsonists, the boy was publicly apologetic for what he had done, realising that it was wrong. To his credit he said:
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“I’m sorry for what I have done .. and I won’t do it again.”
Government-sanctioned arsonists know what they are doing is wrong – but the Firie peer pressure is too great
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Why don’t gardeners of Australian native gardens follow the National Parks biodiversity burning mantra and set fire to their gardens? Because they respect the unburnt value of Australia’s flora.
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Why do we not see much wildlife anymore in National Parks?
..the evening news media dramatises a forthcoming government declaration of a‘Total Fire Ban’. Next day yep, dry and hot, then early afternoon wind picks up. Yep, having mapped target, and with no-one around, opportunity to be ‘Bushfire Hero’…
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7th Feb 2009, 1:30pm – a pine plantation near Churchill, West Gippsland:
Of the thousands of bushfires that burn Australia’s natural landscape each year, humans cause the vast majority, with somewhere around half of these being deliberately lit, that is, not by accident.
Bush Arson is a serious and heinous crime now systemic in bushfire-prone Australia, California and southern forested regions of Europe. It is committed usually by misfit serial offenders, yet despite the statistics, across all states in Australia from Tasmania to the Top End, the crime remains largely given lip service by governments.
Researchers at the Australian Institute of Criminology have assessed that there are many reasons why people light fires. While some want to relieve boredom by creating havoc and excitement, other arsonists crave recognition or attention. Some light fires out of anger or protest while others believe they are being altruistic by clearing what they see as dangerous fuel-loads. Sometimes there are multiple motives.
People who light fires for excitement will often stay around after the fire to view their handiwork, which suggests that fire crews should look around and talk to the people who are there watching. Knowing that some people light fires just so they can treated as a hero if they report the fire or put it out is also useful, especially for fire services screening new members.
Some of those people who light those fires do become members of fire services, and this needs to be a consideration in the firefighting recruitment process.
The 2009 Victorian Bushfires, collectively branded by the media as ‘Black Saturday’, involved far many more bushfires that the ones that ignited and reported by the media on Saturday 7th February 2009.
‘The number of fires that had not been extinguished rose from seven on New Year’s Day to 29 on 14 January. Then it doubled to 58 by 25 January and continued to steadily increase to 125 in the week before 7 February. By this time firefighting resources had been committed for a fortnight responding to new fires and attending to fires already contained or controlled.’
[Source: ‘The Number of Fires’ in Overview, Part One: ‘The January-February 2009 Fires’, Vol I: ‘The Fires and the Fire-Related Deaths’ p.4 citing the Department of Sustainability and Environment – Annual Report 2009 (TEN.201.001.0001) at 0047, in Final Report, July 2010, Vol. 1, p.20, by 2009 Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission, State Government of Victoria ]
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According to the Victoria Country Fire Authority, of the fires that were not readily contained on or before 7 February, 14 of those 47 became ‘major fires’. On 7th February alone however, the CFA indicated there were a total of 1386 incidents reported on 7 February — 592 grass and bushfires, 263 structure fires and 156 reported incidents that were false alarms.
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[Ed: Clearly the bushfire conditions were extreme (beyond the usual ‘Total Fire Ban’ severity), the number and distribution of bushfires were considerable and emergency resources were overwhelmed. So for bush arson to be committed on such a declared day was beyond arson; it was ‘pyroterrorism’. But the crime does not yet feature in the Crimes Act. It needs to be. The penalty needs to be equated to that which would be imposed upon a terrorist attempting or actually causing mass murder. It is past time that Australia’s lackadaisical and euphemistic term ‘fire bug‘ is cast to history. We owe this to the memory and respect of 173 people lost. What is significant is that of the 173 who died, most were due to either arson or powerline spark – both human caused].
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The bushfires associated with Black Saturday that were selected to be investigated by the Victorian Royal Commission were on the basis of fires having caused the death of the 173 people and/or where significant damage had occurred.
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2009 Bushfires investigated by the Royal Commission
The investigated bushfires numbered twelve and they were:
Kilmore East Bushfire
Murrindindi Bushfire
Churchill Bushfire
Delburn Bushfire
Bunyip Bushfire
Narre Warren Bushfire
Beechworth-Mudgegonga Bushfire
Bendigo Bushfire
Redesdale Bushfire
Coleraine Bushfire
Horsham Bushfire
Pomborneit–Weerite Bushfire
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[Ed: NOTE: We include the suffix ‘bushfire’ above, unlike the Royal Commission in its literature which abbreviates ‘bushfire’ just to ‘fire’, or even drops the reference to fire completely, bless their imported cotton socks].
2009 Victorian Bushfires – Overview Map
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It is instructive to emphasise that the eventual naming of these fires was based on the point of origin, however on the day it had proven problematic during the overwhelming speed and complexity of the multiple simultaneous bushfire emergencies.
The lead item in the Terms of Reference for the Victorian Royal Commission was sensibly to inquire into ‘the causes and circumstances of these bushfires‘.
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The Bushfires Deliberately Lit *
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Of the above 12 bushfires investigated, those known or suspected to have been caused by arson or otherwise in obscure firefighting-speak ‘undetermined‘ or ‘unknown‘ were:
Murrundindi Bushfire
Delburn Bushfire
Redesdale Bushfire
Upper Ferntree Gully Bushfire
Bendigo Bushfire
Churchill Bushfire
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*Various vague assessments as to cause included ‘suspicious’, ‘unknown’, ‘undetermined’, which in 2012 is unacceptable. Compare the term ‘undetermined‘ to any police investigation into an urban fire causing significant damage; such a vague dismissal would be publicly unacceptable. So in the absence of competent investigation, we shall presume bush arson. So half were caused by arson, which is in line with the Australian Institute of Criminology’s conclusions, above.
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The Murrindindi Bushfire
With bushfire conditions extreme (temperature 44.6°C, humidity 8%, wind 46kph, Bushfire Index 110 – off the scale), the bushfire started about 14:55 on 7 February 2009, to the north of a sawmill in Wilhelmina Falls Road, Murrindindi. The cause was assessed as ‘suspicious’.
After the bushfire had merged with the Kilmore East Bushfire some 168,542 hectares had been burnt. Forty people were killed, another 73 people were injured, 538 houses were destroyed or damaged, mainly in and around Marysville, Narbethong and Buxton. The commercial centre of Marysville was razed to the ground. Firefighting resources involved 195 CFA and 311 NEO personnel, supported by 45 CFA appliances, 22 Networked Emergency Organisation (NEO)* appliances and 3 aircraft.
* [Ed: Networked Emergency Organisation? – a rather new convoluted bureaucratic term given to the Royal Commission to collectively represent a mix of disparate government agencies quickly cobbled together to deal with an emergency outside the control of the Country Fire Authority volunteer base].
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The Delburn Bushfire
With bushfire conditions similarly extreme, albeit with a lower Fire Index of 52, this bushfire started as three separate ignitions in the Strzelecki Ranges on 28 and 29 January 2009:
The Ashfords Road Bushfire – discovered on 28 January at about 4.00 pm, 2.5 kilometres north-north-west of Boolarra.
The Creamery Road Bushfire – discovered at about 1.00 pm on 29 January, 2.5 kilometres east of Delburn.
The Lyrebird Walk–Darlimurla Bushfire – discovered at about 3.30 pm on 29 January, 4 kilometres north of Mirboo North near Darlimurla.
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[Ed: So each started under extreme bushfire conditions in the early afternoon]
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The causes of both the above Creamery Road Bushfire and the Lyrebird Walk–Darlimurla Bushfire were assessed as ‘suspicious’ and the Victorian Police have since laid criminal charges against the suspected arsonist.
The three separate bushfires were not contained and ultimately merged. Increasing wind and changes in wind direction caused spotting and resulted in the bushfire spreading quickly east towards the outskirts of the townships of Boolarra and Yinnar. The surrounding townships included Mirboo North (population 1,300), Boolarra (pop. 600), Yinnar (pop. 600) and Churchill (pop. 5,000). Fortunately there were no fatalities or casualties, but 44 houses were destroyed maily on the outskirts of Boolarra, and some 6,534 hectares burnt out. Firefighting resources involved 597 CFA and 699 NEO personnel, supported by 112 CFA appliances, 103 NEO appliances and 14 aircraft.
Delburn Bushfire 30th January 2009 from NASA satellite
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There had been a further three ignitions around the time (1) at the Delburn–Yinnar refuse transfer station, (2) at Ten Mile Creek Rd in a Hancock Victoria Plantation and (3) at Brewsters Rd, Yinnar. Each was either contained or burnt out without fire-fighting intervention.
.The 2009 Delburn Bushfire
A CFA firefighter runs out hose on Piggery Road at Boolarra 2nd February 2009.
(Photo by Greg Cahir)
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The Redesdale Bushfire
The Redesdale Bushfire started with similar bushfire conditions (temperatures reaching 44.7°C, humidity 7%, winds up to 50kph, Bushfire Index 87.2). The bushfire was reported at 3:11 pm on 7 February 2009.
According to the CFA, the ignition started in a creek bed on open farmland between the eastern bank of the Coliban River and the northern end of Summerhill Road, about two kilometres to the west of the township of Redesdale, about 95 kilometres north-west of Melbourne and 35 kilometres south-east of Bendigo. There were more than 100 houses in the bushfire area.
The cause of ignition of the Redesdale fire has been investigated but ‘not determined‘. Possible sources of ignition that have not been excluded are:
(a) ignition by a spark or hot exhaust system
(b) deliberate ignition
(c) ignition by farm operations
(d) ignition by a carelessly discarded cigarette butt
There was no evidence that any of these sources ignited the fire.
The bushfire burned towards the south-east for about 19 kilometres. It was the first of two bushfires in the region on that day, the second originating
in Maiden Gully, 8 kilometres north-west of Bendigo, around 4:20pm. Fortunately again there were no fatalities, but one reported casualty, 14 houses destroyed as well as more than 50 farm sheds and outbuildings, the Baynton church and a bridge, two olive oil plantations, a vineyard and two blue gum plantations, and 7,086 hectares were burned.
Firefighting resources required were 536 CFA and 127 NEO personnel, supported by 103 CFA appliances, 21 NEO dozers and 1 aircraft. Two CFA forward control vehicles were damaged in the course of the fire fight.
The Upper Ferntree Gully fire started on Saturday 7th February 2009 at about 3:40 pm in a suburban railway corridor through bushland between the Burwood Highway and Quarry Road. The bushfire conditions were extreme as with the entire State. By mid afternoon the wind had picked up and was gusting to 90kph, exacerbating the conditions.
The cause of the fire was not known. The fire initially spread by spotting south-east through scrubland between the Burwood Highway and Quarry Road near houses. By 4:30pm an air crane was requested and just after 5pm the Erikson Aircrane nicknamed ‘Elvis’ had made a number of rapid water drops on the fire, obtaining water from a nearby disused quarry, critically preventing the loss of houses and finally contained by 6pm. There were no fatalities or casualties and no houses were lost, but 4 hectares of regenerated scrubland was burnt.
Erickson S-64 Air-Crane Helitanker (N179AC)
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[To stop video and continue, click the pause button bottom left]
Repeat Offenders? – same place lit again in January 2012: a hot, dry, windy afternoon, familiar turf
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‘Members of the Upper Ferntree Gully cricket team were quick to report a grass fire that started near Quarry Rd. Firefighters from Ferntree Gully and Upper Ferntree Gully attended the blaze, which was reported about 7.15pm on Friday. Upper Ferntree Gully CFA captain Peter Smith said the fire started in vegetation-regeneration area near Quarry Rd.
“It was a grass and scrub fire at the old quarry of probably about a third of a hectare,” Mr Smith said. “Conditions were on our side but we wouldn’t have wanted it any hotter or windier.”
About five trucks responded to the blaze and Mr Smith praised the efforts of those who called 000.
“The people that spotted it were fantastic,” Mr Smith said. “They were local guys from the Upper Ferntree Gully Cricket Club I think, that helped us get in and assisted police.”
The cause of the fire is unknown and being investigated.‘
The Bendigo Bushfire started shortly after 4pm on Saturday 7th February 2009 in the tinder dry hilly bushland of Maiden Gully, 8 km north-west of central Bendigo. Bushfire conditions were extreme (temperatures up to 45.4°C, humidity 6%, winds up to 41kph and the Bushfire Index off the scale at 129). The ignition cause was assessed as ‘suspicious’ – the arsonist was classically upwind of the outskirts of targeted western Bendigo.
The bushfire burned through gently rolling country bordering the city’s western suburbs, where there are numerous former gold diggings that are now public open space interspersed between suburban blocks. One person died as a result, plus there were 41 reported casualties. Some 58 homes were destroyed and 341 hectares burned out.
Firefighting resources required were 152 CFA and 111 NEO personnel, which were supported by 30 CFA appliances, 31 NEO appliances and 3 aircraft.
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The Churchill Bushfire
2009 Churchill Fire Map Overview
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The Churchill Bushfire started at 1:30pm on Saturday 7th February 2009, 3km south-east of the Churchill fire station, from two separate ignitions respectively one at the intersection of Glendonald Road and the other at Jelleffs Outlet. The recorded ‘000’ call received from the public, not coincidently, at 13:32, two minutes later.
Like the other bushfires on that day, the climate background was characterised by a decade long El Niño drought, making the native vegetation tinder dry and so extremely flammable. It was a declared Total Fire Ban across Victoria. The Forest Fire Danger index was off the scale recorded at 103 at Latrobe Valley AWS at 4pm, the temperature reached 46.1°C an humidity at just 8% at the Latrobe Valley automatic weather station around 4pm, the humidity just 8%. The maximum winds recorded before the wind change were north-north-westerly
at 44 kilometres an hour at Latrobe Valley Automatic Weather Station at 15:43, before a south-westerly wind change came through.
Before 7th February, the Country Fire Authority and the Department of Sustainability and Environment had already been providing support in response to three separate bushfires which had started on 28th and 29th January and which had coalesced into one and became the Delburn Bushfire. It had been contained by 3rd February. Like the Delburn Bushfire, thge Churchill Bushfire was started on the one day by two separate ignitions by an arsonist. So then was the Churchill Bushfire a copy cat arson episode? Were the two somehow connected? Did both arsonists know each other?
At the time, the cause of the Churchill Bushfire was recorded as ‘suspicious’. It was in fact deliberately lit in two locations, outside the township of Churchill along a roadside next to and upwind of a pine plantation owned by Hancock Plantations Victoria at the foot of Walkers Hill. The tinder dry conditions fanned by a steady breeze meant the ignitions took hold quickly.
The recorded 000 call received from the arsonist himself at 13:32, two minutes later. Actual fire-fighting response was not documented in the Royal Commission report. It could well have been some hours before the blaze was fought. The following photos of the Churchill Fire are purportedly from the nearby township of Morwell looking south. They show the early minutes after the ignitions.
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The very start of Churchill Bushfire
Photo taken looking south from Hunt Street, Morwell
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‘Composition: vertical-panorama of the smoke from the Churchill Fires that have jumped containment lines near me’
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[Source of photos: ‘Nchalada’s Photostream’, Flickr, ^http://www.flickr.com/photos/nchalada/page2/, accessed 20120827, Ed: Due to their controversial nature, the many photos on this Flickr website may not be accessible for long.]
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During the afternoon and early evening the fire travelled rapidly, affecting Jeeralang North, Balook, Le Roy, Koornalla, Callignee, Callignee North, Callignee South, Hazelwood South, Hazelwood North, Traralgon South, Devon, Yarram and Carrajung South. The final statistics confirm that firefighting resources deployed involved 409 CFA, 167 NEO personnel and 33 Hancock Victorian Plantations firefighters, supported by 76 CFA appliances, 29 NEO appliances and 4 waterbombing aircraft.
Although the fire was at its most destructive on 7th February, it was not reported as controlled until 19th February. Eleven people died as a result of the fire, plus an additional 35 casualties, 156 houses were destroyed, and more than 36,000 hectares were burnt.
About 1000 hectares of Bluegum plantations and 1700 hectares of Radiata Pine plantations owned Hancock Victorian Plantations by were burnt in the fires. An untold number of livestock and wildlife were also burned to death. In the nearby Delburn Fire, an arrest has been made but the outcome of that trial is not yet known at the time of publishing this article.
‘Residents of fire ravaged Gippsland towns have been warned to remain alert despite cooler temperatures today. So far 27 homes around Boolarra and Mirboo North have been lost in the fires. (Ed: The Delburn Bushfire)
More than 400 firefighters from as far as Mildura are currently battling the 6300 hectare blaze with 113 fire trucks, 14 helicopters and 12 bulldozers. About 40 Boolarra and Mirboo North residents have spent the past two nights in emergency accommodation at Monash University in Churchill, after fire swept through their town on Friday.
More than 100 residents attended a community meeting in Churchill this morning to discover whether their properties had survived the weekend.
CFA spokeswoman Rachel Allen warned locals the blaze was far from being classified as safe, despite drizzle predicted and a top temperature of only 29 degrees. “Obviously the threat has diminished somewhat because of the cooler temperatures, but it as important now as it was a few days ago to keep yourselves aware,” Ms Allen said.
Peter McHugh from the Department of Sustainability and Environment agreed, saying the fire threat “was far from over,” and that residents need to remain vigilant for flying embers.
Mr McHugh said possible electrical storms predicted to hit the area later today are a cause of concern for emergency services.
The Delburn fires have claimed 27 homes, 59 sheds, 5 cars and a piggery since they began on Wednesday. Another home is also believed to have been lost yesterday, but fire crews have so far been unable to access the property, just outside Mirboo North. Almost 40 homes are still left without power, while water supply has been restored to Boolarra.
Department of Primary Industries staff are now counting livestock losses around the Boolarra area, and the number is believed to be substantial.
Latrobe City CEO Paul Buckley said it would take at least a year to rebuild Mirboo North and Boolarra.
“When the fires hit Toongabbie about three years ago that took six months to rebuild, and this one is much, much worse,” Mr Buckley said.
Boolarra evacuees housed in Monash University student accommodation units have shared their horror stories of the blaze that engulfed their town.
Tania Martin, 35, praised the efforts of her partner Dave Caldwell, 40, for saving both theirs and their neighbours’ house.
Ms Martin and her son Storm, 10, left their Boolarra home late Friday while Mr Caldwell stayed behind to defend the properties.
“I think he is an absolute hero,” Ms Martin said. Mr Caldwell worked for hours pumping water on both houses as flying embers showered all around him from the fire less than 100 metres away. But Mr Caldwell said the real heroes are the firefighters who have been working around the clock.
“Those guys and girls, you should watch them heading over the hill straight for the fire. It’s unbelievable,” Mr Caldwell said. “They are made of the right stuff, they are.”
Val Kingston, 68, and her husband recently moved to Boolarra from Melbourne for a “tree change.” “And now all the trees are gone,” Ms Kingston said.
Ms Kingston said leaving Boolarra lat Friday had been difficult. “It was the saddest sight I have ever seen looking over my shoulder as I drove away. I just thought “there goes my town.”
Ms Kingston praised the efforts of Monash University residential staff. The University purchased fans for the units where evacuees have set up makeshift homes. They have also provided tea and coffee and icy poles for the kids. “We can’t thank them enough,” Ms Kingston said.
A further 20 firefighters from Mildura and 18 firefighters from Ballarat arrived in Churchill this morning to relieve exhausted colleagues who have been stationed on the fire front for the past two days.
The Churchill fire was threatening communities in south Gippsland late on Monday, fire authorities said. The 33,000 hectare blaze was threatening the community of Won Wron just north of Yarram, in south Gippsland at 5.30pm (AEDT) on Monday.
Residents of nearby Carrajung on the east side of Carrajung-Woodside Road were also expected to be impacted directly.
The Country Fire Authority also issued an urgent threat message at 4.15pm (AEDT) to residents near the Thomson Road area, Churchill, who were being directly hit by the fire. A CFA spokesman said the fire threat had increased as freshening winds picked up.
The death toll from the fires, which police believe were deliberately lit, in the area continued to rise. Nineteen people have now been confirmed dead in the region after the Churchill fires devastated the towns of Callignee, Hazelwood, Jeeralang and Koornalla in southwest Gippsland.
Nine people died in Callignee, one person was killed in Upper Callignee, four people died at Hazelwood, one at Jeeralang and four at Koornalla.
The Churchill fires south of the Princes Highway have so far burnt about 33,000 hectares, while the Bunyip Ridge fire, north of the highway, has razed 25,000 hectares.
Containment lines are also being established on the western and eastern flanks of the Bunyip blaze. Residents of Gembrook have also been warned to be vigilant, although the town is not currently under threat.
In the north of the state, fire around Dederang escalated significantly late on Monday afternoon, also threatening the towns of Beechworth and Yackandandah. The fire was spotting ahead of the main fire and ash and embers were threatening communities in Gundowring, Gundowring Upper, Glen Creek, Kergunyah South, Mudgeegonga and Running Creek. Authorities said some fires could take weeks to contain.
At least 750 homes have been destroyed and more than 330,000 hectares burnt out. The latest death toll is 131, which surpasses the toll from the 1983 Ash Wednesday bushfires, in which 75 people died in Victoria and South Australia, and the Black Friday bushfires of 1939, which killed 71.’
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Misfit Profile of a Bush Arsonist
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Brendan James Sokaluk, was in April 2012 found guilty of all 10 counts of arson causing death by the Victorian Supreme Court in Melbourne for deliberately lighting the Churchill Bushfire on 7th February, 2009. Sokaluk was an ex-volunteer firefighter with a local brigade of the Victorian Country Fire Authority (CFA) from 1987 to 1988, some twenty years prior.
Brendan SokalukNot the smartest bush arsonist, but then could he be?
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Sokaluk, then aged 39, claimed that his old sky blue Holden HJ sedan had apparently broken down on the road near where the fire started, next to a pine plantation where the Churchill Black Saturday fire had begun just minutes earlier.
He was the only outsider on the road. To the residents of Glendonald Road busily packing up their possessions and preparing to flee the raging fire, Brendan Sokaluk stood out. Dressed in shorts and sandals, he was frantically trying to restart his broken-down Holden, which was partially blocking the gravel road.
Once home, Sokaluk climbed on to the roof of his house so he could look back towards Glendonald Road and watch the fire burn.
Sokaluk told several lies to cover his tracks. He told one person he was on his way to a wedding, while to others he said he was visiting a friend in the area. As he was driven back to Churchill by a resident, Sokaluk was overheard telling his father on the phone that he had been in the area to visit a friend to get his chisel set back.
Days later Sokaluk was arrested on the following Friday 12th February on a local street while working delivering the local Latrobe Valley Express newspaper. Sokaluk was interviewed by police for about three hours both at the scene of the fire and in an interview room at a local police station. Police interviewed him and on the following day, Saturday 13th February, they returned him to Glendonald Road and to nearby Jelleff’s Outlet, where the fire had started and where the landscape was now blackened and burnt out.
What emerged was that on the morning of 7th February, Sokaluk had picked up his father Kazimir in his distinctive sky blue Holden HJ and the pair drove to Morwell and Traralgon, visited auto and hardware stores, had lunch at KFC and bought lottery tickets. Kazimir Sokaluk said Brendan’s car was playing up and “running rough” but against his advice his son said he was “going up into the trees” because it was cooler there. Sokaluk also said he wanted to get a chisel set back from a friend named Dave who lived in that area. Another excuse was to access his apparent junk metal collection along Glendonald Road.
The police attempted a re-enactment and the field interview was recorded by video. Sokaluk admitted to police that he had started the blaze, but declared it had been an accident after he dropped cigarette ash out of his car window. He explained that the previous Saturday he had been driving slow, dawdling along in his car. “Looking for animals and stuff,” he said. Asked if he is familiar with the area, he replies: “It’s different `cause it’s not green no more. It’s all burnt out.” The detective asks “How do you know this area?” Sokaluk replied it was where he threw his piece of paper out the window.
“Part of my cigarette thing fell on the floor, so I got a bit of paper out to grab it and stuff… I thought it was dead and I’ve chucked it out the window, but I didn’t know it had lit up. I thought it was out when I threw the paper out the window.” Sokaluk told them. “I had no intention of this all to happen. Now I have to put up [with it] for the rest of my life and it makes me sad.”
The cigarette ash explanation was pivotal in what was a largely circumstantial case. But Sokaluk strenuously denied deliberately starting the fire. But then Sokaluk had told several lies to cover his tracks. He was a serial liar. Yet, without witnesses, evidence, a confession, proving bush arson is inherently difficult.
Prosecutor Ray Elston Senior Counsel argued that Sokaluk deliberately drove to bushland and started a fire on a day that had temperatures that reached nearly 45C. He was calculating enough to lie about his reasons for being in the area, to try to cover his tracks and to point the finger at others. Sokaluk tried to disguise his crime by claiming to police that it was an accident, lying about his reasons for being in the area and trying to point the finger at others, including making a false anonymous report to Crime Stoppers from his home computer blaming a Department of Sustainability and Environment worker for the fire.
Police managed to piece together Sokaluk’s movements on Black Saturday almost to the minute from phone records, witness accounts, shop receipts and CCTV footage. At 1.16 pm Sokaluk was in the IGA store in Churchill where he bought cigarettes before heading off into the Jeeralang Hills. Within 15 minutes a fire erupted in the hills and witnesses said that in tinder dry conditions the inferno tore through the bush seawards towards Yarram.
The Crown called 80 witnesses and its case was a mosaic of evidence that pointed to the guilt of Sokaluk. Mr Elston told the jury the accused had no reason to be in the area that day and if he was going to see Dave, who was home, he never got there.
“Why did he travel on a dirt road to get out there?” Mr Elston said to the jury in his summing up. “Why did he drive off that dirt road on to a graded track on the south side of Glendonald Road? A short distance from where the fire started Sokaluk’s car broke down and he was spotted at the side of the road by a Churchill CFA truck and then later picked up by a couple who drove him back to town.
Mr Elston told the jury:
”When the accused man arrives at that intersection there is no fire. ‘No one else is suggested to be present. When he leaves it’s ablaze. All causes save for deliberate ignition of this fire have been eliminated. ‘There is only therefore one irresistible conclusion to draw from the totality of the material, with respect, we suggest, and that is the accused man set those fires at two points.”
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Neighbours saw Sokaluk on his roof watching the progress of the fire and for some never explained reason he later walked back into the fire area. A resident found him in his back yard and told him to shelter in his house a few minutes before the returning fire storm passed. The jury saw a pathetic picture of Sokaluk with a garden hose in his hand taken by the resident.
It was not until after he was charged with 10 counts of arson causing death that experts diagnosed him with autism spectrum disorder. Until then his family had believed his disability was result of a difficult birth. People in the Churchill area thought Sokaluk was a weirdo and called him” beanie boy” and other names and as soon as locals learned he was in the area where the bushfire erupted he became the prime suspect.
Sokaluk’s barrister Jane Dixon SC during the trial painted a picture of a harmless individual, a “simpleton” whose autism set him apart from others in the community – a “lights out and no-one home” type of personality. “He’s a bit of a misfit really, but nevertheless he muddled along in his own way, muddled along OK with a bit of help from his mum and dad, comfortable enough with his own company, his dog, his hobbies, his obsessions.”
After leaving school, where he had been bullied, Sokaluk worked in a series of jobs before becoming a gardener at Monash University. He did that job for nearly 18 years. Sokaluk spent his days watching kids TV and collecting scrap metal with his dog. Neighbours would hear Sokaluk playing Bob the Builder and Thomas the Tank Engine tapes as he worked in his shed, where he liked to tinker with scrap metal and other junk he had found dumped in the area. Sokaluk’s neighbour Patricia Hammond would sometimes talk to him over the back fence. He would talk to his dog as if he was talking to a child, she said during the trial.
Justice Paul Coghlan of the Victorian Supreme Court sentenced Sokaluk stated in his summing up: “The event was terrifying for all involved in the fires, whether directly or otherwise,” he said. “For the victims, these were and are life-changing events and no sentence that I impose can compensate for their loss.”
Yet Justice Paul Coghlan of the Victorian Supreme Court sentenced Sokaluk to a non-parole custodial sentence of just 14 years. That is one and half years for each human death, excluding the millions of dollars in property damage and the horrific cruel burning to death of all people and animals, the other irreversible damage and tragedy – 156 homes with their personal possessions and memories, the livestock, 36,000 hectares of land, all the agricultural equipment and infrastructure, the forgotten wildlife.
Sokaluk is one of Australia’s worst mass killers as Justice Coghlan concluded. Sokaluk should never be released. Yet his lawyers have already said they are likely to appeal. So who are the real villians? Sokaluk’s barrister Jane Dixon, SC, argued her client had autism and was a simple man and a misfit who was incapable of concocting a web of lies or deceit. Cold comfort to the victims. It was early afternoon on an extreme bushfire day. Sokaluk was upwind of and next to a pine plantation. Sokaluk knew what he was doing.
Had he done it before but not been caught?
Why did he leave the CFA?
Had he been dismissed?
In the CFA one is taught how to light fires for prescribed burning. What triggered his arson?
Was it the devastation and attention that the Delburn Bushfire had created? It too was the cause of local arson.
What was the news reporting like at the time?
Did the media sensationalising serve to encourage Sokaluk as a dormant arsonist to copycat?
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As aptly described by the Herald Sun’ Norrie Ross:
“He was a killer who brought death and devastation to his own community and left a vile legacy for LaTrobe Valley that will never be forgotten or erased.”
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Royal Commission’s Findings into Bush Arson
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One of the Royal Commission’s identified research gaps and priorities emanating out of its analysis was the extent of ‘Deliberately Lit Bushfires‘ and the ‘Causes of Fire-setting Behaviour‘. [Source: ‘Final Report – Summary’, July 2010, Vol. 1, p.20, by 2009 Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission, State Government of Victoria ]
Following from this, the Royal Commission made two specific recommendations to address what it terms ‘Deliberately lit Fires’. Those two recommendations read as follows:
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ROYAL COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION 35
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Victoria Police continue to pursue a coordinated statewide approach to arson prevention and regularly review its approach to ensure that it contains the following elements:
High-level commitment from senior police
A research program aimed at refining arson prevention and detection strategies
Centralised coordination that includes comprehensive training, periodic evaluation of arson prevention strategies and programs, and promotion of best-practice prevention approaches
A requirement that all fire-prone police service areas have arson prevention plans and programs, according to their level of risk.
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ROYAL COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION 36
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The Commonwealth, states and territories continue to pursue the National Action Plan to Reduce Bushfire Arson in Australia, giving priority to producing a nationally consistent framework for data collection and evaluating current and proposed programs in order to identify and share best-practice approaches.
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[Source: ‘Final Report – Summary’, July 2010, Vol. 1, pp.30-31, by 2009 Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission, State Government of Victoria ]
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Misfits in Fire Fighting
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It is disturbing that Sokaluk’s lawyer went to considerable effort and persuasion to try to have Sokaluk acquitted on mental illness grounds. Despite the adversarial nature of our legal system, the ego and public profile of lawyers should not be encouraged in spite of justice. Why was Sokaluk entitled to be represented by expensive and exclusive Senior Counsel? The bastard was at best entitled to Legal Aid. What was the total cost to Victorian taxpayers for his legal defence case? Why was the cost not made public?
Sokaluk was not just an arsonist. The scale and impact of his crime escalates him to being a pyroterrorist. But in Australia, the law lags reality. The maximum penalty for arson is 25 years custodial sentence, yet bushfire arson carries a maximum penalty of just 14 or 15 years. Sokaluk received just 14 years – the maximum penalty for arsonists are charged with criminal damage by fire or similar offences under the Bushfire Act or a manslaughter charge if someone dies as a result of the fire.
What is the rationale behind that discrepancy? It is archaic colonial legislation that sends a message that the value of Australia’s natural environment matters not. But when the bush burns, sometimes it lead to 173 human lives destroyed, as well as widespread calamity and wildlife extinctions.
Sokaluk’s 14 years custodial sentence translates to just 15 months in prison for each human he killed by fire. His sentence ignores his inflicting 35 human casualties, 156 houses destroyed, and more than 36,000 hectares of native forest and plantation forest burnt. Solaluk’s penalty is a judicial disgrace. The slap on the wrist penalty sends an sick and enticing message to dormant serial arsonists, that no matter how bad the fire you may light, at worst you get just 14 years. Solaluk should rot in prison. Yet legally technically, Sokaluk could have received the maximum penalty under the Victorian Forests Act of 1958 for ‘Lighting – intentionally or negligently and where authority should have been obtained – or maintaining a fire in the open air in a state forest or national park; failing to prevent the spread of a fire; leaving a fire without taking reasonable precautions to prevent it spreading or causing injury’.
The maximum penalty? 2 years
Australia’s arson laws and penalties are obscenely excusing of mass murder by being burned alive, horrific burn injuries, considerable and absolute property loss, large scale livestock loss by being burned alive, widespread wildlife habitat killing by being burned alive, livelong trauma, ruination of families and communities, immense suffering, widespread habitat destruction, and the irreversible destruction of a region in every sence of the meaning.
Yet Australian backward politicians dismissively treat bush arson akin to the playing with matches of a fire bug.
In the United States, ‘pyroterrorism’ is becoming seriously recognised. It is deemed to be the willful destruction of a Nation’s forests, farms and cities, through the use of fire. On 28th March 2005 the US Homeland Security held a press conference and revealed that they now had an anti-pyroterrorist taskforce. On April 1st, George W. Bush announced that “Anyone caught deliberately setting forest fires as an act of pyroterrorism will be dealt with the same way we treat other terrorists. Pyroterrorists are getting smarter and learning how to create bigger, more unstoppable forest fires… or there are copycats who want to do the same thing.
The Australian Institute of Criminology has concluded that half of Australia’s 20,000 to 30,000 vegetation fires each year are deliberately lit, costing the community $1.6 billion per year. So what is the Australian Government doing about this home grown terrorism? Nothing!
Many bushfire arsonist are disturbingly drawn from the very agencies entrusted to fight fires. But where are the statistics and what is being done about it?
How many misfits serve in volunteer fire fighting across Australia? How many have been psychologically tested as suitable? How many are subject to IQ tests before joining? None? How many dormant Sokaluks does Australian rural fire-fighting have in its ranks?
The Australian Government at federal and delegated state level neglectfully relies upon a low-cost volunteer base that is drawn from a goodwilling Australian culture, but which is dangerously under-resourced, underfunded and recipient of propaganda that perpetuates this.
Consequently, Australia’s non urban fire-fighting is so desperate for volunteers that dormant Sokaluks are unscrutinised, undetected and yet with their bushfire fighting training are trained to become the most deadly bush arsonists of all.
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Armageddon aftermath of Sokaluk’s 2009 Churchill Bushfire Arson– he’ll be out in just 14 years
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‘Police in Victoria are refusing to confirm reports that the major suspect in their investigation into the marysville bushfire is a member of the Country Fire Authority. Earlier this month detectives said they were closing in on the arsonist responsible. The Marysville fire claimed more than 30 lives. Fairfax Media has reported that the CFA fire-fighter is now considered the major suspect and has been questioned and released with investigations continuing. The CFA won’t comment except to say it’s working closely with the Phoenix Taskforce investigating the fires.’
‘A CFA volunteer was jailed for 22 months today for starting a series of bushfires that had to be fought by his comrades in the local brigade. Justice Michael Tinney told Damian Lisle, 36, that any of the fires had the potential to cause catastrophic loss of life and property in one of Victoria’s highest bushfire danger areas, the Herald Sun reports.
Lisle drove around Mt Evelyn throwing lit pieces of paper from his car just days after the first anniversary of Black Saturday in which 173 Victorians lost their lives. Judge Tinney said Lisle started fires in dead-end streets near houses and in bushland and he did not hang around to see what happened. “You lit these fires and you left. Thereafter it was in the lap of the gods,” Judge Tinney said in his County Court sentence.
Lisle pleaded guilty to nine charges that on February 17, 2010, he intentionally caused a bushfire, and to counts of attempting to escape from custody and drink driving. Judge Tinney said Lisle had a history of mental and alcohol problems and at the time of his offending he was suspended from the Mt Evelyn CFA and facing the sack from his job as an assistant supermarket manager. After he was caught, Lisle told police he had drunk eight stubbies and added: “I remember being angry. I don’t know what about.”
Each of the arson counts faced by Lisle carries a maximum of 15 years jail. Judge Tinney said members of the Mt Evelyn brigade told the court that his crimes had a significant impact on CFA morale. The judge said the fact that Lisle was a CFA volunteer and had fought bushfires made him more aware of the danger to life and limb and both general and specific deterrence were important factors in sentencing.
During a court appearance at Melbourne Magistrates’ Court Lisle jumped the dock and tried to escape and the judge said two people were injured trying to restrain him. He set a maximum term of three years and 10 months.’
‘A CFA volunteer has been charged over a series of fires north of Melbourne, including one on Christmas Day. A man will appear in court today charged with lighting a series of bushfires north of Melbourne.
Jarred Brewer, 19, of Darraweit Guim, near Wallan, has been charged with five counts of intentionally starting a bushfire and 16 counts of improper use of emergency services.Brewer was arrested yesterday following a joint operation between Seymour detectives and the arson squad that began in May last year. The charges relate to fires in bush at Wallan and at nearby Mount Disappointment.
Mr Brewer faced Broadmeadows Magistrates’ Court briefly yesterday afternoon before he was remanded until today. Police prosecutor Sen-Constable Renee Azzopardi told the court Mr Brewer had been charged over fires at Mt Disappointment on November 12 and Christmas Day and two fires at Wallan on January 15.
Sen-Constable Azzopardi said he is also alleged to have made 16 calls to 000 reporting fires. At the Christmas Day fire a 20L fuel container and matches were allegedly found.At one of the fires at Wallan investigators believe the fire was started using fire starters. Mr Brewer was allegedly captured on CCTV footage at Safeway in Wallan shortly before the fire with a shopping bag. The court was told that store records showed a BBQ gas lighter and a bag of fire starters were purchased at that time.
Sen-Constable Azzopardi said local emergency services believed their resources were deliberately stretched so that Darraweit Guim fire brigade could be turned out to fires. The court heard that Mr Brewer attended a fire station at one point and became abusive to fire fighters when they wouldn’t allow him on a truck. Court documents reveal that Mr Brewer has also been charged with lighting fires at Wallan on October 10 and November 16.’
Six Foot Track being bulldozed into a two-laned RFS Fire Trail
(Photo by Daniel Kelton, 20120802)
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News is filtering out that a large section of the iconic Six Foot Track has been bulldozed and vast swathes of forest destroyed.
The Six Foot Track starts from the Blue Mountains west of Sydney near the famous Explorers’ Marked Tree on the Great Western Highway near Katoomba and traces through wild gorges, forests and over ridges to the famous Jenolan Caves, some 42km to the south-west.
‘The Track descends via Nellies Glen to the Coxs River and then climbs Blacks Range before descending again to the Jenolan River by way of Binomea Ridge. In traversing The Track walkers cross a number of distinct cultural and physical landscapes.
William Cooper was instructed in 1884 to undertake a survey of a bridle track between Katoomba and Jenolan Caves. Cooper also supervised the construction of a track which had a width of six feet following approval by the New South Wales Parliament.’[Source: ‘Six Foot Track Conservation and Management Plan’, 1997, Foreword, prepared by Integrated Site Design Pty Ltd in association with Jim Smith for the Six Foot Track Heritage Trust].
The 19th Century Heritage of the Six Foot Track
(An old photo at the information shelter at the start of The Track)
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Aug 2012: Track Bulldozed
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Two weeks ago, on Thursday 2nd August 2012, an Outdoor Recreation Lecturer leading a group of students along the Six Foot Track happened across a crew of construction workers driving bulldozers and in the process of destroying the Six Foot Track. The section of the track affected is situated between Allum Creek and the Black Range Campsite.
When challenged, the construction workers said that the work had been approved by Oberon Council and Kanangra Boyd National Parks Office. They were calling it “road maintenance“.
So much for the Six Foot Track and its 19th Century heritage. It is now a six metre wide road so that fire trucks can hoon along ringing their fire bells in the middle of the forest. In some places the Track has been bulldozed it to 30 metres wide!
Six Foot Track bulldozed beyond recognition
(Photo by Daniel Kelton, 20120802)
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Daniel Kelton, an Outdoor Recreation Lecturer at TAFE and a Bush Walking Guide for a regional commercial company leads regular walks along the Six Foot Track more than twenty times a year.
“I saw numerous earth moving machines blocking the iconic track, doubling the width of the original fire trail in places, I saw many old growth trees bulldozed and pushed into the bush in piles, I saw water drains driven excessively into the vegetation on each side of the track. I witnessed stunned native birds walking amongst the newly felled trees. The impact is over a 15km section of the 6ft Track and has impacted up to 30 metres each side of the original fire trail”, Mr Kelton said.
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Initial investigation has revealed that the earth works were given the go ahead by Oberon Council Engineering Service’s works manager, Ian Tucker, and the Oberon Area Manager with the New South Wales National Parks and Wildlife Service (NPWS), Kim De Govrik, apparently without any environmental, hydrological, or cultural heritage assessments or supervision.
After initial complaints being made to National Parks and Wildlife Service office and Oberon Shire Council from Friday 27th July, road works where substantially decreased, yet Aboriginal sites were damaged after these concerns where raised.
Initial onsite investigation has confirmed the following damage caused along the Six Foot Track:
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Aboriginal Sites have been destroyed at Mini Mini Saddle, Kyangatha Station and Alum Creek along the Track
Road works have been bulldozed to within less than a metre of watercourses along Little River (large piles of dirt waiting to be washed into the river in the next rain)
Counted 213 mature native trees pushed over with a 300 mm or more Diameter at Breast Height (DBH)
At least 23 hollow forming (habitat) trees pushed over
Heritage listed fence post and gate from the old Kyangatha Station knocked down and has disappeared.
The Six Foot Track has been widened, up to double its original width, “For fire trucks to pass” as explained by NPWS Oberon Office
Water mitre drains have been pushed into the bush up to 50 metres in length
Considerable destruction of native vegetation and top soil removal through wetland areas, which may fall under the ecosystem classification of a Montane Peatlands (Temperate Highland Swamps on Sandstone?)
Water drains have been created in inappropriate or unnecessary locations
Piles of soil have been graded into Spring Gully at Grid Reference 2234450E 62603500N, with no silt trap to prevent siltation of the watercourse
Vast areas of exposed soil left will inevitably attract weeds
Large amounts of non-road or safety related impact on vegetation stretching up 50 square in some areas.
There appears to have been no consultation with land owners, or the Aboriginal Land Council, or Gundungurra people of the region
The damage will cause serious adverse impact on tourism appeal of The Six Foot Track
Since the Six Foot Track is now no longer a walking track, vehicles will use it and present a hazard to bush walkers walking along the new road.
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The Aboriginal site destruction and massive Native Flora impact was which committed by a contract road works gang, who where engaged to undertake the works without any impact statements, by Ian Tucker of Oberon Shire Council. The destruction has occurred between Grid Reference 2236590E 6262500N at old Kayangatha Station Ruins and Grid Reference 2269000E 6260600N at the edge of the Pine Forest.
Aboriginal Sites that have been destroyed by machinery are at the following grid references:
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Kyangatha Station: 2236590E 6262500N on the right edge of the road 50m North of the cattle grid. Two chert flakes, and one quartz flake
Mini Mini Saddle: 2235850E 6261700N on the flat cleared ground opposite the un-used cattle grid. Six chert flakes, a direct impact break in one of the flakes from a heavy machine rolling over it
Alum Creek: 2234900E 6260500N on the Little River side of the road opposite Tree of Heaven cluster. One white chert flake.
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All sites are comprised of small chert and quartz flake material of varying colours and sizes. The size of the materials vary from 10mm to 50mm. I was led to believe that the site in which heavy rolling machines have rolled over, and broken some of the chert flake pieces, at Mini Mini Saddle was a pre-recorded camp site. This directly breaches Section 90 of the National Parks and Wildlife Act 1974, whether the sites where identified prior to the works or not.
In an undated Archaeological assessment of the Six Foot Track by Hooper and Marloo, which ran numerous predicted modelling of Archaeological significant areas it was interesting to note that the Black Range was mentioned as a possible route to the West from the Megalong and Kanimbla Valleys. The significance of the ridge as a travel path remained un-assessed, although it was noted as a highly likely area for Aboriginal sites. It is also interesting to note that the only two site areas in the West of the Six foot track that where impacted by the recent works, were listed in the article.
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Why?
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The unsupervised construction workers called it “routine maintenance”. Crap! Clearly, this is illegal land use development. It is wanton irreverible vandalism of important New South Wales natural and cultural heritage.
Oberon Man?
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It appears the Oberon Council was in a hurry to spend “a big payout from flood relief money” according to one of the construction workers, and that they fast tracked the earth works. They told National Parks and the Six Foot Track Heritage Trust that the works where only minor and would fall under the banner of “routine maintenance“.
But how can flood relief money be connected to converting The Six Foot Track into a two-laned fire trail? Has the funding been misappropriated by Oberon Council?
In the past two weeks, many of the so called ‘improvement areas’ have subsequently returned to their original boggy state even after little to no rain.This begs the question: Why the works where carried out in the first place?
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National Parks seem to have agreed with the works, so that they can now drive two fire trucks along it – hooning along a nice wide speedway two abreast.
You reckon?
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“I feel very hurt, and disheartened by the damage to the Track, and I have many unanswered questions”, says Mr Kelton:
‘How can Oberon Council claim that the large amount of impact was only routine maintenance?’
‘Why where local Aboriginal Land Council Members not consulted about the impact on potential sites?’
‘Why was there no member from National Parks or Aboriginal Lands Council on the ground during the works to assess (supervise) damage?’
‘Why where local businesses and tour operators not consulted or informed?’
‘Why does National Parks need to drive two fire trucks along the track, as there are no residential properties along the Black Range Road, and fire trucks could not pass each other on any of the long hill sections anyway?’
‘Would a more thoughtful, ongoing fire control regimes negate the necessity for emergency fire truck access?’
‘Was the impact to local tourism even considered?’
‘What will be the safety and aesthetic impact of the widened road for bushwalkers, who share the track?’
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Aboriginal rock implements found along the bulldozed section of the Six Foot Track Aboriginal cultural sites have been reportedly destroyed at Mini Mini Saddle, Kyangatha Station and Alum Creek.
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Oberon Man’s Day Off?
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History of Government Vandalism to Six Foot Track
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Destruction to The Six Foot Track is not new. Back in June 2005, the Blue Mountains Bushfire Co-ordination Committee, under the chairmanship of Blue Mountains Councillor Chris Van Der Kley, subcontracted a similar bulldozing of the Nellies Glen section of the Six Foot Track. Again the earth works were unsupervised. Again the earth works caused considerable ecological and riparian damage and again they involved reckless bulldozing through documented Aboriginal sites and cultural heritage – as in the case now, numerous ancient stone implements were discovered disturbed by the trail making works.
In August 2005, recent bulldozing of the Six Foot Track was inspected by local Indigenous people and members of the Blue Mountains Conservation Society
(Photo by Liz Mitchell, 20050814)
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Subsequent remediation of the works involved a number of stakeholder meetings and the responsibility for environmental remediation was passed from the BM Bushfire Co-ordination Committee to the Blue Mountains Council to fix. The earth works had resulted in significant disturbance of the road verge in several sections along the road. Ultimately the remediation was carried out by a soil remediation consultant through the New South Wales Department of Lands Soil Conservation Service costing $27,000.
The Soil Conservation Service inspected the damage and created a rehabilitation plan and specification for a section of Crown Road and Crown Reserve (Nellies Glen Road and along the Six Foot Track) where fire trail maintenance works were implemented by the Blue Mountains Rural Fire Service.
The majority of the mitre drains installed typically exceeded the recommended amount of fall. Many of the mitre drains have been extended into drainage lines and were already actively eroding. There were several sections of track where mitre drains had been installed and there was insufficient drainage / fall causing water to build up and likely to erode the table drains and / or mitre drains down slope. Several small culverts had been graded over limiting their capacity. There were several sections of track where water flow would likely increase due to the slope and lack of drainage measures. Several creek crossings had been graded over, potentially exposing the creek bed to scour. There was also noted significant clearing and disturbance along the length of the roadside/track.
The Department of Lands Soil Conservation Service is the New South Wales Government agency to which the custodial Six Foot Track Heritage Trust reports.
Back in 2005, a local Blue Mountains resident, Liz Mitchell, reported her similar shock discovery of recent bulldozing along the Nellies Glen section of The Six Foot Track to this Editor. At the time, this Editor was acting in the capacity as Honorary Director of Colong Foundation for Wilderness. Subsequent investigations were initiated including a walk down The Track to inspect the damage first hand. This Editor wrote the following two articles in the Local Blue Mountains Gazette in the weeks following:
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Letter #1: ‘RFS Bulldozes Six Foot Track’
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This is what a bulldozer can do midweek when nobody’s watching. (Ed: See photo above)
The Six Foot (Bridle) Track is a State icon, first negotiated on horseback in 1887 as a shortcut from Katoomba to Jenolan Caves. The track is ‘protected’ under the Central Tablelands Heritage Trust by the Department of Land and Water Conservation. The area holds important Aboriginal cultural value. The Track passes through a significant River Oak Forest vegetation community and the topsoils along this river valley are particularly sandy, and once exposed are highly susceptible to erosion and weed infestation.
RFS choice of contractor has bulldozed the heritage Six Foot Track out to a 66 foot speedway and fresh mitre drains to channel the new runoff problem into Megalong Creek. Once the rains come and the exposed topsoil’s washed into the creek, flat chance the bush’ll come back.
This is not fire trail ‘maintenance’. This is road making. How ‘strategic’ anyway is a track deep in a bush valley over two kilometres from Katoomba? Strategic for arsonists perhaps. Anyone else would need development consent to bulldoze bush – and probably would be rightly rejected. The privileged exemption status granted to the RFS is for times of emergency. It is not a carte blanche for cowboy contractors.
This sad muddy bog left at the Corral Creek crossing is testament to the loose procedural controls of the bushfire committee. Such actions cannot help the RFS’ otherwise high community standing.’
[Source: ‘RFS Under Fire’ (title changed by newspaper), Blue Mountains Gazette, 20050727, Read previous article on The Habitat Advocate: >’RFS Bulldozes Six Foot Track‘]
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Letter #2: ‘Six Foot Track Abused’
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‘The June bulldozing or grading of the Six Foot Track near Megalong Creek was not only wrong, unnecessary and excessive; it breached the statutory provisions of the Crown Lands Act 1989 under Crown Lands (General Reserves) Bylaw 2001, which prescribes rules for the Track’s environmental protection, heritage and public recreation.
For instance, By-law 23 (2) (n) prohibits conduct in the reserve involving defacing or removing or disturbing any rock, sand, soil, stone or similar substance. It appears no written consent was provided by the Trustee of the Six Foot Track Heritage Trust to the RFS.
The bulldozing also breached the Six Foot Track Conservation and Management Plan of 1997 (two volumes totalling 279 pages). Section 2.1.1 prescribes the need for ecologically sustainable development principles to be followed for all management and planning associated with the Track. Bulldozing or grading is not ecologically sustainable. Policy Statement (7.2) (d) states that the physical elements of the Track including examples of the original alignment, works and sites of Aboriginal and European significance and remnant stands of vegetation should be retained and conserved wherever possible. Numerous threatened species of flora and fauna are recorded as likely present in the Six Foot Tack environs and are listed in Volume I of the Plan. The Plan also states at Section 8.2.5 that “Where development consent is not required an environmental impact statement should be undertaken where there is likely to be an adverse impact on the environment.”
The Plan proposes the following general management objectives for the Six Foot Track:
To ensure that all management decisions fully recognise the considerable cultural and heritage significance of the Six Foot Track
To seek to recover and retain the Track’s original character by the preservation and restoration of identified sites and Track features.’
[Source: ‘Six Foot Track abused’, by Editor, (letter to the editor), Blue Mountains Gazette, 20050831, p.12]
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Oberon Man after a big night out?
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Letter #3: ‘RFS Strategy Misguided’
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It has been revealed that the June bulldozing or grading of the Six Foot Track near Megalong Creek was a mere drop in the RFS Bushfire Mitigation Programme. Across the Blue Mountains, some twenty natural reserves including the Six Foot Track were targeted under the RFS 2004-05 fire trail strategy – Edith Falls, McMahons Point, Back Creek, Cripple Creek, plus some 95 hectares inside our National Park. According to the federal Department of Transport and Regional Services (DOTARS) website, $151,195 was granted to the RFS in the Blue Mountains alone, bulldozing 144 hectares of bush in the name of “addressing bushfire mitigation risk priorities.”
The Six Foot Track Conservation and Management Plan 1997, Vol II lists numerous vulnerable species of fauna recorded near Megalong Creek – the Glossy Black-Cockatoo (Clyptorhynchus lathami), Giant Burrowing Frog (Heleioporus australiacus) and the Tiger Quoll (Dasyurus maculatus). The RFS contractors wouldn’t have had a clue if they were within 100 metres or 1 metre of rare, vulnerable or threatened species.
The RFS is not exempt from destroying important ecological habitat; rather it is required to have regard to the principles of Ecologically Sustainable Development (ESD). Yet the RFS policy on hazard reduction is woefully loose on the ‘Bushfire Co-ordinating Committee Policy 2/03’ on ESD – advocating protection of environmental values and ensuring that ESD commitments are adopted and adhered to by contractors. Experience now confirms this policy is nothing more than ‘green-washing’.
The critical value of dedicated RFS volunteer fire-fighters fighting fires is without question. What deserves questioning is the unsustainable response of the RFS ‘old guard’ to fire trails and hazard reduction with token regard for sensitive habitat. Repeated bushfire research confirms that bushfires are mostly now caused by arson and that the prevalence of property damage is a result of more residential communities encroaching upon bushland.’
[Source: ‘RFS Strategy Misguided’ by Editor, (letter to the editor), Blue Mountains Gazette, 20051005]
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Recommendations:
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The management and conservation of The Six Foot Track is guided by the aptly named ‘Six Foot Track Conservation and Management Plan‘ 1997, which comprises two volumes of a total of 279 pages.
However, on at least two occasions now this plan has been ignored and The Six Foot Track and its surrounding natural habitat and cultural heritage fabric have been extensively vandalised by government contractors. This is unacceptable. Enough is enough. Some organisations are just either slow at learning, or more likely think they are above the law and somehow beyond community accountability.
We make the following recommendations:
All earth works to be immediately halted along The Six Foot Track
An immediate inspection of the damage to be made by Department of Lands and stakeholders including local indigenous peoples to be invited to inspect and comment
Since the NPWS, the Oberon Council or the Trustee of The Six Foot Track can’t be trusted with environmental heritage, the Premier of New South Wales, Mr Barry O’Farrell, should order the Legislative Assembly Committee on Environment and Regulation to conduct a Parliamentary Enquiry with terms of reference to investigate: (1) The extent of the damage to environmental and cultural values caused by the earth works, (2) The extent to which the damage has breached The Six Foot Track Conservation and Management Plan, (3) The custodial failings by the trustee, (4) Whether government flood relief funds have been misused by the Oberon Council, and (5) Make findings and recommendations as to appropriate actions including environmental remediation and appropriate future governance of The Six Foot Track conservation, management and reporting framework and the delegation of its execution.
Disciplinary action should be taken against NPWS Oberon Area Manager, Kim De Govrik; Oberon Council Engineering Service’s works manager, Ian Tucker; and against the Trustee of the Six Foot Track Heritage Trust, Jon Guyver, or whoever is currently in the role. If they are found responsible for the damage, then they should each be immediately dismissed from their positions and from their respective government employers.
The fire tragedy afflicted Australia’s legendary ‘Conservation Cradle’
A scorched Grose Valley from Evan’s Lookout, looking north up Govett’s Gorge
(Photo by Editor taken 20061209, free in public domain. Free Large Image)
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A heritage tragedy unfolds
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A simple lighting stike ignited remote bushland in rugged terrain within the Blue Mountains National Park, over 5km north of the township of Blackheath on 20061113.
Innocuously, the ignition started off on hilly Burra Korain Ridge,It was far from settlement but during relatively calm weather and low temperature, so it was not suppressed but ‘monitored’..then the wind picked up.
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It and a second ignition west were allowed to continue burning for days until they eventually coalesced with compounded backburning into a firestorm some ten days later down in the Grose Valley. On 20061122, the prized Grose Valley and its iconic and precious Blue Gum Forest were incinerated under a pyrocumulus cloud of towering wood smoke that could be seen from the Sydney coast a hundred kilometres away. Some 14,070 hectares of National Park habitat was burnt. The tragedy did not so much as ‘strike‘ from the lighting itself, but as Blue Mountains residents we saw it ‘unfold‘ over many days and nights under the trusteeship of Bushfire Management.
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..ten days later
The pyrocumulus cloud of a screaming, dying Grose Valley precious to many, including wildlife
The Grose Valley and its Blue Gum Forest and wildlife burning to death on 20061122
A greenhouse gas estimate was not taken.
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Community shock, sadness and overwhelming sense of loss
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How was this allowed to happen?
In the days that followed, many Blue Mountains residents and especially the many conservationists familiar with the Grose Valley and Blue Gum Forest over many years became deeply shocked at learning about the loss of this magnificent sacred preserved forest – its tall 300+ year old rare Blue Gums (Eucalytus deanii).
Without knowledge of personal accounts, one respects that the dramatic scenes of the smoke and fire inflicted personal trauma with many, given so many people’s long and established personal knowledge, affinity, love, awe and respect for..
‘The Blue Gum‘
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The Habitat Advocate reaches out to these people (doesn’t matter the fact that years have passed) and we choose to express the view of a need to tell truths and to seek some sense of learned maturity from it all. For the Grose Valley contained many tracks, many walks and many special places if one knew where to look. Popes Glen and from Govetts Leap down under Bridal Veil following the popular Rodriguez Pass to Junction Rock then Acacia Flat and the Blue Gum Forest in the heart of the Grose. Many special places includes Beauchamp Falls, Docker Buttress, Pulpit Rock, Lockley Pylon, Anvil Rock lookout, Perrys Lookdown, Hanging Rock, Pierces Pass, Asgard Swamp, and the inaccessible Henson Glen and David Crevasse gorge.
To this editor, the return in 2007 to a previously sacred special, but incinerated Neates Glen was emptying in spirit. There was heartfelt shock and dismay by many local conservationists familiar with the iconic Blue Gum Forest who became deeply saddened by the tragedy.
Neates Glen, as it was But since incinerated, not by the wildife, but by deliberately lit ‘backburning’
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Phone calls and emails were exchanged with many locals wanting to know the extent of the damage and whether ‘the Blue Gum‘ could recover. The original fire had been fanned westward from Burra Korain Head spotting along the Blackheath Walls escarpment, but then decended and burnt through Perrys Lookdown, Docker Buttress and down and through the Blue Gum. Deliberately lit backburns had descended and burnt out Pierces Pass (Hungerfords Track) through rainforest into the Grose and everyone had seen the pyrocumulus mushroom cloud towering 6000 feet above the Grose on the 22nd.
There was an immense sense of loss. The relatively small Blue Gum Forest, perhaps just several hectares, was unique by its ecological location, by its grand age and by its irreplaceability. The sense of loss was perhaps more pronounced amongst the more mature conservationists, now lesser in number, who knew its original saviours of the 1930s – Alan Rigby, Myles Dunphy and other dedicated bushwalkers who had championed to save it from logging 81 years ago.
The conservation heritage of The Blue Gum Forest dates back to Australia’s earliest conservation campaign from 1931For this reason ‘The Blue Gum Forest’ has been passionately respected as Australia’s ‘Cradle of Conservation’
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The region is home to threatened or rare species of conservation significance living within the rugged gorges and tablelands, like the spotted-tailed quoll, the koala, the yellow-bellied glider, the long-nosed potoroo, the green and golden bell frog and the Blue Mountains water skink. Many would have perished in the inferno, unable to escape. The Grose is a very quiet and sterile place now, with only birds. But to the firefighters, these were not human lives or property.
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Deafening silence from the ‘Firies’ naturally attractedcommunity enquiry and suspicion
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The day after the firestorm that enveloped the Grose Valley, the wind subsided and from 20061123 through to the final mopping up date of 20061203, the 2006 Grose Bushfire and its many ember spotfires came under bushfire management control and were ultimately extinguished or else considered to be ‘benign‘.
It is important to note that during the entire bushfire event from 20061113 through to 20061203, only NSW Rural Fire Service ‘Major Fire Updates’ on its website and headline journalism appeared in the local Blue Mountains Gazette newspaper. Initially, the community, conservationists and ‘firies’ were respectfully passive. In the immediate aftermath of the fire from 20061204 through to the weekly issue of the Blue Mountains Gazette on 20061129, the local community, conservationists and ‘firies’ were letter silent in the paper. It was a combination of shock, preoccupation with the emergency and respectful anticipation of communication from the bushfire authorities.
One can assume here that given the scale of the tragedy, many in the Blue Mountains community were respectfully patient in anticipation of an assured announcement from Bushfire Management or some communication process. But none eventuated.
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Injustice
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The following weekly issue of the Gazette was published on 20061129, but no communication from Bushfire Management. Only dismissive bureaucratic statements came from Parks and Wildlife’s Regional Director Geoff Luscombe with a tone suggesting minimal damage and business-as-usual.
This was the article:
6th Dec: ‘Park managers take stock as smoke clears’
‘Hundreds of fire-fighters are celebrating a return to normality this week after cooler weather and an intense two-week campaign by volunteers and professionals brought a fire in the Grose Valley under control.
According to the Rural Fire Service this good weather, combined with a thorough mop-up operation and ongoing infra-red monitoring, means flare-ups are unlikely.However the 15,000 hectare burnt area – including the iconic Blue Gum Forest – is likely to remain closed for the “foreseeable future” due to safety concerns and regeneration.
Geoff Luscombe, regional manager of the National Parks and Wildlife Service (NPWS), said the fact that only part of the Grose Valley burnt meant many animals had been able to seek refuge.
“Many of the Australian plants and animal species have learnt not only to survive fire but to exploit it,” he said. However he confirmed fears that the fire had burnt Blue Gum Forest – a Mecca for bushwalkers and conservationists in the heart of the Grose Valley.
“Blue gums aren’t a particularly fire-tolerant species,” he said. “Fire last burnt through Blue Gum in 1994. The effects of this fire we don’t know yet and we may not know for many months to come.”
A botanist has been sent to inspect the area and there could be ongoing monitoring.Mr Luscombe did not wish to comment on how the fire was handled due to a lengthy absence, but Inspector Jack Tolhurst from the Blue Mountains District Rural Fire Service has warded off any potential criticism.
“I think at the moment we should be looking at the positive,” said Inspector Tolhurst. “The fire is contained . . . It’s been a very long campaign but at the end of the day we haven’t lost any property or lives and half the Grose Valley at least remains intact.”
A fire that broke out near Zig-Zag Railway last week has also been contained. [Ed. According to inside reports, Zig Zag Railway Station was accidentally firebombed by an aerial helicopter attempting backburning].
“We’ve had a lot of help from a wide range of people. We’ve had wonderful support from the community . . . it was a wonderful effort from everyone.”
Meanwhile the hard work has only just begun for another group of dedicated volunteers.Blue Mountains WIRES are expecting to rescue a number of fire-affected native animals in coming months as they wander into residential areas for food and water.
“The arboreal animals – possums and gliders – they come to grief,” said chairperson Greg Keightly. “Birds suffer heat stress and smoke inhalation. They’re going to be flying around bewildered.”
He said residents who see native wildlife in urban areas should keep pets inside, provide water off the ground in a place safe from predators, and avoid the temptation to feed wildlife.
“Things come up for months after fires,” said Mr Keightley.“Do ring us (4754-2946) if you thing something is injured or doing it tough,” he said.
The national park south of the Great Western Highway, and the lookout at Govetts Leap, are open to visitors.For information on closures call 4787-8877 or visit www.nationalparks.nsw.gov.au’
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Mismanagement?
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So the silence from the firies, from Bushfire Management and from the New South Wales Government ultimately responsible and accountable, was deafening. It was as if the entire Firie fraternity had gone to ground in a code of silence behind closed doors.
So naturally the community response was that something smelt fishy. This communication intransigence was a public relations blunder by Bushfire Management, to its detriment.
Then filtered out accounts of crazy operational mismanagement during the bushfire and of bush arson by the firies behind the roadblocks beyond the public gaze.
Rumours circulated that the initial ignition had been left for burn in the critical first few days of 13th November and 14th November up on Burra Korrain Ridge because it wasn’t right next to a road so that fire trucks could get to it. The fire had even been abandonned. Then the wind picked up and it spread. Airborne firefighting was not called in until a Section 44 incident declaration was effected on 15th November.
A second fire nearby to the west near Hartley Vale, purported also lit by dry lightning on 14th Nov, had attracted broadscale backburning from the Hartley Vale Road. But the backburn got out of control, ripped up the valley fanned by winds and crossed over the Darling Causeway on to the Blackheath Escarpment and the Upper Grose to join up with the first blaze. The onground evidence shows that this was a hazard reduction burn starting from alongside the Hartley Vale Road just east of the village of Hartley Vale.
Then came the account of senior bushfire management at the Rural Fire Service headquarters at Homebush ordering a ‘headburning’ a new 10km fire front along the south of the Bells Line of Road into the Grose Valley. Perhaps the NSW Government had stepped in demanding action. Perhaps RFS headquarters response was a series of overreactions, albeit too late and to be seen to be now ‘acting’ was only compounding the fire risk to the Grose . Apparently, the RFS Commissioner had even touted imposing a massive defacto hazard reduction north of the Bells Line of Road right though the vast wilderness of the Wollemi National Park, to somehow head off another fire on 20th November some 80km away north of Wiseman’s Ferry, but that strategy was rejected in a heated operational debate. [“The Wollemi National Park is part of the World Heritage Area and covers 488,620 hectares. Important values of the park include the spectacular wild and rugged scenery, its geological heritage values, its diversity of natural environments, the occurrence of many threatened or restricted native plant and animal species including the Wollemi pine and the broad-headed snake, significant plant communities, the presence of a range of important Aboriginal sites and the park’s historic places which are recognised for their regional and national significance.” – Wollemi NP Plan of Management, April 2001]
Even the Zig Zag tourist railway station was apparently accidently firebombed by an overzealous airborne firefighter starting backburning en mass
Then came the account of Blackheath residents who had their houses subjected to the risk of a deliberately lit backburn during the course of the bushfire. Despite the out of control wildfire being many miles to the north west of Blackheath, a broadscale backburn (some say is was really a ‘defacto hazard reduction‘) was lit along the fire trail below the electricity transmission line near Govetts Leap lookout. But it got out of control briefly and threatened to burn houses in Connaught Road. Indeed the entire Blackheath Escarpment fire from Hat Hill Road south through Govetts Leap Lookout and Ebans Head was started deliberately as a ‘strategic’ backburn.
Blackheath Escarpment completely burnt (top) for hectares, looking south from Hat Hill Road
(Photo by editor 20061209, free in public domain, click image to enlarge)
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The rural property east of Hartley Vale where on 20070207 there was clear evidence of hazard reduction (HR)commencing only from the south side Hartley Vale Road, opposite.Eucalypts were burned only at the base, but further up the hill the tree crowns had been burned.The HR had quickly got out of control and then crossed over the Darling Causeway.
(Photo by editor 20070207, free in public domain, click image to enlarge)
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Once two weeks had passed since the dramatic firestorm and with only silence emanating from Bushfire Management and the NSW Government, local people had had enough and they wanted answers.
Some 143 local yet disparate conservationists via ‘jungle drums’ met up, discussed the issue, united informally and agreed to go public. They informally formed the ‘Grose Fire Group‘ and contributed to a fighting fund some $1700 odd and became vocal. Two weeks after the Grose Valley Firestorm the Grose Fire Group managed a full page open letter in the local Blue Mountains Gazette on 20061206 on page 13. It was directed to the ultimate authority responsible and accountable for the Grose Fire Tragedy, the NSW Government. The Premier at the time was Labor’s Morris Iemma MP. The NSW Member for the NSW Seat of Blue Mountains as well as NSW Minister for Environment at the time was Bob Debus MP.
Those who valued the Blue Gum Forest challenged those responsible for its protection. The tragedy certainly stirred and polarised the Blue Mountains community. Conservationists naturally wanted answers, an enquiry, a review of bushfire prevention and management from:
NSW National Parks and Wildlife Service under the direction of Regional Director Geoff Luscombe
NSW Rural Fire Service under the direction of Commissioner Phil Koperberg
Blue Mountains Bushfire Management Committee aligned with Blue Mountains City Council and chaired by Councillor Chris Van Der Kley.
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‘Grose Valley Fire – World Heritage takes a hit’
“The Blue Gum Forest, birth-place of the modern conservation movement, was badly damaged by the Grose fire on Wednesday the 22nd of November. If this precious forest was a row of houses, then there would automatically be a major investigation into how the fire was fought. The fact that this major loss of our natural heritage is only now becoming known is testimony to the prevailing attitudes of those controlled the media spin during this recent fire event,” said Keith Muir director of the Colong Foundation for Wilderness.
“Until today the overall perception from the media was that this fire was a good one. No houses or lives lost”, Mr Muir said.
“There where no media updates on the struggle to save Blue Gum. No the reports of success in saving fire sensitive rare plants and rainforests along the escarpment edge. All the media reports spoke of bushland burnt; not on the success of any strategy to minimise the impact on the World Heritage listed national park, while saving lives and property”, he said.
“The Blue Mountains National Park Fire Management Strategy 2004 sets out all the necessary actions to protect the natural environment, as well as life and property. Yet for some reason it appears at this stage that the fire was not fought according to that agreed Strategy, as far as its provisions on natural heritage were concerned”, said Mr Muir.
“Increased fire is a major threat to World Heritage values of the Greater Blue Mountains national parks. Unless we develop and implement better strategies to defend the bush, as well as lives and property, then climate change will make this threat much worse,” Mr Muir said.
“The fire management strategies and techniques undertaken during the fire need to be re-examined to ensure the diversity of the Blue Mountains forests is protected into the future,” he said.
“Future fire management requires the feedback that only an inquiry into the Grose Valley Fire can achieve. Such an inquiry should not be taken as a criticism of those involved in fighting fire. It is an opportunity to ensure that everyone stays on fully board with future efforts to minimise fire damages,” Mr Muir said.’
What exacerbated the conflict was not some much that the bushfire had got out of control and had raged through the precious Grose Valley per se, but it was more the defensive, aloof reaction by ‘Firies’ which escalated into a barrage of defensive and vocal acrimony against any form of criticism of the firefighters.
In the face of such palatable denial by the Firies,of any accountability the initial shock and sadness within the local community within days quickly manifested into outrage and anger, and even to blame and accusations.
Most conservationists however felt a right to question and seek specific answers from Bushfire Management about the Grose Fires, for lessons to be learned, for fundamental changes to be made to bushfire management policy, bushfire fighting resourcing and practices, all simply so that such a tragedy should not be repeated.
But the key problem was that the ‘Firies‘ adopted an ‘in denial’ approach to a community suffering loss. Many Firies denied that they had done anything wrong and rejected any criticism by conservationists. Some Firies vented their anger in the local media attacking anyone who dared criticise. Clearly, Bushfiore Management’s debriefing and review of the bushfire in its immediate aftermath was poorly managed.
Underlying the conflict was the Firies urban fire fighting mandate to ‘protect lives and property” – that is human ones, not forests, not wildlife. Whereas what emerged with many in the Blue Mountains community was the implicit expectation that the World Heritage Area is an important natural asset to be protected, including from devastating bushfire.
The Grose Valley Greater Blue Mountains World Heritage Area
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Hence, it was a conflict between differing cultural value systems. It was about recognition of the value of the natural assets of the Blue Gum Forest and the Grose Valley within the Bue Mountains National Park within the Greater Blue Mountains World Heritage Area.
The iconic Blue Gum Forest
(Acacia Flat, before the pyrocumulus firestorm of 22nd November 2006)
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The iconic Blue Gum Forest
(The aftermath)
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20 Sep: (2 months prior)…‘Fire crews prepare’
[Source: ‘Fire crews prepare’, Blue Mountains Gazette, 20060926]
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‘With warmer days just around the corner and continuing dry weather the Blue Mountains Region National Parks and Wildlife Service (NPWS) is again undertaking rigorous preparation for the coming fire season.
“Every year around this time the NPWS run a number of fire preparedness days to ensure staff and fire-fighting equipment are fully prepared for the season ahead,” said Minister for Environment Mr Bob Debus.
NSW Labor Minister for Environment Mr Bob Debus MP
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“Fire preparedness days require fire-fighting staff to check their personal protective equipment, inspect fire-fighting pumps and vehicles and ensure that communication equipment and procedures are in place and working before the fire season begins.”
Mr Debus said a number of exercises, including four-wheel drive and tanker driving, first aid scenarios, entrapment and burnovers, were also employed to re-familiarise staff with all aspects of fighting fires.
“Burnovers, where fire-fighters are trapped in a vehicle as fire passes over it, is one of the worst case scenarios a fire-fighter can face so pre-season practice is critical to ensure that their response is second nature”, he said. “Local fire-fighters have also undergone stringent fitness assessments to make sure they are prepared for the physical demands of fire-fighting – like being winched from a helicopter into remote areas with heavy equipment, to work long hours under very hot and dry conditions wearing considerable layers of protective clothing”, Mr Debus explained.
Mr Debus said that fire preparedness and fitness assessment days worked in conjunction with a number of other initiatives as part of a year-long readiness campaign for the approaching summer.
“Over the past 12 months, NPWS officers have conducted more than 150 hazard reduction burns on national park land across NSW.”
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“Nineteen hazard reduction burns have been conducted in the Blue Mountains region covering nmore than 4500 ha” ~Bob Debus MP
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Mr Debus said that while fire-fighting authorities are preparing themselves to be as ready as possible for flare ups and major fires, home-owners in fire prone areas of teh Blue Mountains should also be readying themselves for the approaching season. “Now is the time to start cleaning gutters, ember proof houses and sheds, prepare fire breaks and clear grass and fuel away from structures”, he said.’
‘Residents in the historic Hawkesbury River village of St Albans prepared for the worst as raging bushfires neared. Their predicament came with a fresh fire outbreak in a remote corner of Wollemi National Park, 73 kilometres north of Windsor about 2pm. A Rural Fire Service spokesman said the blaze had destroyed 450 hectares by 3pm. It was being fanned by a string of north-westerly winds and had jumped Putty Road, causing its closure to traffic between Singeleton and Richmond. Winds of up to 80kmh forecast for the early hours of tomorrow are expected to drive the fire towards St Albans. About 45 Rural Fire Service volunteers with 10 tankers have been deployed to protect the small community as residents tried to safeguard their homes from floating embers. At least two helicopters were in the air to assist the operation.
Wildfire, spot fires and back burning across the Blackheath plateau
(Photo by Rural Fire Service)
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Blue Mountains:
‘Meanwhile a spokesman for the RFS, Andrew Shade, told (the Sydney Morning Herald) firefighters were waiting to see if changing winds would affect the Blue Mountains fires, which jumped containment lines overnight. “The fire is across about 7000 hectares; we’ve got 18 aircraft working the fire, including two sky cranes, [and] 400 personnel at the fire on about 60 trucks.”
..Other fires continue to burn across the state, with a number of fires across 7000 hectares in the Hunter Valley burning in remote and inaccessible areas. Two other fires, near Forbes and Bathurst respectively, are both contained but the RFS has expressed concerns over the weather and its ability to cause a change in the nature of the the two blazes. Firefighters set up a containment line to protect the outskirts of Blackheath in the Blue Mountains.
Rural Fire Service Commissioner Phil Koperberg said today winds gusting up to 80kmh were predicted for about 3am tomorrow – a time when firefighting planes are unable to fly. At a news conference in Katoomba, Mr Koperberg described the present threat to Blue Mountain towns as “fairly serious … not grave”. However, he urged residents to clean fuel away from their homes as a precaution. This afternoon the most intense efforts were along a containment line at the northern end of Hat Hill Road at Anvil Rock. If that line was breached, the outskirts of Blackheath could be under threat, he said. Firefighters expected wind changes in the area between 4pm and 6pm today. The Bells Line of Road remains closed and the Blue Mountains National Park will remain closed until further notice.
The Great Western Highway and the Darling Causeway were open but drivers were advised to proceed with caution, with smoke likely to affect the roads. A total fire ban now applies in all but the north-east corner of the state as temperatures in the high 30s (Celsius), the strong winds and low humidity combine to produce potentially savage conditions…’
‘Thick smoke continues to drift across the Blue Mountains as the largest firefighting and backburning operation in the region since January 2003 enters its second week.
Hundreds of RFS volunteers, NSW Fire Brigades, SES and NPWS personnel, a number of remote firefighting units and 16 waterbombing aircraft are enlisted under a Section 44 declaration with a mission of containing and then attacking bushfires burning in the Grose Valley. The fires are believed to have been ignited by lightning on Monday, November 13 and at the time of going to press had burnt out 3800 hectares of bushland and private parkland in the valley below Blackheath, Mt Victoria, Bell and Mt Tomah.
No homes were under threat on Tuesday morning, but the RFS almost doubled its resources in the Blue Mountains on Monday night following unfavourable weather conditions.
The NSW FireBrigades also deployed extra fire engines and firefighters ot the Blue Mountains on Tuesday.
The large Blue Mountains bushfire broke its containment lines at Anvil Rock about 11 pm on Monday. Earlier, a comprehensive backburning operation involving 300 firefighters commenced on Saturday night between Blackheath and Mt Victoria to protect the townships if conditions worsened. A second phase began along Bells Line of Road between the Darling Causeway and Mt Tomah on Monday morning, continuing to Pierces Pass picnic area to the south.
The backburning activities can cause heavy smoke to linger in residential areas and residents are advised to close windows and doors. An emergency operations centre is active in Katoomba under the control of Local Emergency Operating Controller and Blue Mountains Police Local Area Commander Patrick Paroz, with the RFS as the lead combat agency.
Blue Mountains RFS community safety officer Eric Berry said remote area firefighting units will continue to attack the fire at the fringe and a fleet of 16 aircraft based in Medlow Bath airfield will operate to contain the fire.
“14 medium to heavy capacity helicopters have been operating 24/7 since last Tuesday [Ed: This contradicts the official RFS Section 44 Incident Controllers Report – Wednesday 15th not Tuesday 14th] and we now have three air crane helicopters on the job,” Inspector Eric Berry said. “This is a massive operation, certainly the biggest in the last three years. “It involves up to 300 RFS, NSW Fire Brigades, NPWS, police and SES personnel and volunteers at any one time, sourced from all over eastern NSW as well as every Blue Mountains RFS brigade. “Then there are the support services chipping in like the Salvation Army, who have been supplying breakfast at 5.30 am on a daily basis for the firefighters.”
Inspector Berry said RFS community information meetings last weekend were very successful in seven upper Mountains towns. “More than 200 residents attended one of the meetings held at Blackheath Golf Club, giving us an opportunity to explain what is going on in plain English. “More meetings may occur, but in the meantime residents should phone the RFS information line for updates. “We are getting nearly 6000 hits on our website per day and are updating the site at regular intervals.”
The Gazette visited the Medlow Bath Airfield last Friday, which continues to be a hive of activity. Six helicopters, including a giant sky crane chopper, took off and landed several times inside an hour, collecting water loads from nearby dams and dropping them into and ahead of the flames. Kev Adams, an RFS volunteer from Gloucester, described the conditions the pilots had to deal with early last week as wild.
“I came down from Gloucester last Wednesday and we went up in a chopper and the wind was blowing at about 41 knots. “We hit a pocket of turbulence and I hit my head on the ceiling even though I was strapped in, that’s how wild the wind was. “Hopefully we’ll be able to head home soon.”
Inspector Eric Berry said good progress has been made, but the weather ahead could test the containment lines.’
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Ed: Additional reporting in the online version of this article:
‘Severe weather is expected for the Blue Mountains this afternoon between 2.00pm and 5.00pm. A Total Fire Ban has been declared for a number of areas across the state today, including the Blue Mountains. Temperatures in the Blue Mountains are expected to reach 31 degrees with west-north-west winds gusting up to 45km/h.
Fire behaviour yesterday was subdued due to mild conditions and the main front extinguishing in very low fuel levels. Advantage was taken of these conditions to consolidate containment lines. The fire has now been burning for fourteen days and burnt nearly 15,000 hectares.
The amount of smoke is likely to increase today. Aircraft and ground crews will be actively patrolling the fire for reactivation of fire edges. Infrared hot spot technology is being used in an attempt to identify stumps and roots that are still smouldering near the edges. Crews can then locate the hotspots and extinguish them.
The Bells Line of Road between the Darling Causeway and Mount Tomah has been re-opened but may be closed intermittently. Mount Banks and Pierces Pass trails and tracks are closed to the public. Residents in the Blue Mountains and Hawkesbury should remain vigilant.’
Volunteers back burn along Bells Line of Road as smoke from the fire front can be seen overhead
(Photo by Wade Laube)
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‘A major bushfire burning out of control in the Blue Mountains again broke containment lines overnight ahead of forecast rugged day for fire fighters. Two separate blazes have blackened more than 8,000 hectares of the Blue Mountains, west of Sydney, with the larger of the two burning on a massive front about four kilometres north of the township of Blackheath.
Wind gusts of up to 70kph are forecast to push through that area, around Grose Valley, about 4am (AEDT) today. Blustery conditions expected for most of the day with temperatures in the low 30s (Celsius).
Rural Fire Service (RFS) Commissioner Phil Koperberg has said the towns of Mt Tomah and Mt Wilson would be vulnerable to a wind change. An RFS spokesman said crews had been working on a 35km containment line through the night but the bigger fire had now broken its eastern containment lines. He said crews were prepared for the “tricky” conditions expected early today, with wind gusts expected to pick up as the day gets warmer. Waterbombing aircraft cannot take off until first light but no property is currently under direct threat.
Meanwhile, a new bushfire burning in the Wiseman’s Ferry area is not posing any immediate threat to the village of St Albans, 90km north-west of Sydney. However, the RFS spokesman said that could also change depending on today’s winds. A total fire ban has been declared for much of the state today, including the Greater Sydney and Greater Hunter areas, the Illawarra and far south coast, southern and central ranges, the upper and lower central west plains and the eastern Riverina.’
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23 Nov: “Massive fire back-burn effort’
[Source: ‘Massive fire back-burn effort’, Mx (free Sydney commuter newspaper), by Matt Sun, 20061123, page 1]
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‘Hundreds of firefighters are today hoping a massive 30km containment line will stop the Blue Mountains bushfire in its tracks. [Ed: Bit late, this is the day after that pyrocumulus firestorm]
About 200 Rural Fire Service and NSW Fire Brigade firefighters worked overnight on a back-burn between Blackheath and Wentworth Falls. Firefighters were on standby until temperatures dropped and winds died. They were sent in to light the back-burn as soon as conditions calmed down. Crews spent this morning back burning on the Bells Line of Road and hoping to create containment lines near the village of (Mt) Tomah if winds subside.
The RFS said 400 firefighters started work on the blaze this morning. The weather bureau forecast a maximum temperature of 27C, 45kph gusting winds and 17% humidity this afternoon.
Two fires, both ignited by lightning 10 days ago, joined up this week and have now destroyed 14,500 ha. An RFS spokeswoman said the fire was burning 2.5 km south of Mt Tomah and 7km north of Wentworth Falls…Crews and 15 aircraft will remain on standby to extinguish any spot fires that pass over teh containment line. Fire-bombing helicopters Elvis and Shania were likely to be sent to other fires burning across NSW.
The RFS today said Blue Mountains townships were not in immediate danger but should remain alert. But experts warned the extreme weather conditions would return next week, with the mercury reaching the mid 30s.’
The above photo shot taken by the local Blue Mountains Gazette newspaper’s lead journalist, achieved front page on 20061129. The caption read: “Assessing the aftermath: Medlow Bath RFS crew member Noah Taylor and team leader Michael Anderson near Evans Lookout last Friday.”
This same photo was re-used by the Blue Mountains Gazette a year later on 20071024 (page 7) to support an article by the Rural Fire Service incident controller in charge of co-ordinating the fire-fighting of the 2006 Grose Fire, Mal Cronstedt, who responded to an article in the paper on this subject by The Habitat Advocate dated 20071010.
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‘Hundreds of weary but determined firefighters are steadily gaining the upper hand over a Grose Valley bushfire that has burned about 15,000 hectares since November 13.
Daylight waterbombing by a fleet of choppers based at Medlow Bath airfield, increasing access by remote area firefighting units, successful backburns along the northern and southern escarpments and milder than predicted weather conditions since Saturday have limited the spread of the fire.
At the time of going to press, 130 RFS, NSW Fire Brigades and NPWS firefighters and nine helicopters were conducting backburns, mopping up buffer zones and cutting in access trails to the fire’s fringes. The active front of the fire was within containment lines yesterday morning, allowing the Bells Line of Road and Mt Tomah Botanical Gardens to re-open.
A small fire that started at Mitchells Lookout in Mt Victoria on November 23 is extinguished and investigations are continuing into its cause.
Blue Mountains RFS is warning residents to remain vigilant by continuing to prepare their homes for fire if conditions worsen and to immediately report any suspicious activity to CrimeStoppers by calling 1800-333-000.
The milder conditions are a welcome relief from the heat and 100 km/h wind gusts that put residents of Hazelbrook, Linden, Faulconbridge and Winmalee on high alert last Wednesday afternoon.
An explosion within the fire, which witnesses described as causing a mushroom-like cloud to develop, ignited spotfires four kilometres north of Lake Woodford and five kilometres north of Hazelbrook. Many residents headed home early from work to clear gutters and roofs and two Winmalee schools opted to close for 24 hours as a precaution. Eighteen water-bombing aircraft attacked the spotfires, extinguishing one within hours and the second by Thursday evening.
For daily fire updates and advice, go to www.bluemountains.rfs.nsw.gov.au, phone a dedicated 24-hour hotline manned by local volunteers on 1800-264-525 or visit your local RFS station, staffed by volunteer station officers.
“These people are the unsung heroes of the RFS,” Blue Mountains RFS public liaison and education officer Paul McGrath said.
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Overwhelming grief shunned by government hush, galvanised an immense sense of environmental injustice :
It was time to challenge (with due civility) the unaccountable bastards in authority…the NSW Government:
An extract of a full page letter in the Blue Mountains Gazette 20061206 on page 13 It was commissioned by 143 concerned Blue Mountains residentsIt was addressed not to the ‘firies’, but to the NSW Government.
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Pulpit Rock on the left of the Grose Valley, before the firestorm
It is easy to see why the Blue Mountains, with their Eucalytus tree oil suspended in the atmosphere, get their famous name.
(Photo by Chris Ellis)
The following article was written by Andrew Campbell 20090209 and in the days following Victoria’s ‘Black Saturday‘ bushfire disaster(s) of February 2009. It is entitled ‘Thoughts on the Victorian Bushfires‘ and is reproduced with permission below. It contributes a insightful and reflective review as well as offering bushfire management reform initiatives out of this tragedy and ahead of future inevitable wildfire emergencies.
The bulk of this essay was written on 10 February 2009, circulated by email among colleagues and posted on Professor Campbell’s web site. It received a strong positive response, eliciting many useful additional points, some of which are now incorporated in this updated version. The original document may be accessed from Professor Campbell’s website Triple Helix Consulting ^http://www.triplehelix.com.au, specifically donwloaded ^http://www.triplehelix.com.au/documents/AndrewCampbellontheVictorianBushfires_000.pdf
Triple Helix Consulting site offers a range of information resources including publications, presentations and projects. As of February 2011, Andrew Campbell has taken on a new role as Professor and Inaugural Director of the Research Institute for the Environment and Livelihoods (RIEL) at Charles Darwin University in Darwin, Australia. This website will be maintained as a record of Triple Helix outputs, but Andrew’s more recent writings and talks will be accessible through RIEL.
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The images have been added.
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Approach to Marysville before Black Saturday
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‘Thoughts on the Victorian Bushfires’
by Andrew Campbell
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Countryside north of Marysville before Black Saturday
(Marysville is in the valley amongst the coloured deciduous trees)
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A friend in America asked me for my thoughts about some of the media and web reports circulating about the Victorian fires.
As a Victorian forester with professional training in fire behaviour, fire suppression and fire management, and with experience as a sector boss in fires leading up to and including Ash Wednesday (February 1983), I have maintained an on-going interest in fire management in Australia. As a consultant policy adviser and research manager I’m interested in what our
response says about our collective knowledge base. The way we handle fires for me is one of the key indicators for how well we are learning to live in this ancient continent. The Victorian fires, and in particular some of the media since the fires, suggest that we have a long way to go in improving the ecological literacy of Australians and the body politic.
There has been lots of rabid stuff coming out since 7th February, pushing long-held anti-green agendas. Suggestions that it’s all the greenies’ fault and headlines like “will the real arsonists
please stand up” claiming that conservationists, tree protection policies and green groups’ opposition to hazard reduction burning are to blame for the fires — and by implication, the tragic loss of life and on-going suffering for people and wildlife — have been particularly ghoulish and offensive.
Claims that more broadscale fuel reduction burning in Victoria’s forests would have prevented these fires and the horrendous loss of life are nonsense. The reasons why these fires have been so destructive of life and property are multiple, interacting, complex and systemic – inevitably a recipe for media to simplify and take short-cuts to reach a convenient narrative (even better if it can be polarised into two opposing camps) that ends up being misleading and unhelpful.
Three crucial facts: 47 degrees temp (115 Fahrenheit), 120km/hr winds and relative humidity of 6%. That these conditions followed two weeks of >40 degrees heat wave, that in turn followed an unusually wet November-December and lots of late spring-early summer growth, after a decade of drought, made for an explosive tinderbox and an unprecedented
Fire Danger Index.
7th February 2009 looking east of Melbourne
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Under those conditions, fuel reduction, access tracks etc are much less useful. These fires burnt through areas that had been burnt by wildfire in 2004, and logging coupes that had been clear-felled within recent years. Mountain Ash forests — the tallest flowering plants in the world — have a lifecycle adaptation to fire. They are difficult to ignite (because they are usually wet forests with predominantly smooth bark), but when the conditions are right, they burn ferociously, creating an ash bed suitable for their regenerating seedlings. As ash seedlings are shade-intolerant, they regenerate best after very hot fires that destroy the canopy. In the absence of such fires over their life cycle, they will not persist. When fires are exploding through the canopies of 200+ feet high trees with volatilised oils creating a superheated vapour, the ground layer becomes virtually irrelevant. Witnesses described huge trees literally exploding, and that is an accurate description under these sorts of conditions.
There were few if any lightning strikes on Saturday until the cool change came through in the evening. Along with problems with power lines, arson probably played a role and two people have already been arrested. The authorities were getting saturation airtime on Melbourne radio and TV from Wednesday onwards, telling people to avoid forested areas if at all possible on Saturday. They were saying very clearly that Saturday would be the worst fire conditions ever experienced in Victoria. While these warnings were essential, it is possible that these very warnings motivated arsonists. There has been too little bushfire research on arson, but that which has been done suggests that it is an important factor in large wildfires.
Black Saturday Firestorm
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Australia (especially Victoria) needs a complete rethink of fire preparedness. With a drying, warming climate, these hitherto unprecedented conditions will become more frequent in future. Professor David Karoly of the University of Melbourne has explained that the maximum temperature, relative humidity and drought index (but not wind speed) in Victoria on 7 February were clearly exceptional and can reasonably be linked to climate change. In early 2007, the Climate Institute commissioned the Bushfire CRC, the Bureau of Meteorology and CSIRO to undertake the most comprehensive and up-to-date assessment of the impact of climate change on bushfire weather in Australia. That report concluded that on the current climate change trajectory, very extreme fire weather days may occur around twice as often by 2020 and four to five times as often by 2050 across much of southern and eastern Australia.
Few people have made the connect between fires and water supplies. If we did fuel reduction burns over the areas and on the frequencies advocated by the “it’s all the greenies’ fault” brigade, then water yields from forested catchments would drop, CO2 emissions would increase, species composition of forests would change and some species would disappear. Crucially, we would still have significant risks to life and property, both as a direct result of fuel reduction burns getting away, and because it would not prevent wildfires under the sorts of extreme conditions experienced on 7 February.
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The answers for me lie in these areas:
Dramatically improved fire detection, early warning and first attack capabilities, with real-time use of satellite imagery, many more aircraft already in the air over high-risk areas on high-risk days, and highly trained first attack crews in helicopters distributed around the state (noting that aerial operations are difficult in very windy conditions and first attack possibilities are limited under the catastrophic conditions of 7 February);
More aggressive fuel management immediately around houses and fire survival bunkers for houses/communities in fire prone areas, and changes to planning laws, home lending and insurance policies and practices, and building codes to mandate fire-sensitive design for measures such as window shutters, leafless guttering systems, under-floor venting, gas bottle storage etc;
Dramatically ramped up efforts to identify arsonists (psychological profiling of fire volunteers etc), penalties for arson, and close monitoring of known arsonists on bad days, with increases in the size of arson squads and stronger penalties for arson; and
Much better and mandatory training in fire preparedness for everyone in high-risk areas.
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The ‘leave early, or prepare, stay and fight’ policy remains the right policy. But the bar has been lifted for both options. Leave early means before the high-risk day (which is reasonable now that forecasts are so accurate). Prepare, stay and fight means being trained, equipped and ready with a plan B (the survival bunker) for those rare (but more likely in future) situations (>40C, <20% relative humidity, >80km/hr winds, super-dry fuels) like 7 February where fire behaviour becomes unpredictable and off the scale. If you don’t have such a bunker (see below) and the forecast is for such conditions, as was clear by 4 February, then you should leave very early.
If you have a house in a beautiful bush setting on an elevated site that is difficult to defend, then a valid strategy would be to invest in insurance rather than bunkers, tanks, pumps and so on. Then get into the habit of leaving (and having critical possessions, pets etc organised) before extreme fire weather arrives. You’d then take your chances with the house, knowing that there is still a greater chance of being in a car accident in any one year than having your house burnt down in a bushfire. Even in this scenario though, I’d nevertheless reduce fuel loads in the vicinity of the house as far as possible.
Rob Gell (pers comm), weatherman, communicator and environmentalist, responded to an earlier version of this piece, noting that councils, banks and insurers have much to answer for, and big opportunities to improve their practices:
“They’ve let thousands of lower socioeconomic sector families settle in fire-prone areas where lots are cheaper and the urban planning issues of overlooking and proximity are not on the agenda. The insurance industry and the banks have been accomplices. The banks have required insurance to build but are not concerned when the policies lapse after the first 12 months. More than 50% of houses were uninsured – I have heard 58%! The insurance companies have not insisted on annually checked and approved Fire Plans – let alone provide a premium discount if a plan is approved. There are no premium discounts for fire-proof house design or for sprinkler systems, working pumps etc.”
Turning off the gas supply at the mains on high-risk days would also reduce the risk for residences. Fuel reduction near houses is important. If councils are prepared to approve dwellings being built in high-risk areas, then it follows that they also need to approve the necessary clearing. But for small lots on high risk sites in forested regions, even total clearing may not be sufficient to ensure safety under extreme conditions, so much more consideration needs to be given to the landscape planning and development approval processes in the first place.
Professor Michael Buxton of RMIT notes (pers comm) that:
“anticipatory policies on the use of materials, building design and building location are long overdue. Governments keep avoiding these issues. Fire hazard mapping is proceeding, but government and local responses remain inadequate. Why do we prevent people from building in a flood plain but allow developers to subdivide land on ridges with one access point in areas of high potential fire hazard?”
For existing houses, if people have any intention of staying, it is important to have at least one significant area of cleared land free of flammable material. This is a completely different matter to broadscale fuel reduction over the whole forest estate. In times past, we would have called that cleared safe area a lawn. Now we need to look at other options.
These fires proved that a parked vehicle (preferably a diesel) with the engine running and the air-conditioning on full recirculating could be a suitable survival shelter, provided it was parked on a large enough clear apron away from major fuel loads. But they also reinforced the well-known point that attempting to flee in a car in dense smoke once the fires are well underway is incredibly risky.
For me, much of the media commentary, the so-called informed opinion and the human behaviour on display during and since the fires, underline the point that in many ways we are still behaving more like displaced Poms, than Australians who are adapted to living in this extraordinary continent. Rowan Reid from the University of Melbourne, wondered in The Age why it is that our weather forecasts don’t routinely report the fire danger index (see below) to better educate the community about likely fire behaviour. It’s also critical that people learn that on extreme fire days they must be well clothed, in heavy cotton from ankle to wrist, with a good hat (preferably a hard hat) and something to cover the face. I find that the hard hat with integrated visor that you can buy with your Stihl chainsaw is a good start.
I cannot believe all the TV footage from the fire zones (in these fires and other recent big fires) showing people trying to defend their properties wearing shorts, singlets and thongs.
Fire-resistant footwear is especially important under ember attack in thick smoke. In countries where temperatures often exceed 40C, the natives dress in long loose-fitting robes, usually white, they always have head-dress and they don’t expose acres of flesh directly to the sun — and that’s in daily life, let alone when confronting a fire…
There is a crucial distinction between strategic hazard reduction burning and managing fuel loads in the immediate vicinity of houses and townships; and broadscale fuel reduction burns across the whole forest estate. I think the former is under-done and the latter is overrated. The crucial point that must be underlined is that under very extreme conditions (Forest Fire Danger Index (FFDI) above 50 — see below), fuel loads are no longer the key driver of fire behaviour, compared with weather (some of which is fire-induced) and topography (especially slope). It is worth remembering that in January 2003, Canberra had a strip 5-10 km wide of flogged-out, drought-stricken paddocks with not a blade of grass on them as a “fire break” to its west, but this did not prevent fires from reaching the pine plantations on its western edge. Once that happened, then of course high fuel loads so close to houses (noting that the plantations were there before the suburbs) led to houses in Duffy, Chapman and Holder being lost.
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“This is a completely different matter to broadscale fuel reduction over the whole forest estate.”
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In particular, the suggestion that having had more fuel reduction burning over larger areas more frequently during the drought of the last decade in Victoria would have prevented
these fires — and by extension that doing even more of it is essential in the hotter, drier climate we are moving into — is not backed up by the best available science. Fuel reduction burning doesn’t bring rain. [Note: Moreover, recent research by Clive McAlpine and colleagues has found a statistically significant correlation between the warming and drying in southern and eastern Australia in recent decades and large-scale broadacre land clearing.]
In the bush itself, there is a case for strategic hazard reduction burns in dry sclerophyll stringybark and box-ironbark forests, woodlands and grasslands. Done properly, strategic hazard reduction burns can reduce fire crowning behaviour and increase the probability of control under most conditions. There is a case for arguing that the 2003 and 2006-7 fires lasted so long because fuel build up over large areas made fire control more difficult. But it does not necessarily follow that the answer is therefore more frequent burning off on a larger scale. We need more and better research to understand the appropriate scale, pattern and frequency that will balance ecological health with (changing) fire protection objectives. Fuel reduction burning on the scale and frequency advocated recently by some advocates (e.g. 10% of whole estate every year) is a blunt instrument likely to lead to perverse outcomes without preventing large fires under catastrophic conditions.
The word ‘strategic’ is important. It is easily abused, for example in proposals to clear great swathes of bush in “strategic firebreaks” that coincidentally align very well with freeway construction programs. For me, ‘strategic’ hazard reduction means consistent with a well thought-through strategy, based on the best available (preferably current) scientific research, with very clear and internally consistent objectives (which balance other public good objectives like water, greenhouse and biodiversity) and performance measures. Much that has been advocated recently fails those tests.
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“There is a compelling case for national leadership in bushfire policy, education, research,knowledge management, monitoring and evaluation, and building the technical capabilities we will need in a much more challenging future for fire management in Australia.”
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Water catchments need to be handled very carefully or water yields will drop even further. Fire researchers are already questioning the increasing tendency to use back-burning as a first option rather than a last option in fire suppression, because it increases the ultimate size of fires and the length of the burning edge. Lives have already been lost during back burns. On balance, keeping more tracks open is justified, provided tracks are well-designed and maintained.
Climate change means that the notion of a ‘cool burn’ is problematic. There have already been coroners’ inquests into the deaths of firefighters undertaking so-called ‘cool burns’. Fuel reduction in wet sclerophyll forests is difficult, because when the forest is dry enough to burn, it means virtually having a planned wildfire. Professor Peter Kanowski of the Australian National University has published a very useful briefing note on fuel reduction burning for the Institute of Foresters, pointing out that, while there is a case for more fuel reduction burning, there are many constraints, and it can’t be implemented in fire-sensitive wet eucalypt forests carrying heavy fuel loads such as the Mountain Ash forests north-east of Melbourne.
It is also a fallacy to suggest that tall wet eucalypt forest in south-eastern Australia used to be burned on a regular basis by Aboriginal people and that with increased frequency and
extent of fuel reduction burning, we would be returning to a more ‘natural’ burning regime. Painstaking research by Ron Hateley of Clunes, in a forthcoming book drawing upon a wide range of primary sources from the diaries of the first settlers and explorers, finds no evidence of so called ‘firestick farming’ by Aboriginal people in Victorian forests. Such burning may have occurred on a modest scale in the open woodlands and grasslands of northern Victoria, but there is no solid primary evidence in either the early diaries, the sedimentary record or the dendrochronological record (tree rings) that Aboriginal people burned the forests of southern and eastern Victoria. Hateley documents solid evidence that historians and others have extrapolated evidence from northern Australia, assuming that Aboriginal burning practices in the northern savannas were also employed in the forests of southeastern Australia. Repeated and reinforced by authors as diverse and notable as Geoffrey Blainey, Tim Flannery and Phil Cheney, this has become an enduring and unhelpful myth. The primary evidence suggests that the tall wet sclerophyll forests and temperate rainforests of south-eastern Australia were characterised by a thick, almost impenetrable understorey, and not subject to regular firing by humans prior to European settlement. Phil Zylstra’s research, based on dendrochronology and charcoal and pollen deposits, suggests that fire frequency in the Australian Alps and the wet sclerophyll forests of south-eastern Australia has substantially increased since European settlement.
Mount Buffalo incinerated
(Photo: Johannes Smit)
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Drying conditions mean that in south-eastern Australia, a ‘cool burn’ in our tall eucalypt forests is now most likely possible in spring, when marsupials and birds are breeding. Under contemporary conditions, fires at this time of year are very difficult to control and often become wildfires with consequent risk to life and property — especially as over recent decades we have approved so many more dwellings in and on the fringes of the bush.
There is a torrent of ignorant opinion from self-appointed experts (mainly from outside Victoria, from people who were not there on Saturday (Germaine Greer being the most extreme example!)) hitting the media at the moment, blaming the greenies, the government and local councils for not doing enough hazard reduction burning. I see a grave risk that the intense and widely shared desire to implement measures “so that this can never happen again” (when of course it can and will), will translate into simplistic, one-dimensional approaches that default to non-strategic fuel reduction burning and increased clearing of native vegetation — with perverse and unintended consequences.
No mainstream conservation organisation in Australia is opposed to well-targeted and managed hazard reduction burning. A drying climate and a very dry decade have narrowed the windows within which it can be done successfully, and many communities and people with respiratory problems complain about the smoke (not to mention the wine industry).
The size of wildfires in Victoria over the last decade means that vast areas have been fuel reduced, and yet the events of 7 February still occurred. Professor David Lindenmayer of the ANU (pers comm) points out that: “I worked out of Marysville for 25 years and every year for the past 5 years the outskirts of the town were fuel reduced.”
Kevin Tolhurst from the University of Melbourne (a current fire researcher gathering current data under contemporary conditions, unlike some retired ‘experts’ trotted out by the media) has said that more fuel reduction in the forests would have made little if any difference under Saturday’s conditions. Prof Ross Bradstock from the University of Wollongong and
the Bushfires CRC, has pointed out that the Fire Danger Index (FDI) was over 150 in Melbourne on February 7. The FDI incorporates temperature, wind speed, humidity and a
measure of fuel dryness. It was developed in the 1960s and calibrated on a scale from zero (no fire danger) to 100 (‘Black Friday’ 1939) for both forests and grasslands. Fuel reduction research has mostly involved small-scale experiments at FDIs between 10 and 20. A forest FDI (FFDI) above 50 indicates that, due to fire crowning and spotting behaviour, weather becomes the dominant indicator of fire behaviour, and it becomes impossible to fight a running forest fire front. When eucalypt forests are crowning, fuel reduction at ground level is academic. Recent research suggests that with a drying warming climate we are now seeing unprecedented FDIs, and need to introduce a new fire danger rating above ‘extreme’ called ‘catastrophic’ to more realistically present the dangers associated with days like 7 February.
Graeme Beasley inspects his property damage in the town of Koornalla near ChurchillPhoto: Wayne Taylor
..’More than 5000 people have been left homeless – some permanently – by Victoria’s devastating bushfires.’
[Source: ‘Relief Centres Swamped’, by Britt Smith, 20090209, ^http://www.theage.com.au/national/relief-centres-swamped-20090209-81c1.html]
Much of the recent criticism of Victorian authorities is unfair, or at best premature. The Victorian authorities have more expertise in these sorts of fires than anyone else. It should be remembered that over 300 new fires started in Victoria on 7 February, and only a dozen were not rounded up, which was a great effort. But those 12 major fires, under unprecedented conditions, caused enormous damage and horrible loss of life. None of the 181 deaths announced up to 10 February were firefighters, which is a huge improvement from Ash Wednesday 1983 and Black Friday 1939. Tragically, one volunteer firefighter from Canberra has since been killed by a falling tree, and several others have been injured by falling limbs in trying to secure control lines. But overall, the marked reduction in firefighter casualties from the firefront itself, compared with previous large-scale fires, is commendable. The Victorian inter-agency coordination processes, their large fire management systems, their aerial detection, airborne infra-red fire-mapping systems, their personnel training, and their community education and communication approaches are already up with the best in the world (especially considering their resource constraints compared with say California). This is entirely appropriate given that Victoria is the most dangerous wildfire region anywhere, in its combination of climate, fuel types and fuel loads, topography and population density.
That is not to suggest that all these things and more could not be much better — as the Royal Commission will no doubt reveal. Professor Rod Keenan, Head of the Department of Forest and Ecosystem Science at the University of Melbourne, has written a perceptive piece arguing that we need to rethink Bushfire Governance at the national level, supporting a stronger national approach to bushfire and land management. I agree with Rod on this, as the intersections between fire management and other national priorities such as climate change, greenhouse gas emissions, water yields and biodiversity conservation are acute.
National Army Response – ‘Operation VIC FIRE ASSIST 2009’
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There is a compelling case for national leadership in bushfire policy, education, research,knowledge management, monitoring and evaluation, and building the technical capabilities
we will need in a much more challenging future for fire management in Australia. We have already made a good start with national coordination of aerial fire-fighting through the National Aerial Firefighting Centre (NAFC) and in collaboration across States and Territories through AFAC. But more could be done, and the Australian Government could be taking a stronger leadership role beyond just providing funds. These fires, against the background of climate change, herald a new era. We now need to achieve a comparable improvement in preparedness, training, equipment and discipline across the wider community, especially in high-risk bushfire zones. This is a mammoth and systemic education, planning, policy, technical and management challenge. It will inevitably mean allocating more resources to these tasks than we have in the past. The public response to these fires in donating hundreds of millions of dollars has been heart-warming. Governments always seem to be able to find funds for rescue packages and disaster response measures after the event. But our record in investing properly in prevention and risk management is modest at best.
Just as the post-mortems of 1939, 1967 and 1983 also led to fundamental re-thinks and systemic improvements (albeit with patchy implementation), so will the Royal Commission into these fires. The whole planning system should be overhauled, way beyond just building codes and vegetation management. Premier Brumby and his cabinet — and I suspect now Kevin Rudd — appear to understand that business as usual will not do. They also seem to understand the link to climate change in making events such as these (and worse) more likely in future. But they have yet to make the logical jump to the urgency of mitigating climate change, which means setting ambitious targets, and retooling the economy from top to bottom to achieve them.
Bushfire Governance is a National Responsibilty
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I’m reminded of the challenge of running whole farm planning courses for farmers in the mid-1980s, looking at how to redesign farm layout and management to get a more synergistic blend of conservation and production. It was difficult to get farmers to imagine an entirely new farm layout — the fences on the ground had become fences in their heads. The most effective technique I found was to say “imagine that your farm has just been burnt out, and all the fences and infrastructure have been destroyed. Would you put them back exactly as they were before?” Invariably, the response was an emphatic ‘no, of course not’. That simple scenario exercise often unlocked their imagination and strategies for how the farm could be redesigned to better ‘fit’ into the landscape, its soil types, hydrology and land forms, rather than be superimposed on to it in a rectilinear fashion dictated by some colonial surveyor 150 years ago.
This analogy applies equally at the level of the world financial system, and at the level of national, state and local governments in Australia. We have had our bushfire, literally and figuratively. The old structures have been flattened. Let’s not put them back as they were. Let’s take the opportunity to redesign, to rewire, to replumb and to replenish our landscapes,
our economies, and our basic systems for food production, energy, transport, water and housing, to fit new climatic, ecological and economic circumstances.
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Gippsland Bushfire of 1898
bushfires are not new to Australia.
The following article is from the Tasmanian Times entitled ‘This is just plain wrong. Why is it allowed to continue?‘ contributed by Tasmanian resident Prue Barratt 20120614. Tigerquoll has contributed to the debate condemning prescribed burning. Further investigation has revealed the extent of the bush arson culture on the Island and is included below.
What’s left of Tombstone Creek old growth rainforest in Tasmania after a ‘Planned Burn’This wet forest was dominated by sassafras, myrtle, tree-ferns and tall Eucalyptus after logging and subsequent regeneration burn, 2006. It is situated at the headwaters of the South Esk River catchment water supply for the town of Launceston.
(Photo by Rob Blakers, 2006)
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‘My name is Prue Barratt and I live in Maydena in the Derwent Valley (Tasmania). I’m writing this to highlight what small towns around this state have to deal with in Autumn and Winter.
Today (Wednesday) started off as a spectacular crisp winter’s day; one of a few really beautiful days we get through our colder months. So I was excited to get outside for the day to enjoy the sun. But by the time I organised myself to venture out it was too late … as I opened my front door I was confronted by smoke … it was literally blowing in my door.
I covered my nose and stepped out to see what was going on and realised there were fires right around our little town; not one fire but a two or maybe three, I couldn’t actually see how many because I couldn’t see and I could hardly breath, I stepped back inside, grabbed the camera, and took the pictures above; this was the view from my roof … 360 degrees surrounded by smoke.
It was one of the worst smoke-outs I had experienced whilst living here and by the time I got back inside I reeked of smoke.
This is just plain wrong. It is the 21st Century on a planet that is worried about carbon pollution! Our leaders need to put an end to these archaic practices now. There is no need to subject communities or the environment in general to this kind off filthy practice.
Tasmania already has one of the country’s highest rates of asthma allergies and lung problems. Why is this allowed to continue? Tassie is supposed to be the “Clean Green State”.
I’m pretty sure the tourist bus loaded with people which crawled through town didn’t think it was a clean green state. I’m pretty sure they were horrified that this happens in a supposed developed country every year.
When your eyes are stinging and you are too scared to open the doors of your home because your house will become unbearably flooded with smoke; when you are concerned for the wellbeing of old and frail family members because you just can’t get away from it unless you completely pack up and leave for the night …
You feel like a prisoner in your own home … in country in this day and age.. There is a serious problem!
Postscript: I just needed to add to my article that three Norske Skog (Boyer pulp mill) employees just turned up on my doorstep and apologised for all the smoke. They weren’t burning coupes but were asked by a couple of locals to burn piles close to their houses; most of the coupes were already burnt earlier in the season, so I need to acknowledge that … but the whole burning off thing needs to stop regardless. They said they were looking into alternatives but it needs to stop now; not later. They have had long enough to change the way they do things … at our expense.’
[end of article]
.Smoke-filled atmosphere engulfing Maydena, South West Tasmania
(Photo by Prue Barratt, April 2012)
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In 2009 paper maker, Norske Skog, with its pulp mill plant situated at Boyer on Tasmania’s Derwent River, axed 50 jobs as a combined consequence of its automation upgrade to its pulp mill plant and due to the structural downturn in paper sales by its newspaper clients.
Ed: Newspapers are losing advertising revenue to Internet based businesses like Seek.com, CarSales.com.au, and HomeSales.com.au and so selling less newspapers and so buying less paper from the likes of Norske Skog.
Pile burning and forest (coupe) burning by Norske Skog is typical business-as-usual deforestation across Tasmania, not only by the forestry industry but by National Parks, the Tasmanian Fire Service and by rural landholders. It is all part of an inherited colonial cult of bush arson that is a key threatening process driving habitat extinctions across the island. Prescribed burning, aka ‘hazard reduction’, is a euphemism for State-sanctioned bush arson which is endemic practice not only across Tasmania’s remanining wild forests, but throughout Australia. It is a major contributor to Australia’s greenhouse gas emissions, which are what many scientists argue are Man’s cause of global warming and climate change.
The Gillard Labor Government is about to introduce a Carbon Tax on 1st July 2012, whereby Australia’s major industrial polluters must pay a Carbon Tax of $23 per tonne. Yet the many hundreds of thousands of tonnes of timber that are burnt by bushfires is somehow excluded – whether it be lightning ignitions allowed to get out of control, or deliberate State-sanctioned bush arson. This makes the Carbon Tax nothing but discriminating political greenwashing, with minimal climate impact. Meanwhile, and more critically, Australia’s ecology, regions by regions, is being driven closer to extinction by destructive bushfire management.
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Comments to Prue’s article by Tigerquoll
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‘CEO Bob Gordon and his Forestry Tasmania (FT) forest marauders along with his partners in eco-crime Tasmania Fire Service (TFS) Chief Officer Mike Brown need to be paying Julia’s Carbon Tax. But instead of $23 per tonne, it ought be $23 per cubic metre.
Send the two organisations broke. Do not donate to the TFS bastards. They light more fires than they put out. ‘Fuel’ Reduction is a euphemism for bush arson. It gives ‘em somthing to do in the off season. It reflects the helpless defeatism of Tasmania’s non urban fire emergency service denied proper and effective government resources to put out serious wildfires when they occur.’
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TFS bastards setting fire to native forests is defeatism, knowing that unless native vegetation is converted to sterile parkland that in a real wildlife it is every man for himself.
They even have removed the ‘Low Fire Risk’ category and added a ‘CatastrophicFire Risk’ category. They may as well add an ‘Armageddon’ category and be done with it! It is defeatism at its worst.
Local case in point – look recent Meadowbank Fire near Maydena in February this year east of Karanja. It started on Saturday, reportedly by “accident” at the Meadowbank Dam and burnt out 5000 hectares. Two days later was still officially ‘out of control’. The meaningless and flawed motto of ‘Stay or Go’ was supplanted by the false sense of security of ‘Prepare, Act, Survive’. In reality the pragmatic community message ought to be ‘You’re On Your Own’.
This Tassie Dad’s Army fire agency is more adept at starting bushfires than putting them out.
The under-resourced, raffle funded volunteer dependent model is abject Government neglect of emergency management. Every time someone criticises the non-urban fire fighting performance, the government bureaucracy and politicans hide behinds the nobleness of community volunteers.
Imagine if URBAN fire fighting was volunteer dependent on someone’s pager going off? Goodbye house.
I feel for the volunteers, but have no respect for the policy or organisation.’
Here’s a question..what is the impact on Tasmanian fauna?
Here’s some research…
“It’s spring, and soon we’ll start to get sensationalist stories predicting a horrendous bushfire season ahead. They will carry attacks on agencies for not doing enough to reduce fuel loads in forests close to homes, for unless those living on the urban fringe see their skies filled with smoke in winter they panic about losing their homes in January.
Fighting fires with fear is a depressing annual event and easy sport on slow news days. Usually the debate fails to ask two crucial questions: does hazard reduction really do anything to save homes, and what’s the cost to native plants and animals caught in burn-offs?
…A new scientific paper published in the CSIRO journal Wildlife Research by Michael Clarke, an associate professor in the department of zoology at La Trobe University, suggests the answer to both questions is: we do not know.
Much hazard reduction is performed to create a false sense of security rather than to reduce fire risks, and the effect on wildlife is virtually unknown.’
State-sanctioned bush arson in Tasmania
[Source: http://www.forestrytasmania.com/fire/fire1.html]
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Bushfires, their smoke and heat, contribute to greenhouse gas emissions. So Bushfire Management has an obligation to reduce bushfires, not create them. Bushfire Management needs to pay a Carbon Tax just like any other industrial polluter.
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‘Forestry tries to spin results of CSIRO Emissions Study’
..more smoke and mirrors from an out-of-touch agency.
‘The Tasmanian Greens today said that a CSIRO study comparing smoke emissions from wood-heaters with forestry burn-offs did nothing to justify Forestry Tasmania’s outdated and unsustainable management practices. The study, commissioned by Forestry Tasmania, found that the majority of smoke pollution in specific parts of the Huon Valley during 2009 and 2010 was caused by wood-heater emissions.
Greens Forestry spokesperson Kim Booth MP said that these results aren’t surprising, particularly in the more densely populated areas such as Geeveston and Grove where the study was conducted.
“This is not a case of one type of smoke pollution being better than another. All smoke emissions are an unwanted nuisance for the community, particularly for those with pre-existing respiratory problems such as asthma.”
“The commissioning and release of this study by Forestry Tasmania is another obvious attempt to justify their so-called regeneration burns. That’s despite the Environment Protection Authority identifying numerous breaches of guideline safety levels for particle emissions caused by burn-offs.”
“We need to be working as a community to reduce all smoke emissions and improve air quality. This means that we must work to educate people on the importance of installing heaters that burn efficiently, and comply with Australian standards.”
“Forestry can’t play down the negative impact of its burn-offs. The Greens receive many complaints from people suffering from respiratory problems, such as asthma, who have no option in some cases but to pack up and leave home during the forest burns season.”
“Proper systems need to be put in place, or its time these burns were stopped once and for all.”
2010: Escaped Controlled Burn at Ansons Bay in mid-Summer
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‘The derived fire location..corresponds to a wildfire at Ansons Bay(north-east Tasmania, near Bay of Fires) , listed on the Tasmanian Fire Service (TFS) webpage on the 23rd of January.
This fire had burnt out 100 ha on 23rd January 2010, and had burnt a total of 200 hectares when reported as extinguished on the 26th.
The fire was reported as an escaped permit burn. The permit burn was ignited on the 22nd of January 2010. The local TFS brigade responded to the wildfire at 14:00 EDT on the 23rd. The wildfire burnt mainly in grassland.
Smoke from a bushfire at Ansons Bay on the 23rd of January 2010 moved westwards towards the Tamar River. The BLANkET air stations at Derby, Scottsdale and Lilydale each detected the smoke as it moved. Ti Tree Bend station(Launceston) and the Rowella station in the lower Tamar also detected the smoke. Derby is approximately 35 km from the fire location, while Ti Tree Bend and the Rowella stations are approximately 100 km from the burn. The peak 10–minute PM2.5 concentrations at these stations were of order 10 to 15 μg m−3.
At Rowella the hourly–averaged PM2.5 reached to near 20 μg m−3 near 21:00 AEST.
[Source: ‘Blanket Brief Report 7: ‘Smoke from a bushfire at Ansons Bay, north–east Tasmania moving into to the Tamar Valley 23rd January 2010’, Air Section, Environmental Protection Authority (EPA), Tasmanian Government, February 2011, ^http://epa.tas.gov.au/Documents/BLANkET_Brief_Report_07.pdf, Read Report]
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Tasmanian Forest Industry – its case for burning native forests every year
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‘The Tasmanian forest industry planned burning program, which includes both burning for forest regeneration, and burning for property protection generally commences in mid-March if conditions are suitable.
.. The Coordinated Smoke Management Strategy developed by the Forest Practices Authority is being used by the Tasmanian forest industry.
As of 2011, all smoke complaints are being received and investigated by the Environment Protection Authority, a Division of the Department of Primary Industries, Parks, Water and Environment. [Ed. But the EPA has no watchdog besides the community, so it can be as incompetent, as negligent, as complicit, as dismissive, as colluding with its sister Tasmanian Government agencies all it likes. The EPA does not have any law that requires it to be publicly transparent. The photos in this article evidence the Tasmanian EPA as an ineffectual and spurious organisation.]
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Forest Regeneration
Fire is an important part of the life cycle of Eucalypts. In nature most eucalypt species require the disturbance provided by fire to regenerate. Eucalypt seeds and seedlings need a mineral soil seedbed, abundant sunlight and reduced competition from other plants to establish and grow. In nature this situation is provided by a major wildfire. Tasmanian forest managers mimic nature by using fire in a planned and controlled way to re-establish healthy fast growing trees after harvesting.
Planned burns are part of an industry-wide programme by :
Forestry Tasmania (FT)
The Forest Industries Asssociation of Tasmania (FIAT).
Tasmania Fire Service
Parks & Wildlife Service, Tasmania.
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Forests & Timber
Forests managed for timber production take more carbon out of the atmosphere over time than unmanaged forests locked up in reserves. Tasmania currently has 47% of forests locked up and unmanaged.
Timber from managed forests is used to build an array of structures from houses to multi-level buildings, sports arenas to architecturally designed public spaces. Timber is light and easy to work with and allows for flexibility and efficiency in design. Timber is warm, aesthetically pleasing and most importantly, renewable. Environments rich in timber have a kinship with nature and make people living and working in them feel at one with the outdoors.
It is so important, in these tough economic times, to use local products. Tasmanian timber produced in the state comes from sustainably managed forests, administered under processes established by Government. In addition, all public and most private forests in Tasmania are third party certified as being sustainably managed by the Australian Forestry Standard. Tasmanian timber is a particularly environmentally friendly choice and we should be using more wood to help combat climate change.
Wood is stored greenhouse gas – held together with stored sunlight. If we are serious about trying to address greenhouse and climate change problems, we should be growing and using more forests, for sustainable energy-efficient products that store carbon and for sustainable biomass-based energy systems.
Harvesting a forest results in the release of some carbon dioxide back into the air from which it came however a considerable portion remains stored in resulting forest products such as furniture, timber for housing and a myriad of paper products.
Ed: Fire is unnatural in old growth wet Eucalypt forests. Many forest plant species are fire sensitive so will not recover in teh evnt of a fire. No fauna are fire tolerant – they either burn to death or die after fire from starvation, exposure or predation. Those who burn forests have no idea of the impacts upon fauna populations, nor the impacts of fire upon biodiversity. Their lay observation upon seeing regrowth of some species is that setting fire to forest habitat must be ok.
Those who perpetuate and extend this myth, fabruicate the notion that fire is healthy and indeed essential for forest regeneration and survival. All new recruits of the Tasmanian Forest Industry, Tasmania Fire Service and Parks & Wildlife Service are duly indoctrinated to this dogma. Of course it is unsubstantiated crap. Al one needs do is walk through an ancient Styx forest that has not been burnt for hundreds of years to disprove the myth.
Those vested interests who stand to profit from deforestation and exploitation of native forests, brandish all protected forest habitat as being ‘locked up’ and ‘unmanaged’. The ecological values of the forests are dismissed as worthless. It is no different to 17th Century traders denied access to Africans for the slave trade.
Timber that is from native old growth forests is not “renewable” unless the industrial logger is prepared to wait 500 plus years to harvest. Logging old growth is eco-theft and irreversibly ecologically destructive.
Tough economic times means that the smart investment is into sustainable industries where there is strong market demand and growth for products not vulnerable to buyer rejection on the basis of immoral sourcing or production.
Biomass-based energy is a technical euphemism for burning forests, which is unacceptable because is causes green house gas emissions. Buring natiuve forests also drive local habitat extinctions.
Use LESS wood NOT more!
2010: Smoke rises into the sky above the Huon Valley in southern Tasmania as the state’s Forestry Department (Forestry Tasmania) conducts fuel-reduction burns on April 18, 2010
[Source: ‘Anger over smoke haze prompts review’ , ABC Northern Tasmania, ^http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2010/04/19/2877011.htm?site=northtas]
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Parks & Wildlife Service – its case for burning native forests every year
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‘Planned burning is an important part of fire management designed to maintain biodiversity and to reduce the risk posed by bushfires to people, houses, other property and the natural environment. Fire plays a major role in the ecology of the Tasmanian natural environment. Fire can be a vital force in maintaining healthy bush. But in the wrong place at the wrong time, it can also lead to the destruction of unique vegetation communities, human life and property.
Our diverse vegetation communities have differing responses to fire, from potentially devastating impacts in alpine areas and conifer forests, to ecologically sustainable effects in buttongrass moorlands and dry scelerophyll forest. Tasmania’s unique fauna has some interesting adaptations to fire. For some species, it is essential for their habitat requirements.
‘The Parks and Wildlife Service is responsible for the management of bushfires on all reserved land in Tasmania.
This management includes:
control of unplanned bushfires
planned burning to reduce fuel loads and make fire control easier and safer
planned burning to help maintain biodiversity, promote regeneration of plants that depend on fire and to maintain suitable habitat for animals
maintaining assets that assist with bushfire control, for example, fire trails, firebreaks and waterholes.
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Planned Burning of Tasmania’s National Parks (to date) for 2012
The first planned burn area in the table above labelled as ‘Narawntapu‘ applied to Narawntapu National Park, specifically at Cosy Corner, Bay of Fires Conservation Area, in north-east Tasmania. The ecology is renowned for its Wombats and Tasmanian Devils. Where do they go when Parks Service starts fires?
Tasmania’s famous ‘Bay of Fires’
(Narawntapu National Park)
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The posted notice read:
‘Parks and Wildlife Service is today (Tuesday 8 May) conducting a fuel reduction burn in the Bay of Fires Conservation Area south of St Helens at the Cosy Corner North campground. The burn is about 20 hectares. The objective is to reduce fuel loads to provide protection for the campground in the event of a wildfire.’
So somehow the planned burn of 20 hectares extended to nearly 800 hectares inside the protected National Park! Was this yet another escaped burn? Where is the ecological report of damage to flora and fauna? So much for the National Parks motto ‘leave no trace’. How hypocritical!
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“How can walkers help keep Tasmania wild and beautiful?
Leave No Trace is an internationally accepted way of minimising impacts on the places we visit.”
~ Parks and Wildlife Service, Tasmania
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The National Park before the burn
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A wombat in Narawntapu National Park cannot run from fire
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The Burn Area of nearly 2800 hectares of Tasmania’s National for 2012, translates to 28 square kilometres.This is that aggregate area relative to Hobart – the entire map above!It’s like Hobart’s 1967 Black Tuesday every year in Tasmania’s National Parks
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Forest Smoke across southern Tasmania, from planned burning, April 2008
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Tasmania Fire Service – its case for burning native forests every year
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Ed: It doesn’t just have one programme, but two. One programme to burn native forests every year, the other to slash and bulldoze access to get good access to burn the native forests.
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Fuel Reduction Programme
‘Each summer, bushfires in our forests pose a significant threat to communities in rural areas, and on the rural-urban interface. Large, uncontrollable bushfires can have serious consequences for Tasmanians. The Tasmanian Government has committed funds towards a program of planned fuel reduction burns to help protect Tasmanians from the threat of wildfires. The program will see the State’s three firefighting agencies, Forestry Tasmania, the Tasmania Fire Service and the Parks and Wildlife Service combine their expertise in a concerted program aimed at reducing fuel loads around the state.
The objective of the inter-agency Fuel Reduction Burning Program is to create corridors of low fuel loads to help prevent large wildfires. The program complements but does not replace fuel reduction burning and other means of fuel reduction close to houses and other assets.’
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Bushfire Mitigation Programme
‘The Bushfire Mitigation Programme provides funds for construction and maintenance of fire trails and associated access measures that contribute to safer sustainable communities better able to prepare, respond to and withstand the effects of bushfires.
The program is administered by Australian Emergency Management (AEM) within the Australian Government Attorney-General’s Department. Tasmania Fire Service is the lead agency in Tasmania for the Bushfire Mitigation Program.
In the 2009 Budget the Australian Government announced funding of $79.3m over four years for a new Disaster Resilience Program (DRP).
The DRP will consolidate the existing Bushfire Mitigation Program (BMP), the Natural Disaster Mitigation Program (NDMP) and the National Emergency Volunteer Support Fund (NEVSF) in an effort to increase flexibility for the jurisdictions and streamline the associated administration for both the Commonwealth and the States and Territories.
The Commonwealth Attorney-General’s Department is currently working with representatives from each jurisdiction to ensure that the transition to the new DRP is as smooth as possible.
The DRP will commence in 2009-10 and details of the funding arrangements, program guidelines and implementation plans will be announced by the Commonwealth Attorney-General’s department and disseminated to the relevant agencies and stakeholders in each jurisdiction in due course.’
Smoke haze from burnoffs pushed Tasmania close to breaching air safety standards last week.
In one 24-hour period, emission levels from the forestry regeneration and fuel-reduction burns “were approaching the standard”, state environmental management director Warren Jones told the Sunday Tasmanian.
Elevated particle levels had been detected in Launceston and Hobart on several days during the week.
A Sunday Tasmanian investigation into the smoke haze has revealed:
Between 5000ha and 7000ha is earmarked for forestry regeneration burns this season.
About 70,000ha of the state’s forest was razed by wildfire in the past summer.
The smoke contains a mix of carbon monoxide, tar, ash, ammonia and known carcinogens such as formaldehyde and benzene.’
The Tasmanian Greens today said that the Parliament needs to commission an independent study into the total social, environmental and economic costs of forestry burns, as they continue to emit pollutants into the air causing distress to the many Tasmanians suffering from respiratory complaints, and also impacting on Tasmania’s clean, green and clever brand.
Greens Health spokesperson Paul ‘Basil’ O’Halloran MP burn-off practice as outdated, old-school and not in line with appropriate practice today, especially when it continues to put thousands of Tasmanians with respiratory complaints in distressing situations. These airborne emissions impact disproportionately on children.
“Once again Tasmania’s beautiful autumn days are blighted by the dense smoke plumes blocking out the sun and choking our air,” Mr O’Halloran said.
“This is an unacceptable situation. It compromises Tasmanians’ health, our environment, and is an insult to common-sense.”
“The Greens are calling for the Minister to commission independent social, environmental and economic impact study of these burns.”
“Tasmania’s tourism industry also has reason for concern over this due to the plumes of smoke that choke up the air sheds and appear as a horrible blight on the Tasmanian Landscape.”
“We also want to see an end to these burns, and are calling on the Minister to consult with the community to establish a date by which this polluting practice will end once and for all.”
“It is also concerning at the impact these burns have on Tasmania’s biodiversity and threatened species such as the Tasmanian Devil, burrowing and freshwater crayfish, and a myriad of other plant and animal species.”
“The annual so-called forest regeneration burns have just commenced with Forestry Tasmania alone intends to conduct 300 coupe burns over five districts, and this will emit copious amounts of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere, contributing to climate change, not to mention the risk this poses for the many Tasmanians who suffer from respiratory complaints such as Asthma,” Mr O’Halloran said.
The Killing of Wild Tasmania – Extinction by a Thousand Fires
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These photographs provide an illustration of current Tasmanian forestry practices. The photos are from Coupe RS142E, in the upper valley of Tombstone Creek, one kilometer upstream from the Tombstone Creek Forest Reserve in the northeast highlands of Tasmania. Tombstone Creek is a tributary of the upper South Esk River, the headwaters of the water supply for Launceston.
Majestic ancient Rainforest in Tombstone Creek (c.1000 AD to 2006)BEFORE the Tasmanian Government’s State-sanctioned arson
(Photo taken in 2003)
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AFTER
(Photo taken in October 2006)
‘I first came upon this forest in May 2003, and was so struck by it’s beauty that I made several return visits during the following 12 months. This steep valley-side supported a wet and mossy forest characterized by myrtles, blackwood, tall eucalypt emergents, groves of tree-ferns up to eight meters high and some of the largest sassafras that I have seen anywhere in Tasmania. Many of the sassafras trees had trunk diameters of one meter or more at chest height.
This forest was clear-felled by cable-logging in the summer of 2005 and burnt in an exceedingly hot fire in April 2006. All of the rainforest trees were killed outright. The site is steep and soils are sandy and the valley side was left in a condition which was highly vulnerable to severe soil erosion. This coupe is bordered by some areas that were logged within the last 10 years or so, and the regrowth in these adjacent coupes is a mix of wattle and eucalypt. A narrow strip of rainforest remains at the new coupe’s lowest edge, along Tombstone Creek, but recolonization by the rainforest trees cannot occur, due to the competitive advantage of the eucalyptus and wattles in a full sunlight situation. This is especially so in the context of a drying climate. Simply put, the process enacted here is conversion, in this case from a mature mixed rainforest dominated by myrtle and sassafras, with eucalypt emergents, to an uncultivated crop of wattle and, presumably, the aerially sown eucalypt species.
In this process of conversion, which is far from being confined to this particular coupe, two options are precluded. Firstly, the option for the natural forest to continue to exist for it’s own sake and to develop towards rainforest, a point from which, given the age of the eucalypts, it was not far removed. The second opportunity forgone is for the possibility of alternative uses of species other than wattle and eucalypt, including wood uses, for future generations of people.
Other negative and significant ecological impacts have occurred here, including devastating effects on wildlife, altered hydrology, atmospheric pollution, weed invasion and not least, the release of massive amounts of carbon, previously sequestered within the soil and the living vegetation, into the atmosphere.
The scenes depicted here are all within 100 meters of each other. The forest scenes were photographed in 2003, the other scenes in October 2006.
‘It’s spring, and soon we’ll start to get sensationalist stories predicting a horrendous bushfire season ahead. They will carry attacks on agencies for not doing enough to reduce fuel loads in forests close to homes, for unless those living on the urban fringe see their skies filled with smoke in winter they panic about losing their homes in January.
Fighting fires with fear is a depressing annual event and easy sport on slow news days. Usually the debate fails to ask two crucial questions: does hazard reduction really do anything to save homes, and what’s the cost to native plants and animals caught in burn-offs?
A new scientific paper published in the CSIRO journal Wildlife Research by Michael Clarke, an associate professor in the department of zoology at La Trobe University, suggests the answer to both questions is: we do not know.
What we do know is a lot of precious wild places are set on fire, in large part to keep happy those householders whose kitchen windows look out on gum trees.
Clarke says it is reasonable for land management agencies to try to limit the negative effects of large fires, but we need to be confident our fire prevention methods work. And just as importantly, we need to be sure they do not lead to irreversible damage to native wildlife and habitat.
He argues we need to show some humility, and writes: “The capacity of management agencies to control widespread wildfires ignited by multiple lightning strikes in drought conditions on days of extreme fire danger is going to be similar to their capacity to control cyclones.” In other words, sometimes we can do zip.
Much hazard reduction is performed to create a false sense of security rather than to reduce fire risks, and the effect on wildlife is virtually unknown.
The sooner we acknowledge this the sooner we can get on with the job of working out whether there is anything we can do to manage fires better. We need to know whether hazard reduction can be done without sending our wildlife down a path of firestick extinctions.
An annual burn conducted each year on Montague Island, near Narooma on the NSW far South Coast, highlights the absurdity of the current public policy free-for-all, much of which is extraordinarily primitive. In 2001 park rangers burnt a patch of the devastating weed kikuyu on the island. The following night a southerly blew up, the fire reignited and a few penguins were incinerated. It was a stuff-up that caused a media outcry: because cute penguins were burnt, the National Parks and Wildlife Service was also charcoaled.
Every year since there has been a deliberate burn on Montague, part of a program to return the island to native vegetation. Each one has been a circus – with teams of staff, vets, the RSPCA, ambulances, boats and helicopters – all because no one wants any more dead penguins.
Meanwhile every year on the mainland, park rangers and state forests staff fly in helicopters tossing out incendiary devices over wilderness forests, the way the UN tosses out food packages. Thousands of hectares are burnt, perhaps unnecessarily, too often, and worse, thousands of animals that are not penguins (so do not matter) are roasted. All to make people feel safe. Does the burning protect nearby towns? On even a moderately bad day, probably not. Does it make people feel better? Yes.
Clarke’s paper calls for the massive burn-offs to be scrutinised much more closely. “In this age of global warming, governments and the public need to be engaged in a more sophisticated discussion about the complexities of coping with fire in Australian landscapes,” he writes.
He wants ecological data about burns collected as routinely as rainfall data is gathered by the agricultural industry. Without it, hazard reduction burning is flying scientifically blind and poses a dangerous threat to wildlife.
“To attempt to operate without … [proper data on the effect of bushfires] should be as unthinkable as a farmer planting a crop without reference to the rain gauge,” he writes.
In the coming decades, native plants and animals will face enough problems – most significantly from human-induced climate chaos – without having to dodge armies of public servants armed with lighters. Guesswork and winter smoke are not enough to protect our towns and assets now, and the risk of bushfires increases with the rise in carbon dioxide.
James Woodford is the editor of www.realdirt.com.au.
This article was initially written by this editor and published in the Blue Mountains Gazette newspaper on 20051005 as a letter to the editor, entitled ‘RFS strategy misguided‘.
.19th Century heritage-listed ‘Six Foot Track’
..bulldozed by the Rural Fire Service in July 2005, widened into a convenient Fire Trail for its fire truck crews.
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It has been revealed that the June bulldozing or grading of the Six Foot Track near Megalong Creek (Blue Mountains, New South Wales) was a mere drop in the Rural Fire Service (RFS) Bushfire Mitigation Programme.
Across the Blue Mountains, some twenty natural reserves including the Six Foot Track were targeted under the RFS 2004-05 Fire Trail Strategy:
Edith Falls
McMahons Point
Back Creek
Cripple Creek
Plus some 95 hectares inside the Blue Mountains National Park.
According to the Australian Government’s (then) Department of Transport and Regional Services (DOTARS) website, some $151,195 was granted to the RFS in the Blue Mountains alone, for it to bulldoze and burn 144 hectares of native bushland under the euphemism of “addressing bushfire mitigation risk priorities” (Ed: Read ‘bush arson‘)
‘The Six Foot Track Conservation and Management Plan 1997, Vol II’ lists numerous vulnerable species of fauna recorded near Megalong Creek – the Glossy Black-Cockatoo (Clyptorhynchus lathami), Giant Burrowing Frog (Heleioporus australiacus), Spotted-tailed Quoll (Dasyurus maculatus).
Spotted-tailed Quoll
(Dasyurus maculatus)
Blue Mountains top order predator, competing with the Dingo
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The RFS contractors wouldn’t have had a clue if they were within 100 metres or 1 metre of rare, vulnerable or threatened species.
The RFS is not exempt from destroying important ecological habitat; rather it is required to have regard to the principles of Ecologically Sustainable Development (ESD).
The ‘Rationale‘ of this RFS ESD policy states at Clause 1.2:
‘The Bush Fire Coordinating Committee, under the Rural Fires Act 1997 Sec 3 (d), is required to have regard to ESD as outlined in the Protection of the Environment Administration Act 1991, which sets out the following principles:
a) The precautionary principle namely, that if there are threats of serious or irreversible environmental damage, lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing measures to prevent environmental degradation. In the application of the precautionary principle, public and private decisions should be guided by:
i. careful evaluation to avoid, wherever practicable, serious or irreversible damage to the environment, and ii. an assessment of the risk-weighted consequences of various options.
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b) Inter-generational equity namely, that the present generation should ensure that the health, diversity and productivity of the environment are maintained or enhanced for the benefit of future generations
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c) Conservation of biological diversity and ecological integrity should be a fundamental consideration in all decisions.
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d) Recognising the economic values that the natural environment provides. The natural environment has values that are often hard to quantify but provide a benefit to the entire community. By recognising that the natural environment does have significant economic and social values we can improve decision making for the present and future generations.’
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Yet the RFS policy on hazard reduction is woefully loose in the ‘Bushfire Co-ordinating Committee Policy 2 /03 on ESD‘ – which (on paper) advocates protecting environmental values and ensuring that ESD commitments are adopted and adhered to by contractors.
Experience now confirms this policy is nothing more than ‘greenwashing’. The RFS wouldn’t know what environmental values were if they drove their fire truck into a Blkue Mountains upland swamp. There is not one ecologist among them.
While the critical value of dedicated RFS volunteer fire-fighters fighting fires is without question, what deserves questioning is the unsustainable response of the RFS ‘old guard’ to fire trails and hazard reduction with token regard for sensitive habitat. Repeated bushfire research confirms that bushfires are mostly now caused by:
Bush arson (hazard reduction included, escaped or otherwise)
More residential communities encroaching upon bushland.
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Under the ‘Blue Mountains Bushfire Management Committee Bushfire Risk Management Plan’(Ed: their bureaucratic name), key objectives are patently ignored:
‘Ensure that public and private land owners and occupiers understand their bushfire management responsibilities’
‘Ensure that the community is well informed about bushfire protection measures and prepared for bushfire events through Community Fireguard programs’
‘Manage bushfires for the protection and conservation of the natural, cultural, scenic and recreational features , including tourism values, of the area’.
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Instead, the Rural Fire Service is content to look busy by burning and bulldozing native bushland. The RFS actively demonises native vegetation as a ‘fuel hazard‘, in the much the same way that ignorant colonists of the 18th and 19th centuries demonised Australia’s unique wildlife as ‘vermin‘ and ‘game‘.
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Further Reading:
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[1] Previous article on The Habitat Advocate: ‘RFS Bulldozes Six Foot Track‘ (published 20101220): [>Read Article]
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[2] Tip of the Bush-Arson Iceberg
What these government funded and State-sanctioned bush-arsonists get up to, deliberately setting fire to wildlife habitat, is an ecological disgrace.
The following list is from just 2005 of the vast areas of native vegetation deliberately burnt across New South Wales in just this one year. [Source: DOTARS].
Not surprisingly, this State-sanctioned bush-arson information is no longer published by government each year for obvious clandestine reasons, as the bush-arson continues out of the public eye.
The hazard reduction cult is similarly perpetuated across other Australian states – Victoria, Queensland, South Australia, Tasmania, West Australia as well as Northern Territory and the ACT. No wonder Australia’s record of wildlife extinctions tragically leads the world! There is little precious rich wildlife habitat left.
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National Park and Wildlife Service (NSW) Bush Arson:
(Note: ‘NR’ = Nature Reserve, ‘NP’ = National Park, ‘SCA’ = State Conservation Area… as if these bastards care)
Reserve / Activity Name
Treatment Area (km2)
Baalingen NR
5
Baalingen NR
6
Bald Rock NP
7
Banyabba NR
0.5
BANYABBA NR
3
BANYABBA NR
24
BANYABBA NR
8
Barakee NP
6
Barool NP
20
Barool NP
6
Barool NP
5
Barool NP
4
Barool NP
2
Barool NP
5
Barrington Tops NP
2.5
Barrington Tops NP
2
Barrington Tops NP
6
Barrington Tops NP
18
Barrington Tops NP
6
Barrington Tops NP
16
Barrington Tops NP
11
Barrington Tops NP
1
Barrington Tops NP
4
Barrington Tops NP
2
Barrington Tops NP
1
Barrington Tops NP
3
Basket Swamp NP
1
Basket Swamp NP
12
Basket Swamp NP
2
Basket Swamp NP
4
Bellinger River NP
1
Ben Boyd NP
0.8
Ben Boyd NP
3
Ben Boyd NP
0.9
Ben Boyd NP
0.9
Ben Boyd NP
5
Ben Boyd NP
13
Ben Boyd NP
5
Ben Boyd NP
0.4
Ben Boyd NP
1
Ben Boyd NP
2
Ben Boyd NP
3
Ben Boyd NP
5
Ben Boyd NP
3.6
Ben Boyd NP
1.9
Ben Boyd NP
1.6
Ben Halls Gap NP
3
Bindarri NP
2
Black Bulga SCA
8
Black Bulga SCA
12
Black Bulga SCA
21
Blue Mountains NP
42
Blue Mountains NP
8.3
Blue Mountains NP
23
Blue Mountains NP
10
Blue Mountains NP
12
Bogendyra NR
Bolivia NR
1
BOLLONOLLA NR
2
Bondi Gulf NR
8
Bondi Gulf NR
6
Bondi Gulf NR
10
BONGIL BONGIL NP
0.3
BONGIL BONGIL NP
0.5
Boonoo Boonoo NP
9
Boonoo Boonoo NP
10
Booti Booti NP
0.5
Booti Booti NP
0.3
Booti Booti NP
3
Booti Booti NP
0.3
Booti Booti NP
3
Border Range NP
6
Border Ranges NP
4
Border Ranges NP
3
Border Ranges NP
4
Border Ranges NP
2.8
Bouddi NP
0.5
Bouddi NP
0.3
Bouddi NP
0.9
Bouddi NP
0.9
Bouddi NP
0.5
Bouddi NP
1.1
Bouddi NP
0.5
Bouddi NP
1.9
Bouddi NP
1.1
Bouddi NP
0.6
Bouddi NP
2.3
Bournda NR
10
Bournda NR
5
Bournda NR
0.5
Bournda NR
0.5
Bournda NR
0.5
Brindabella NP
20
Brisbane Water NP
4.4
Brisbane Water NP
2.4
Brisbane Water NP
3.7
Brisbane Water NP
3.6
Brisbane Water NP
0.3
Brisbane Water NP
3.1
Brisbane Water NP
0.6
Budawang NP
4.8
Budderoo NP
10
Bugong NP
3.1
Bundgalung NP
2
BUNDJALUNG NP
7
BUNDJALUNG NP
4.5
BUNDJALUNG NP
8
BUNDJALUNG NP
1.5
BUNDJALUNG NP
0.5
BUNDJALUNG NP
6
BUNDJALUNG NP
3
BUNDJALUNG NP
3
BUNDJALUNG NP
4
BUNDJALUNG NP
2
BUNDJALUNG NP
1
Bundundah Reserve
1.94
Bundundah Reserve/Morton NP
4.7
Bungawalbyn NP
2
Bungawalbyn NP
2.25
Bungawalbyn NP
4
Bungawalbyn NP
5
Bungawalbyn NP
3
Bungawalbyn NP
4.5
Bungawalbyn NP
6.5
Bungawalbyn NP
5
Bungawalbyn NP
1.65
Bungawalbyn NP
1.5
Burnt Down Scrub NR
2
Burnt School NR
2
Burrinjuck NR
8
Burrinjuck NR
15
Burrinjuck NR
3
Butterleaf NP
Butterleaf NP
3
Butterleaf NP
3.2
Butterleaf NP
1.2
Butterleaf NP
1.6
Butterleaf NP
1.2
Butterleaf NP
2
Butterleaf NP
1.8
Butterleaf NP
1.4
Butterleaf NP
0.5
Butterleaf NP
2.3
Butterleaf NP
3.3
Butterleaf NP
3.9
Butterleaf NP
5.3
Butterleaf NP
0.4
Butterleaf NP
0.5
Butterleaf NP
1.5
Butterleaf NP
2.9
Butterleaf NP
5.3
Butterleaf NP
4
Butterleaf NP
3.3
Butterleaf NP
3.6
Butterleaf NP
1.5
Butterleaf NP
8.8
Butterleaf NP
0.5
Capoompeta NP
10
Cataract NP
Cataract NP
1.5
Cataract NP
2
Cataract NP
2
Cataract NP
1.5
Cataract NP
2
Cataract NP
1
Clayton Chase
5
Clayton Chase
10
Clayton Chase
3.5
Clayton Chase
4
Clayton Chase
3
Clayton Chase
3
Clayton Chase
4
Conjola NP
5.7
Conjola NP
1.8
Conjola NP
8.3
Conjola NP
4.8
Conjola NP
2.9
Conjola NP
4.5
Conjola NP
6.5
Coolah Tops NR
28
Coolah Tops NR
1
Coolah Tops NR
6
Copeland Tops SCA
3
Copeland Tops SCA
3.5
Corramy SCA
0.7
Cottan-bimbang NP
6
Cottan-bimbang NP
16
Cottan-bimbang NP
15
Culgoa NP
30
Curramore NP
Curramore NP
8
Curramore NP
8.9
Curramore NP
11
Curramore NP
5.5
Dapper NR
10
Deua NP
15.2
Deua NP
1.4
Deua NP
1
Deua NP
4
Deua NP
21.5
Deua NP
2.1
Deua NP
1.4
Deua NP
3.3
Deua NP
8.5
Deua NP
20.8
Deua NP
5.3
Deua NP
6.6
Deua NP
28.2
Deua NP
5.65
DUNGGIR NP
4
Eurobodalla NP
0.8
Eurobodalla NP
2.5
Eurobodalla NP
0.8
Eurobodalla NP
2.4
Eurobodalla NP
2
Flaggy creekNR
3
Flaggy creekNR
1.8
GANAY NR
2
GANAY NR
2
Garawarra SCA
Garby NR
2
Gardens of Stone NP
18
Gibraltar NP
14
Goobang NP
5
Goobang NP
25
GUMBAYNGIR SCA
12
GUMBAYNGIR SCA
7
GUMBAYNGIR SCA
6
Ironbark NR
13.5
Jerrawangala NP
6.83
Jervis Bay NP
2.37
Jervis Bay NP
5.42
Jervis Bay NP
0.56
Jervis Bay NP
0.82
Jervis Bay NP
1.45
Jervis Bay NP
1.72
Jervis Bay NP
0.21
Jervis Bay NP
0.32
Jervis Bay NP
0.7
Jervis Bay NP
0.4
Jervis Bay NP
0.35
Jervis Bay NP
0.35
Jervis Bay NP
0.48
Jervis Bay NP
1.03
Jervis Bay NP
0.65
Jervis Bay NP
1.91
Jervis Bay NP
0.34
Jervis Bay NP
0.95
Jervis Bay NP
1.46
Jervis Bay NP
0.71
Jervis Bay NP
1.07
Jingellic NR
20
Karuah NR
10
Karuah NR
28
Karuah NR
10
Karuah NR
12
Karuah NR
1
Kings Plains NP
7
Kings Plains NP
0
Kings Plains NP
4
Koreelah NP
6
Kosciuszko NP
30
Kosciuszko NP
9.5
Kosciuszko NP
22
Kosciuszko NP
22
Kosciuszko NP
33
Kosciuszko NP
33
Kosciuszko NP
33
Kosciuszko NP
12
Kosciuszko NP
12
Kosciuszko NP
17
Kosciuszko NP
5
Kosciuszko NP
28
Kosciuszko NP
9
Kosciuszko NP
6
Kosciuszko NP
6
Kosciuszko NP
26
Kosciuszko NP
8.9
Kosciuszko NP
15
Kosciuszko NP
15
Kosciuszko NP
2.5
Kosciuszko NP
8.9
Kosciuszko NP
10
Kosciuszko NP
11
Kosciuszko NP
4.8
Kosciuszko NP
18
Kosciuszko NP
19
Kosciuszko NP
7.2
Kosciuszko NP
7.2
Kosciuszko NP
13
Kosciuszko NP
18
Kosciuszko NP
33
Kosciuszko NP
33
Kosciuszko NP
18
Kosciuszko NP
18
Kosciuszko NP
15
Kosciuszko NP
12
Kwiambal NP
7
Kwiambal NP
3
Kwiambal NP
2
Kwiambal NP
2.25
Lake Macquarie SCA
0.3
Lake Macquarie SCA
0.4
Lake Macquarie SCA
0.4
Lake Macquarie SCA
0.4
Ledknapper NR
15
Linton NR
12.5
Meroo NP
2.4
Meroo NP
0.9
Meroo NP
0.6
Meroo NP
3.3
Meroo NP
3.9
Meroo NP
3.5
Meroo NP
0.5
Morton NP
5.9
Morton NP
8.3
Morton NP
3.8
Morton NP
6
Morton NP
13
Morton NP
0.4
Morton NP
4.5
Morton NP
5
Morton NP
2.7
Morton NP
0.7
Morton NP
2.1
Morton NP
1
Morton NP
6
Mt Canobolas SCA
1
Mt Clunnie NP
6.5
Mt Dowling NR
2
MT NEVILLE NR
11
MT NEVILLE NR
1
MT NEVILLE NR
1.5
MT NEVILLE NR
11
MT NEVILLE NR
1.5
MT NEVILLE NR
3.5
MT PIKAPENE NP
2
MT PIKAPENE NP
4
MT PIKAPENE NP
2.5
MT PIKAPENE NP
1.5
MT PIKAPENE NP
1.5
MT PIKAPENE NP
4
MT PIKAPENE NP
7
MT PIKAPENE NP
2
MT PIKAPENE NP
2.5
MT PIKAPENE NP
6
MT PIKAPENE NP
3
MT PIKAPENE NP
0.5
MT PIKAPENE NP
0.5
MT PIKAPENE NP
2.5
MT PIKAPENE NP
2
MT PIKAPENE NP
1
MT PIKAPENE NP
2.5
MT PIKAPENE NP
6
MT PIKAPENE NP
2
MT PIKAPENE NP
1
MT PIKAPENE NP
2.5
MT PIKAPENE NP
2
MT PIKAPENE NP
1.5
Mummell Gulf NP
3
Mummell Gulf NP
7
Mummell Gulf NP
5
Munmorah SRA
0.7
Munmorah SRA
0.8
Munmorah SRA
0.45
Munmorah SRA
1
Munmorah SRA
2
Munmorah SRA
0.9
Munmorah SRA
1.6
Muogamarra NR
1
Murramarang NP
0.9
Murramarang NP
8
Murramarang NP
1
Murramarang NP
5.1
Murramarang NP
8.2
Murramarang NP
3.1
Murramarang NP
6.8
Murramarang NP
16
Murramarang NP
4.3
Murramarang NP
4
Myall Lakes NP
5
Myall Lakes NP
5
Myall Lakes NP
1.5
Myall Lakes NP
2
Myall Lakes NP
1
Myall Lakes NP
5
NGAMBAA NR
2
NGAMBAA NR
5
Nombinnie NR
10
Nymboida NP
6
Nymboida NP
12
Nymboida NP
3
Nymboida NP
4
Nymboida NP
1
Nymboida NP
4
Nymboida NP
4
Nymboida NP
3.2
Nymboida NP
4.5
Nymboida NP
2
Nymboida NP
4
Nymboida NP
2.8
Nymboida NP
4.2
Nymboida NP
4.2
Nymboida NP
4.2
Nymboida NP
4.2
Nymboida NP
4.2
Nymboida NP
4.2
Nymboida NP
4.2
Nymboida NP
4.2
Nymboida NP
7
Nymboida NP
6
Oxley Wild Rivers NP
10.7
Oxley Wild Rivers NP
19.1
Oxley Wild Rivers NP
13.4
Oxley Wild Rivers NP
18
Oxley Wild Rivers NP
18
Oxley Wild Rivers NP
15
Oxley Wild Rivers NP
33
Oxley Wild Rivers NP
33
Oxley Wild Rivers NP
5
Oxley Wild Rivers NP
5
Oxley Wild Rivers NP
4
Oxley Wild Rivers NP
3
Oxley Wild Rivers NP
7
Parma Creek NR
0.21
Parma Creek NR
0.07
Parma Creek NR
0.3
Parma Creek NR
0.01
Parma Creek NR
0.29
Parma Creek NR
5
Paroo Darling NP
60
Policemans Cap
10
Razorback NR
17
Richmond Range NP
3.9
Richmond Range NP
6.5
Richmond Range NP
3.8
Richmond Range NP
4.5
Richmond Range NP
5.5
Richmond Range NP
9
Royal NP
1
Seven Mile Beach NP
1.09
Seven Mile Beach NP
1.79
Seven Mile Beach NP
2.24
Seven Mile Beach NP
0.74
Seven Mile Beach NP
2.03
Severn River NR
6
Single NP
21
South East Forest NP
5
South East Forest NP
1.2
South East Forest NP
1.2
South East Forest NP
2.6
South East Forest NP
3
South East Forest NP
10.9
South East Forest NP
1.3
South East Forest NP
1
South East Forest NP
1.2
South East Forest NP
2.8
South East Forest NP
2
South East Forest NP
1.2
South East Forest NP
2
South East Forest NP
5.1
South East Forest NP
3.5
South East Forest NP
0.5
South East Forest NP
6
South East Forest NP
3
South East Forest NP
1
South East Forest NP
5.5
South East Forest NP
0.8
Stoney Batter NR
6
Tapitallee NR
0.52
Tapitallee NR
0.33
Tapitallee NR
0.36
Tapitallee NR
0.32
Tarlo River NP
3.8
Tarlo River NP
2.1
Tarlo River NP
2.9
Tarlo River NP
5.9
Tarlo River NP
6.5
Tarlo River NP
2.7
Tarlo River NP
2.1
Tarlo River NP
6
Tollingo NR
150
Tomaree NP
1.8
Tooloom NP
3
Toonumbar NP
31.9
Toonumbar NP
8.5
Toonumbar NP
17
Toonumbar NP
21.5
Triplarina NR
0.71
Triplarina NR
0.32
Triplarina NR
0.66
Triplarina NR
0.75
Triplarina NR
1.34
Triplarina NR
0.31
Triplarina NR
1.24
Triplarina NR
1.35
Ungazetted (Kalyarr NP)
48
Ungazetted (Kalyarr NP)
26
Unknown
7
Wa Hou NR
10
Wa Hou NR
1
Wa Hou NR
7
Wa Hou NR
1
Wa Hou NR
11
Wa Hou NR
1
Wa Hou NR
7
Wa Hou NR
1
Wa Hou NR
1
Wa Hou NR
1
Wa Hou NR
1
Wallaroo NR
3
Wallaroo NR
1.5
Wallaroo NR
8
Wallaroo NR
5
Wallaroo NR
11
Wallaroo NR
7
Wallaroo NR
7
Wallaroo NR
16
Wallaroo NR
6
Wallingat NP
2
Wallingat NP
1.3
Wallingat NP
3.6
Wallingat NP
3.3
Washpool Np
18
Washpool NP
5.3
Washpool NP
5.6
Washpool NP
7.1
Washpool NP
6.4
Washpool NP
1.6
Washpool NP
7
Washpool NP
2.8
Watson’s Creek NR
5
Wereboldera SCA
9
Woggoon NR
144
Wollemi NP
21
Wollemi NP
12
Wollemi NP
10
Wollemi NP
30
Wollemi NP
7
Wollemi NP
11
Wollemi NP
7
Wollemi NP
16
Wollemi NP
2
Wollemi NP
8
Wollemi NP
5
Woodford Island NR
1.5
Woodford Island NR
2
Woodford Island NR
3
Woodford Island NR
3
Woollamia NR
1.51
Woollamia NR
0.77
Woollamia NR
1.95
Woollamia NR
1.88
Woollamia NR
0.74
Woomargama NP
15
Yabbra NP
8
Yabbra NP
45
Yango NP
0.45
Yanununbeyan NP
11
YARRIABINNI NP
2
YARRIABINNI NP
3
YARRIABINNI NP
5
YARRIABINNI NP
6
YARRIABINNI NP
4
Yuraygir NP
4
Yuraygir NP
3.5
Yuraygir NP
1
Yuraygir NP
1
YURAYGIR NP
0.03
Yuraygir NP
1
Yuraygir NP
3.5
Yuraygir NP
1.5
Yuraygir NP
1.5
Yuraygir NP
1.5
Yuraygir NP
1.5
Yuraygir NP
1.5
Yuraygir NP
1.5
Yuraygir NP
1.5
Yuraygir NP
1.5
Yuraygir NP
1.5
Yuraygir NP
1.5
Yuraygir NP
28
Yuraygir NP
10
Yuraygir NP
12
Yuraygir NP
1
Yuraygir NP
1
Yuraygir NP
4
Yuraygir NP
3.5
3,785.10 Ha
i.e. An area 6km x 6km
.
NSW Local Government Areas (LGAs)
Bush Fire Management Committee / LGA
Reserve / Activity Name
Treatment Area (km2)
Blue Mountains
Northern Strategic Line -Primary
8
Blue Mountains
De Faurs Trail – Mt Wilson -Primary
2.8
Blue Mountains
Mitchell’s Creek Fire Trail – Primary
3.5
Blue Mountains
Nellies Glen Fire Trail
2.8
Blue Mountains
Back Creek Fire Trail – Primary
3.2
Blue Mountains
Mt Piddington Trail – Hornes Point
N/A
Bombala
Gibraltar Ridge Fire Trail (2) (PT)
20
Bombala
Mt Rixs Fire Trail (PT)
6
Bombala
Roaring Camp Fire Trail (PT)
12
Cooma-Monaro
Brest Fire Trail (2) (PT)
15
Cooma-Monaro
Calabash Fire Trail (2) (PT)
22
Cooma-Monaro
Murrumbucca Fire Trail (2) (ST)
15
Cooma-Monaro
Bridge Fire Trail (2) (PT)
6
Cooma-Monaro
Log In Hole Fire Trail (2) (PT)
5
Gloucester
Upper Avon Fire Trail
11
Greater Argyle
Mountain Ash Fire Trail
10
Greater Argyle
Mootwingee Fire Trail
6
Greater Hume
Murphy’s Fire Trail
0.2
Greater Hume
Mandaring Fire Trail
1
Greater Queanbeyan City
Queanbeyan River Fire Trail
5.5
Greater Queanbeyan City
Gourock Fire Trail
5.8
Hawkesbury District
Jacks Trail
1.6
Hawkesbury District
Duffys Trail (2) ?tenure
3
Mallee
Various Fire Trails
N/A
Mallee
No 21 Fire Trail
20
Namoi/Gwydir
Warialda State Forest
6.5
Namoi/Gwydir
Zaba-Kaiwarra-Kiora Fire Trail (check)
10
Namoi/Gwydr
Blue Nobby Fire Trail (check)
8
Namoi/Gwydr
Araluen Fire Trail (check)
6
Snowy River
Snowy Plain Fire Trail (2) (PT)
18
Snowy River
Crackenback Fire Trail (PT)
10
Snowy River
Devils Hole Fire Trail (PT)
18
Snowy River
Golden Age Fire Trail (2) (PT)
8
Sutherland
Sabugal Pass Fire Trail
N/A
SW Mallee
Various Fire Trails
N/A
SW Mallee
Oberwells Fire Trail
28
SW Mallee
Mandleman Fire Trail
40
Upper Lachlan
Johnsons Creek Fire Trail
15
Warringah/Pittwater
Lovett Bay Trail (2)
2.5
Warringah/Pittwater
Elvina Bay Trail (2)
1.5
Yass Valley
Nelanglo Fire Trail
21
Yass Valley
Hayshed Fire Trail 1
7
Yass Valley
Hayshed Fire Trail 2
7
391.90 km2
i.e. An area 20km x 20km
.
Forests NSW (government’s industrial logger of NSW remnant forests).
(Forests NSW did not publish the area burnt, only the cost. As a rule of thumb use $3000/square km)
Bush Fire Management Committee
Reserve / Activity Name
NSW Allocation
Clarence Zone
Dalmorton SF
$30,000
Future Forests
Swan
$20,050
Future Forests
Tindall
$10,680
Future Forests
Tooloom
$10,425
Future Forests
Mazzer
$7,341
Future Forests
Kungurrabah
$4,435
Future Forests
Morpeth Park
$3,773
Future Forests
Loughnan
$3,155
Future Forests
Inglebar
$3,000
Future Forests
Lattimore
$2,604
Future Forests
Byrne
$1,755
Future Forests
Ziull 4
$1,677
Future Forests
Lejag
$1,670
Future Forests
Ziull 2
$1,600
Future Forests
Bates
$1,563
Future Forests
Ziull 3
$1,454
Future Forests
Envirocom
$1,410
Future Forests
Morgan
$1,361
Future Forests
McNamara
$1,279
Future Forests
Neaves
$967
Future Forests
Zuill
$872
Future Forests
Boyle
$807
Future Forests
Fitzpatrick
$791
Future Forests
Morrow
$785
Future Forests
Morrow
$785
Future Forests
Morrow
$785
Future Forests
Wallwork
$665
Future Forests
Smith
$665
Future Forests
Wilson
$622
Future Forests
Jarramarumba
$600
Future Forests
Hession
$597
Future Forests
Edwards
$563
Future Forests
Maunder
$558
Future Forests
Kuantan
$515
Future Forests
Billins
$484
Future Forests
Cox
$475
Future Forests
Paterson
$461
Future Forests
Gladys
$415
Future Forests
O’Keefe
$371
Future Forests
Woodcock
$369
Future Forests
Pratten
$346
Future Forests
Truswell
$323
Future Forests
Divine
$323
Future Forests
Hastings
$323
Future Forests
White
$300
Future Forests
Miller
$300
Future Forests
Koop
$300
Future Forests
Lacy
$277
Future Forests
Nosrac
$277
Future Forests
Tully
$277
Future Forests
Baker
$277
Future Forests
Yaganegi
$277
Future Forests
Siezowski
$254
Future Forests
Zuill
$254
Future Forests
Atcheson
$254
Future Forests
Dissevelt
$254
Future Forests
Hoy
$254
Future Forests
Woods
$254
Future Forests
Dawson
$254
Future Forests
Hagan
$254
Future Forests
Skelly
$231
Future Forests
Robards
$231
Future Forests
Maunder
$231
Future Forests
Day
$231
Future Forests
O’Connell
$231
Future Forests
Kompara
$231
Future Forests
Carmen
$231
Future Forests
Maurer
$231
Future Forests
Cunin
$208
Future Forests
GCC
$208
Future Forests
White
$208
Future Forests
Hayer
$208
Future Forests
Southgate
$208
Future Forests
Peck
$208
Greater Taree
Kiwarrak SF
$40,000
Hastings
Cowarra SF
$30,000
Hastings
Caincross SF
$4,000
Hume
Clearing fire trails
$100,000
Hume
New FT
$6,000
Hunter
Pokolbin SF
$13,600
Hunter
Myall River SF
$12,800
Hunter
Myall River SF
$12,800
Hunter
Heaton SF
$12,400
Hunter
Bulahdelah SF
$6,100
Hunter
Watagan SF
$3,200
Hunter
Awaba SF
$3,200
Hunter
Myall River SF
$3,100
Macquarie
Warrengong
$16,250
Macquarie
Vulcan & Gurnang
$11,519
Macquarie
Kinross SF
$8,800
Macquarie
Mount David
$6,101
Macquarie
Newnes SF
$5,199
Macquarie
Printing 25 fire atlas’
$2,048
Macquarie
Black Rock Ridge
$447
Mid-Nth Coast – Taree
Knorrit SF
$36,000
Mid-Nth Coast – Taree
Yarratt SF
$16,000
Mid-Nth Coast – Wauchope
Boonanghi SF
$37,000
Mid-Nth Coast – Wauchope
Northern Break
$9,000
Mid-Nth Coast – Wauchope
Caincross SF
$3,000
Mid-Nth Coast – Wauchope
Western Break
$2,000
Monaro
Clearing fire trails
$114,685
North East
Thumb Creek SF
$46,000
North East
Candole SF
$29,535
North East
Various State Forests
$20,000
North East
Mt Belmore SF
$12,115
North East
Candole SF
$8,900
North East
Lower Bucca SF
$5,500
North East
All North Region
$3,300
North East
Wild Cattle SF
$3,000
North East
Orara East SF
$1,900
Northern -Casino
Barragunda
$11,522
Northern -Casino
Yaraldi 2003
$8,847
Northern -Casino
Yaraldi 2004
$3,207
Richmond Valley
Bates
$20,000
Richmond Valley
Whiporie SF
$13,154
Richmond Valley
Swanson
$12,000
Richmond Valley
McNamara
$10,180
Richmond Valley
Whiporie SF
$9,582
Southern
Pollwombra FT
$6,360
Southern-Eden
Various – whole district
$112,019
Tamworth
Nundle SF
$40,000
Walcha
Nowendoc SF
$30,000
Walcha
Styx River SF
$20,000
$1,073,482
i.e. Approximately an area 20km x 20km
.
NSW Department of Lands (what native vegetation’s left).
Bush Fire Management Committee
Reserve / Activity Name
Treatment Area Ha / Other
Treatment Area (km2)
Baulkham Hills
Porters Rd / Cranstons Rd
5
Baulkham Hills
Porters Rd / Cranstons Rd (2)
4
Baulkham Hills
Pauls Road Trail
5
Baulkham Hills
Mount View Trail
1
Baulkham Hills
Idlewild
2
Baulkham Hills
Maroota Tracks Trail
7
Baulkham Hills
Yoothamurra Trail
1
Baulkham Hills
Kellys Arm Trail
3
Baulkham Hills
Dargle Ridge Trail
5
Baulkham Hills
Dargle Trail
3
Baulkham Hills
Days Road Trail
3
Baulkham Hills
Dickinsons Trail
6
Baulkham Hills
Fingerboard Trail
3
Baulkham Hills
Floyds Road Trail
8
Baulkham Hills
Neichs Road Trail
4
Bega
Eden Strategic Fire Trail
3
Bega
Illawambera Fire Trail
1
Bega
Merimbula/Turu Beach Strategic Protection
2
Bega
Yankees Gap
2
Bega
Millingandi Special Protection (Trail)
1
Bega
Wallagoot Strategic Protection (Trail)
1.2
Bega
South Eden Strategic Protection (Trail)
1
Bega
Merimbula/Pambula Strategic Protection (APZ)
1
Bega
Pacific St Tathra
0.5
Bland
Bland Villages (FTM)
2
Bland
Water Tower Reserve FTM
3
Blue Mountains
Cripple Creek Fire Trail Stage 2
5
Blue Mountains
Cripple Creek Fire Trail Complex
5
Blue Mountains
Caves Creek Trail
0.4
Blue Mountains
Edith Falls Trail
2
Blue Mountains
Boronia Rd – Albert Rd Trails
1
Blue Mountains
Perimeter Trail – North Hazelbrook
1.5
Blue Mountains
McMahons Point Trail – Kings Tableland
7
Blue Mountains
Back Creek Fire Trail
3.2
Blue Mountains
Mitchell’s Creek Fire Trail
3.5
Bombala
Gibraltar Ridge Fire Trail
11
Bombala
Burnt Hut Fire Trail
5
Bombala
Merriangah East Fire Trail
12
Bombala
Bombala Towns & Villages (Trails)
10
Campbelltown
St Helens Park – Wedderburn Rd (Barriers)
0.3
Campbelltown
Barrier / Gate
Campbelltown
Riverview Rd Fire Trail
0.65
Canobolas
Calula Range FTM
Canobolas
Spring Glen Estate FTM
Cessnock
Neath South West Fire Trail
2
Cessnock
Neath South East Fire Trail
1.5
Cessnock
Neath North Fire Trail (2)
1
Cessnock
Gates – Asset Protection Zones
Cessnock
Signs – Asset Protection Zones
Cessnock
Signs – Fire Trails
Cessnock
Kearsley Fire Trail
0.5
Cessnock
Neath – South (Trail)
4
Cessnock
Neath – North (Trail)
2
Clarence Valley
Bowling Club Fire Trail
1
Clarence Valley
Brooms Head Fire Trail
0.2
Clarence Valley
Ilarwill Village
0.3
Cooma-Monaro
Chakola Fire Trail
21
Cooma-Monaro
Good Good Fire Trail
12
Cooma-Monaro
Inaloy Fire Trail
19
Cooma-Monaro
Cowra Creek Fire Trail
4
Cooma-Monaro
David’s Fire Trail
2.1
Cooma-Monaro
Clear Hills Fire Trail
5
Cooma-Monaro
Mt Dowling Fire Trail
16
Cooma-Monaro
Towneys Ridge Fire Trail
6
Cunningham
Warialda Periphery 2
20
Cunningham
Upper Bingara Fire Trail
Dungog
Dungog Fire Trail Signs
Far North Coast
Byrangary Fire Trail
1
Far North Coast
Main Arm Fire Trail (NC67)
2
Far North Coast
Burringbar Fire Trail (NC69)
1
Far North Coast
Mill Rd Fire Trail (NC95)
1
Far North Coast
Broken Head Fire Trail (NC68)
0.5
Far North Coast
New Brighton Fire Trail (NC44)
0.5
Far North Coast
Mooball Spur Fire Trail
1
Far North Coast
Palmwoods Fire Trail (NC06)
0.5
Gloucester
Coneac Trail
6
Gloucester
Moores Trail
6
Gloucester
Mt Mooney Fire Trail
6
Gosford District
Signs – Fire Trails
Great Lakes
Ebsworth Fire Trail
1
Great Lakes
Tuncurry High Fire Trail
0.6
Great Lakes
Monterra Ave Trail – Hawks Nest
0.7
Greater Argyle
Browns Rd Komungla
12
Greater Argyle
Greater Argyle Fire Trail Maintenance
Greater Argyle
Cookbundoon Fire Trail
2
Greater Taree District
Tinonee St Road Reserve
0.25
Greater Taree District
Beach St SFAZ – Wallabi Point
0.35
Greater Taree District
Sth Woodlands Dr – SFAZ
1.3
Greater Taree District
Cedar Party Rd – Taree
2
Hawkesbury District
Sargents Road (2)?tenure
0.75
Hawkesbury District
Parallel Trail (2)
2.5
Hawkesbury District
Parallel Trail (1)
1.1
Hornsby/Ku-ring-gai
Tunks Ridge, Dural
1
Hornsby/Ku-ring-gai
Radnor & Cairnes Fire Trail
0.5
Hornsby/Ku-ring-gai
Binya Cl, Hornsby Heights
1.5
Shellharbour District
Saddleback – Hoddles Trail
3
Shellharbour District
Rough Range Trail
1
Lake Macquarie District
Kilaben Bay Fire Trail
1.5
Lake Macquarie District
Gates – Access Management
Lake Macquarie District
Signs – APZ
Lake Macquarie District
Signs – Fire Trails
Lithgow
Wilsons Glen Trail
6.1
Lithgow
Kanimbla Fire Trail No 314
7.8
Lithgow
Camels Back Trail No 312
4.5
Lithgow
Crown Creek Trail No 206
7
Lithgow
Capertee Common Trail No 203
3
Lower Hunter Zone
Access Infrastructure – All Districts
Lower North Coast
Cabbage Tree Lane Fire Trail, Kempsey
1.5
Lower North Coast
Bullocks Quarry Fire Trail
0.66
Lower North Coast
Perimeter Protection, Main St, Eungai Creek, Nambucca
In November 2006, two separate bushfires that were allowed to burn out of control for a week as well extensive deliberate backburning, ended up causing some 14,070 hectares of the Blue Mountains National Park to be burnt.
This wiped out a significant area of the Grose Valley and burnt through the iconic Blue Gum Forest in the upper Blue Mountains of the Greater Blue Mountains World Heritage Area (GBMWHA).
In the mind of Rural Fire Service (RFS) and the National Parks and Wildlife Service of New South Wales (NPWS), National Parks and World Heritage do not figure as a natural asset worth protecting from bushfire, but rather as an expendable liability, a ‘fuel’ hazard, when it comes to bushfire fighting.
.
This massive firestorm has since been branded the ‘Grose Valley Fires of 2006‘.
Pyrocumulous ‘carbon’ smoke cloud above the firestorm engulfing the Grose Valley 20061123
.
About a month after the fire, on Tuesday 19th December 2006 there was apparently an ‘Inter-Agency Review‘ which took place at Katoomba behind closed doors by members of bushfire management and operating personnel involved in the fire fighting. Despite requests by this Editor, no minutes or reports of that meeting were ever forthcoming. The meeting was internal and secret.
Immediate local community outrage called for explanations and accountability from the Rural Fire Service (RFS) (the government agency responsible for rural fire fighting throughout the State of New South Wales) in charge of fighting the bushfires and for a review of bushfire management practices with a view to ensuring that the highly valued Greater Blue Mountains World Heritage Area and iconic Blue Gum Forest in particular is protected from bushfire in future. Many members of the local community called for an independent and public review or enquiry.
One local resident wrote in the local Blue Mountains Gazette newspaper:
.
‘Questioning the RFS’
by Dr Jackie Janosi, Katoomba, 20061204
. ‘To start, this is directed at the upper levels of the RFS and not to the wonderful local volunteers – many of whom are loved and respected friends and colleagues.
To stop the loud community Chinese whispers and restore faith with the local community, could someone please respond with factual answers about the recent Grose Valley fire that are not reinterpreted with a political spin.
How many hectares of bush was burnt by the Grose Valley wildfire and how many was burnt by the RFS mitigation efforts?
How many houses and lives were at risk from the wildfire as versus to the RFS fire?
How many millions of dollars were spent on water bombing the RFS fire?
How many litres of precious water were used to put out the RFS fire?
Is it true that soil-holding rainforest was burnt and that the real reason for the Mt Tomah road block was erosion from the RFS removal of this natural fire-break?
Was local advice and expertise sought and followed or simply ignored?
If mistakes were made, what measures will be taken to ensure that this does not happen again?
.
I sincerely hope that if mistakes were made then the upper levels of the RFS can show the humility and good future planning that is now required to restore it’s good reputation. I hope that the RFS can show that it is still a community group that cares for the safety of our Blue Mountains residents, is able to respect and respond to our very special local environment and is able to make sound decisions about valuable resources.’
.
Ed: Her questions were never answered. With the RFS rejecting calls for a public or independent review, there was a general sense amongst many in the local community of a cover up and of gross incompetence going unaccounted for.
One of two ignitions that got out of control
– this one in ‘Lawson’s Long Alley‘, north of Mount Victoria
(Photo: Eric Berry, Rural Fire Service, 2006)
Community activists form ‘Grose Fire Group’ in protest
.
Within days of the Grose Valley Fires finally coming under control, some 143 Blue Mountains concerned residents informally formed the ‘Grose Fire Group’ and collectively funded a full page letter in the local Blue Mountains Gazette 20061206 asking of the RFS a different set of questions:
.
‘We call on the New South Wales government to:
1. Undertake a thorough, independent review of the Grose Valley fire, involving all stakeholders, with particular attention to the following questions:
Were fire detection and initial suppression timely and adequate?
Were resources adequate, appropriate and supported?
Were the adopted strategies the best available under the circumstances?
Could other strategies of closer containment have offered lower risk to the community, better firefighter safety, higher probabilities of success, lower costs and less impact on the environment?
Was existing knowledge and planning adequately utilised?
Is fire management funded in the most effective way?
2. Ensure adequate funding is available for post-fire restoration, including the rehabilitation of environmental damage. 3. Pay for more research to improve understanding of fire in the Blue Mountains landscape and methods for fire mitigation and suppression. 4. Improve training in strategies for controlling fires in large bushland areas. 5. Improve pre-fire planning to support decision-making during incidents. 6. Improve systems to ensure that local fire planning and expertise is fully utilised during incidents, and that the protection of the natural and cultural values of World Heritage areas and other bushland are fully considered.’
.
On 20061220, my letter was published in the Blue Mountains Gazette on page 12:
.
‘Blue Gum Lessons’
. ‘One of our most precious natural heritage assets, the Blue Gum Forest, has been allowed to be scorched by bushfire. This demands an independent enquiry into current fire fighting practices to ensure such a tragedy is not repeated.
Not a witch hunt, but what is needed is a constructive revision into improving bushfire fighting methods incorporating current research into the issue. The intensity and frequency of bushfires have become more prevalent due to disturbances by man, including climate change.
An enquiry should consider the assets worth saving; not just lives, homes and property but natural assets of the World Heritage Area. Fire fighting methods should seek to protect all these values. It seems back-burning, however well-intentioned, burnt out the Blue Gum. This is unacceptable. What went wrong? The future survival of our forests depends on how we manage fire.’
Blue Gum Forest shortly after the firestorm
(Photo: Nick Moir, Sydney Morning Herald 20061210)
.
Ed: The above community questions and demands were ignored by the RFS and the New South Wales Government. Many within the ranks of the RFS came to its defence, as the following letters to the Blue Mountains Gazette reveal.
As letters to the editor continued over the Christmas holiday break, by January 2007, Local Member for the Blue Mountains and Minister for the Environment, Bob Debus MP finally responded by proposing that community members be given an opportunity to discuss their concerns with fire authorities and be encouraged to contribute to the development of revised fire management strategies, policies and procedures which may arise from the routine internal reviews of the 2006-07 fire season, and particularly the Grose Valley fire.
The ‘Grose Valley Fire Forum‘ was scheduled for Saturday 17th February 2007, but it was invitation only. I requested permission to attend, but by was rejected.
The incinerated remains of the Grose Valley
– now devoid of wildlife, also incinerated
.
Grose Valley Fire Forum
.
The following is an edited account of the official ‘Report on (the) Grose Valley Fire Forum‘, which was arranged and co-ordinated by the Blue Mountains World Heritage Institute (BMWHI) and which took place at Blue Mountains Botanic Garden, Mount Tomah on Saturday 17th February 2007. The Report is dated 16 March 2007. ‘The content of this report reflects the Forum discussion and outcomes and does not necessarily reflect the views of the Blue Mountains World Heritage Institute‘ – BMWHI.
.
.
The Grose Valley Fire Forum and report were undertaken by the Blue Mountains World Heritage Institute at the request of the NSW Minister for the Environment, the Honourable Bob Debus MP.
.
Forum Participants
.
Associate Professor Sandy Booth – Forum Chairman and Facilitator (BMWH Institute)
Professor Ross Bradstock Centre for Environmental Risk Management of Bushfires, University of Wollongong
Mr Ian Brown BM Conservation Society
Mr Don Cameron BM Conservation Society
Mr Matthew Chambers Environmental Scientist, Blue Mountains City Council (Observer)
Dr Rosalie Chapple Forum Co-Facilitator, BMWH Institute
Mr Bob Conroy Director Central, Parks and Wildlife Division, DEC
Ms Carol Cooper Darug and Gundungurra Nations (Observer)
Superintendent Mal Cronstedt Blue Mountains District, Rural Fire Service
Mr Grahame Douglas Acting Chair, BM Regional Advisory Committee
Group Captain John Fitzgerald Blue Mountains District, Rural Fire Service
Mr Shane Fitzsimmons Executive Director Operations, Rural Fire Service (Observer)
Mr Richard Kingswood Area Manager Blue Mountains, Parks and Wildlife Division, DEC
Mr Geoff Luscombe Regional Manager Blue Mountains, Parks and Wildlife Division, DEC
Dr Brian Marshall President, BM Conservation Society (Observer)
Mr Hugh Paterson BM Conservation Society & NSW Nature Conservation Council
Dr Judy Smith GBMWH Advisory Committee Member
Inspector Jack Tolhurst Blue Mountains District, Rural Fire Service
Mr Haydn Washington GBMWH Advisory Committee Member
Mr Pat Westwood Bushfire Program Coordinator, Nature Conservation Council
Members of the general public were not permitted to attend, including this Editor, who had requested permission to attend
.
List of Acronyms used in this Report
.
AFAC Australasian Fire Authorities Control ARC Australian Research Council BFCC Bush Fire Coordinating Committee BM Blue Mountains BMCC Blue Mountains City Council BMWHI Blue Mountains World Heritage Institute BFMC Blue Mountains District Bush Fire Management Committee BMCS Blue Mountains Conservation Society CERMB Centre for Environmental Risk Management of Bushfires, Faculty of Science, University of Wollongong CRC Co-operative Research Centre DEC NSW Department of Environment & Conservation GBMWHA Greater Blue Mountains World Heritage Area GIS Geographic Information System NCC NSW Nature Conservation Council NPWS NSW National Parks & Wildlife Service, Department of Environment & Conservation RAFT Remote Area Fire-fighting Team CRAFT Catchment Remote Area Fire-fighting Team RFS NSW Rural Fire Service
The Grose Valley from Govetts Leap, Blackheath(Photo by Editor 20061209, free in public domain, click photo to enlarge)
.
Forum Agenda
.
10.00 Welcome to Country – Carol Cooper
Introduction by the Forum Chair -Sandy Booth:
Purpose
Process
Agreements
Outcomes
Reporting
.
10.10 Introduction and opening statement by each participant without comment
.
10.30 Presentations (10 mins each) by:
Mal Cronstedt (RFS) – report on agency debrief Dec 19
Richard Kingswood (NPWS) – national parks and fire management
Dr Brian Marshall President, Blue Mountains Conservation Society – local community perspective
Ross Bradstock (Wollongong University) – gaps and priorities in bushfire research for the BM
.
11.10 Points of Clarification
.
11.20 Grose Valley Fire Management
Issues not covered in RFS official Section 44 Debrief Report
.
11.40 Fire Management and the Greater Blue Mountains World Heritage Area (WHA) (Ed: the region affected by the fire)
Longer term and landscape scale management issues relating including climate change implications
.
12.00 Grose Valley Fire Management
. 1.00-2.00 Lunch
.
Grose Valley Fire Management and the WHA (continued)
Identification of agreed list of actions, with nominated organisations and recommended timeframes
.
Close & Afternoon Tea (Ed: no specific time set. 5pm?)
Ed: Assuming that the forum concluded at around 5pm, the duration allocated for discussing and devising the ‘Actions’, including each Action’s Goal, Trends, Causes and Conditions, Delegation and Timeframe was just 3 hours, presuming the forum ended at 5pm.
.
Since there are and remain some 50 listed Actions out of this forum within a 3 hour allocated period (2pm to 5pm), just 3.6 minutes was allowed for discussing and devising the details of each Action. It is highly implausible that this could have been completed at the forum. So the question remains: were many of the Forum’s 50 Actions in fact devised outside the forum either by the Blue Mountains World Heritage Institute on its own or in consultation with some of the forum attendees?
.
In any case none of the Actions has been undertaken. There has been no follow up report on the performance of the Actions.
.
This Grose Valley Forum of 2007 was just a politically contrived token talk-fest behind closed doors. Its glossy motherhood report was designed to appease critics of the RFS management of this devastating fire.
.
The forum was not open to the general public, nor was it independent of bushfire management’s selective bias.
.
The only benefit was that bushfire management would appease the critics of its handling of the fire fighting by producing a report and that most would forget. Well the purpose of this article is, out of respect for the ecology and wildlife of the Grose Valley, to reveal that report and to help ensure people do not forget.
Forum Introduction
In November 2006, fire caused by lightning strikes burnt a significant area of the Grose Valley in the upper Blue Mountains of the Greater Blue Mountains World Heritage Area (GBMWHA). Like many areas throughout the GBMWHA, the Grose Valley is an area of high natural and cultural value, including the iconic Blue Gum Forest. The two original ignitions were designated as the Burrakorain Fire and the Lawson’s Long Alley Fire, and they came jointly under the jurisdiction of an emergency declaration under Section 44 of the Rural Fires Act.
Community members called on the State Government to undertake a thorough and independent review of the management of this fire, involving all stakeholders. Principal among the issues raised by the concerned residents were backburning, impacts of frequent fires, under-utilisation of local expertise, and economic costs. The community members also called for adequate funding for rehabilitation and environmental restoration works, to conduct more research and training in certain areas of fire management, to improve pre-fire planning
and to develop management systems to better capture and utilise local knowledge.
Local Member for the Blue Mountains and Minister for the Environment, Hon. Bob Debus responded to these concerns by proposing that community members be given an opportunity to discuss their concerns with fire authorities and be encouraged to contribute to the development of revised fire management strategies, policies and procedures which may arise from the routine internal reviews of the 2006-07 fire season, and particularly the Grose Valley fire. The Minister also noted the opportunity for the community to be informed of, and
contribute to, the development of future research projects concerning climate change and fire regimes.
The Minister invited the Blue Mountains World Heritage Institute (BMWHI) to organise and chair a forum of representative community members and fire authorities. The Institute is an independent non-profit organisation that supports the conservation of the natural and cultural heritage of the GBMWHA, with a key objective to “support the integration of science, management and policy within and adjoining the GBMWHA properties.
The purpose of the forum was to:
Brief the community on the management of the Grose Valley fire and the framework and context for the management of fire generally within the World Heritage Area
Identify any issues that relate specifically to the management of the Grose Valley fire, and that haven’t already been captured and/or responded to within the s.44 debrief report
Identify longer term and landscape scale issues relating to the management of fire in the Greater Blue Mountains WHA, particularly in this time of climate change
Develop an action plan, which responds to any unresolved issues identified above.
.
In accordance with the Minister’s brief (Ed: Bob Debus), the following organisations were represented at the forum:
NSW Dept of Environment and Conservation;
NSW Rural Fire Service
Blue Mountains Conservation Society
Nature Conservation Council of NSW
Blue Mountains City Council
NPWS Regional Advisory Committee
GBMWHA Advisory Committee.
In addition to senior representatives of the agencies involved, representatives also came from the principal community-based organisations that had expressed concern and called for a review process. It should be noted that one of the main public calls for a review was made by an informal coalition of residents that was not formally represented at the forum, but a number of these residents were members of those organisations represented.
.
(Ed: the general public were not permitted to attend, there was no public notice of the forum in advance, and this Editor was specifically excluded from attending.)
.
Forum Process
An open invitation was given to the community organisations to identify the issues of community interest and concern to be discussed at the Forum.
From these issues, a consolidated list of 22 issues (Table 1.2) was prepared by the Institute, and then circulated to all participants prior to the forum. To facilitate the workshop discussions and the detailed consideration of the identified issues, the ‘5R Risk Management Framework‘ was used to group the issues.
Following a Gundungurra and Darug ‘Welcome to Country’ by Carol Cooper, and an introduction by the Forum Chair, self-introductions and personal opening statements were made by each participant without comment. These were followed by a series of briefins on management of the Grose Valley Fire and fire management generally within the World Heritage Area. The Forum began by acknowledging that fire management in the Blue Mountains is close to best practice in many ways.
It was unfortunate that copies of the Section 44 debrief report were not available for the forum as anticipated (Ed: a copy is provided in the ‘Further Reading‘ appendix below).
While this was partly overcome through verbal presentation and comment, it limited the ability to reach consensus on the factual basis of what happened on the fire ground and to move forward productively from this point of consensus. Community representatives expressed their dissatisfaction with this situation, and it must be noted that the forum was therefore not able to engage effectively on specific issues of the control strategies used on the Grose Valley Fires.
After a brief session on points of clarification, the issues presented to the forum were explored in detail by working through a problem orientation process that asked a series of questions about each issue, to reach consensus on the exact nature of the problem. As this work progressed, a series of agreed actions were identified to effectively address key aspects of the issues as these unfolded. It is noted that the issues addressed toward the end of the day were examined in less detail due to time constraints, but warrant further attention (e.g. the issue about remote area fire-fighting teams). The original list of 22 issues was consolidated into 11 goal statements, with 50 associated actions.
The main body of this report presents the goals and actions along with documentation of the discussion that took place on the day. It utilises the structured approach to systematically work through the issues, and identify the actions required to bring about more sustainable bushfire management for the Blue Mountains. Within a week of the Forum, the Institute circulated a copy of the forum proceedings to all participants for comment and clarification. The Institute also sought identification of responsibilities for the 50 Actions identified by the Fire Forum.
It is strongly recommended that implementation of the Action Plan be reviewed annually by the representative organisations, to assess progress and effectiveness of actions. It is proposed that the BMWH Institute co-ordinate this review process in partnership with the Nature Conservation Council, with a workshop held after the 2007/08 fire season, to re-address the issues and their progress. (Ed: This was never done)
.
Forum Overview
.
A big challenge in bushfire management is how to better integrate valid community interests with those of fire management agencies. Over recent years, the public has come to demand and expect a greater say in decision-making processes that impact upon their local environment. The Grose Valley Fire Forum represents a step forward in this process of better integrating community knowledge and interests into local natural resource management.
The Forum also illustrated that the Blue Mountains community is both a great supporter of fire authorities, and of the role of volunteer firefighters for the outstanding effort that they are prepared to undertake on behalf of the community.
.
The concerns and questions addressed at the forum included:
Identifying weaknesses and gaps in fire management plans and processes
How well are plans being implemented and what are the barriers to implementation e.g. financial, institutional, political?
How should fire authorities and land managers respond to climate change impacts?
.
Integrating scientific knowledge into fire management plans
How can bushfire management policy allow for the incomplete knowledge of complex ecological systems?
What roles should science and other research play in decision processes, given the uncertainty arising from incomplete understanding of ecosystem dynamics and insufficient scientific information?
.
The role of fire as an ecological process
How do we resolve the conflict between rapid fire suppression to reduce risk versus the fire-dependency of the ecosystem?
What does it take to more effectively mitigate against the risk?
.
Concern that fire control strategies do not compromise the significant natural and cultural heritage values of the Greater Blue Mountains region.
How can bushfire management policy better account for protection of World Heritage values?
How adaptive is bushfire management and policy to the specific circumstances of the Blue Mountains?
.
The Forum recommended actions in relation to:
Better interpretation of ecological data into decision-making and practical fire-fighting procedures
Improvements in bushfire risk management planning
Better translation of legislated objectives for protection of natural and cultural values into operational guidelines
Improved information flow between fire authorities and the community during and after major fires, including more transparency and public involvement in the review processes
Increasing funding for fire-related research, planning, risk mitigation, and post-fire ecological rehabilitation
Enhancing the preparedness, detection and rapid fire response capacity of fire authorities in response to fire ignitions
Modelling the effects of different control strategies and suppression.
.
The Forum acknowledged the increasing and serious challenges arising from risks associated with liabilities and litigation. These trends are of principal concern to fire management agencies and the fire fighters themselves, and many in the general community share these concerns.
Bushfire management is a cultural phenomenon, inextricably bound up between nature and culture. It involves the interaction of multiple, complex systems, including:
organisational/institutional behaviour and decision-making
fire fighting strategies and technologies
science, research and ecosystem behaviour
variable fire behaviour and weather, including climate change
politics; and
personal values and attitudes.
.
The complexity is increasing, especially with climate change, along with pressure for bushfire management to be more adaptive and responsive to the needs of the present and the future.
Facilitating the necessary changes in the behaviour of any of these systems is highly challenging for both government and the community. These systems often have severe constraints including limited resources, threats of litigation, and limited data on which sound decisions can be confidently made. Where these systems are not continuing to learn and adapt, is where attention is needed, not on individual accountabilities. Sound decision-making at the time of a fire event is crucial and the process by which these decisions are made requires careful
analysis. The system should be able to support open reflection after a fire, without blame or litigation. This is where a process of scientific analysis should come into its own: what the fire did, what was done to control it, what worked, what didn’t, why or why not, and what can be done to make things better. How can the system be changed and improved to make success more likely?
Research and adaptive management are essential in helping to address both current challenges and the issues arising from climate change. But alone, these will not bring about the required changes as neither of these domains explicitly addresses the overall policy process or the political realm in which bushfire management happens. Conflict and uncertainty are becoming increasingly common, as evidenced by the Four Corners Program “Firestorm” broadcast on Monday 12th March. The program featured the 2004 Canberra Bushfires and also
raised the Grose Valley fire and resulting Fire Forum.
To overcome the key problems identified by the Grose Valley Fire Forum and achieve real and lasting triple bottom line outcomes, change and innovation need to take place in the realm of governance. This is particularly the case in the areas of science, policy and decision-making.
The Grose Valley Fire Forum has brought fire management agencies and interested representatives of the community together in a spirit of co-operation to consider issues critical to the management of bushfires. Driven by the high conservation values of the Greater Blue Mountains World Heritage Area, the implications of the issues raised at this Forum have obvious relevance to other regions and states. Protecting people as well as the environment should not be mutually exclusive. Our efforts to address this challenge in the Blue Mountains will increasingly come in for close scrutiny.
Notwithstanding the existing mechanisms of review and community consultation surrounding bushfire management, the Institute recommends to the Minister that the issues and actions identified herein by the Grose Valley Fire Forum warrant special consideration and support.
Properly pursued with senior political and agency commitment and support, they offer key insights and potential pathways for the continued adaptive development and implementation of state of the art fire fighting for which NSW, and in particular, the Blue Mountains are justifiably renowned.
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Issues of Community Interest and Concern
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A. Research, information and analysis
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1. Commitment in fire management to conservation of natural and cultural values of World Heritage Area as well as human life and property.
2. Understanding and consideration (including on-ground knowledge) both by those involved in pre-fire planning and those required to make operational decisions during fire events -of the WH values for which the GBMWHA was inscribed on the world heritage list, and of other values, such as geodiversity, cultural values and beauty, which have the potential to be nominated for World Heritage listing in the future.
3. Biodiversity impacts of frequent fires in Grose Valley for last 40 years, including impacts of the recent fire on World Heritage values.
4. The ecological basis for fire policy (knowledge base for response of local biota to fire regimes) e.g. biodiversity loss associated both with high fire frequency and intensity, and with fire exclusion.
5. Translation of NPWS Blue Mountains Fire Management Plan (e.g. risks to natural heritage particularly World Heritage values) to S.52 operational plans during Grose Valley fire.
6. Effectiveness of review processes in generating real improvements for the future; current debriefing process performed by BFMCs [i.e. BFCC Policy 2/2006].
7. Assessment of community values – protection of property versus protection of the natural environment.
8. Implications of climate change for increased fire frequency and intensity.
9. Adequate funds for fire suppression versus inadequate funds for research, planning and fire mitigation.
. B. Risk modification
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10. Effectiveness of current risk strategies in managing fire regimes for biodiversity and community/asset protection (e.g. upper Grose Valley).
11. Implications of climate change for risk modification (e.g. fuel reduction).
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C. Readiness
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12. Skills in implementing fire control strategies for large bushland areas e.g. back-burning.
13. Ecological sustainability of current responses to fire (both suppression & bushfire risk management) e.g. knowledge and skill of plant operators in sensitive environments (environmental damage from machine work e.g. bulldozer lines).
14. Community understanding of control strategies used.
15. RAFT capacity (e.g. for night-time work).
16. Efficiency of fire detection technologies.
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D. Response
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17. Back-burn control strategy from “Northern Strategic Line” and Bell’s Line of Road in large bushland area: overriding consideration for asset protection versus lack of consideration and recognition of impacts on ecological values.
18. Application of planning, guidelines, procedures & local information & expertise during fire suppression.
19. Rapid containment of lightning strike or arson fires.
20. Aerial attack efficiency and effectiveness.
21. Media – inaccurate and misleading use of language and presentation of information.
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E. Recovery
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22. Funding for post-fire assessment, strategy review and ecological restoration including addressing activation of weed seed banks.
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Problem Orientation Process
(Problem Solving Methodology applied by the BMWHI to the Forum)
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1. Clarify goals in relation to the issue
What goals or ends do we want?
Are people’s values clear? (there may be an over-riding goal and then more specific goals to operationalise the over-riding goal)
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2. Describe trends
Looking back at the history of the issue, what are the key trends?
Have events moved toward or away from the specified goals? Describe both past and current trends.
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3. Analyse causes and conditions
What factors, relationships, and conditions created these trends, including the complex interplay of factors that affected prior decisions? (e.g. environmental, social, political factors) i.e. what explanations are there for the trends?
What management activities have affected the trends?
What are the conflicts about different approaches to address the issue?
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4. Projection of developments (e.g. if no action is taken to address the issue)
Based on trends and conditions, what is likely to happen in the future (e.g. if nothing is done differently).
If past trends continue, what can we expect?
Is the likely future the one that will achieve the goals?
What future possible developments are there (e.g. politically, environmentally e.g. how will climate change affect the problem)?
5. Decide on any Actions to address the problem
If trends are not moving toward the goal, then a problem exists and actions need to be considered.
What other policies, institutional structures, and procedures might move toward the goal?
What research, analysis, or public education may be needed?
* Adapted from Clark, T.W. 2002. “The Policy Process: a practical guide for natural resource professionals.” Yale University Press. U.S.Vast hectares of the Blue Mountains’ native vegetation was either left to burn uncontrolled or else deliberately burned by the RFS and NPWS
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Action Plan
~ a consolidated list of goals and actions [organisations delegated for executing ‘Actions’ are shown in brackets […]
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1. Protection of Natural and Cultural Values
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GOAL:
.
To protect natural and cultural heritage values, consistent with the protection of human life and property, by ensuring that bushfire management strategies:
• take a risk management approach toward protection of these values
• improve access to and interpretation of natural and cultural heritage values when deciding on fire suppression strategies and tactics
• ensure that these natural and cultural heritage guidelines for fire management are integrated throughout the entire planning framework for short, medium and long-term bushfire management and operational strategies.
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ACTIONS:
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1. Data collected within the “Managing ecosystem change in the GBMWHA” project, including the new GIS, to be effectively interpreted into decision-making and practical fire-fighting terms. [Responsibility for action: BMWHI & CERMB – ARC Linkage project, NPWS, BMCC, BMCS]
2. Monitor impacts of fires on Aboriginal cultural heritage values, and undertake opportunistic mapping of these values post-fire. Translate findings into decision-making and practical fire fighting terms. As a priority, undertake an opportunistic survey of Aboriginal cultural heritage post-Grose fire. [Aboriginal communities, BMWHI, NPWS]
3. Greater effort in general to be made in translating and interpreting research and other relevant information on the protection of ecological and cultural values to better inform decision-making and into practical fire-fighting terms wherever required. [CERMB, BMWHI, NPWS, BMCC, BMCS]
4. Consider further developments in environmental risk management planning by the BFCC for inclusion in the Bush Fire Risk Management Plan model template. [BFMC]
5. Effectively integrate the strategic hazard reduction plan being developed by BMCC, into the risk management plan and the operations plans. [BMCC, BFMC]
6. Translate the NPWS Fire Management Strategies objectives for protection of natural and cultural values into operational guidelines across the entire planning framework at all levels, using a risk management approach. [NPWS, BFMC]
7. Continue to identify the best mix of treatments i.e. prevention, mitigation, suppression and recovery, to achieve both fire management and land management objectives. [NPWS, RFS, BFMC]
8. Review risk management and operational plans to include relevant reserve fire management plan information, including aspects of mitigation and appropriate fire management guidelines from the RFS Environmental Code [BFMC].
9. Develop a single map-based approach for interagency use that depicts all relevant information in a user-friendly way and enables optimal use and consideration of this information under operational conditions. [NPWS, RFS, BMCC, BFCC, BFMC, BMCS]
10. Provide the outcomes of this forum to the BFCC for consideration in developing and reviewing policies and procedures such as for the Bush Fire Risk Management Policy and Bush Fire Risk Management Plan Model template. [NPWS, RFS]
11. Develop a quantitative framework for risk management: undertake research to evaluate the effectiveness of current strategies to inform the resources and strategies required to achieve integrated life, property, cultural and natural value protection outcomes. The research should identify what is the return on current ‘investment’ and the results then linked back to budgeting systems [BMWHI].
12. Undertake and improve community liaison and surveys to better capture community values within fire management plans [BFMC].
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2. The Role of Fire as an ‘Ecological Process’
.
GOAL:
(2?) To better understand the role of fire as an ecological process, including the long-term ecological effects of fire regimes on fauna and flora, as a basis for identifying fire regimes that sustain the ecology both locally and across the landscape.
.
ACTIONS:
13. Undertake a research project using the Grose Valley fire as a case study, to ascertain and explore the opportunities to improve fire management for protection of ecological impacts [NPWS, BMCC, CERMB, BMWHI].
14. Development of a threat abatement plan for the ecological consequences of high frequency fires. [DEC]
15. Use the Blue Mountains as a case study for modelling different control strategies and suppression (e.g. analysis of suppression operations) utilising historical raw data for retrospective mapping. [RBradstock/CERMB]
16. Source external funds for priority research and investigation projects [NPWS, RFS, BMCC].
17. Undertake ecological research into the impacts of fire regimes including intervals between fires, ensuring an appropriate focus on large-scale transformation [NPWS, BMCC, CERMB, BMWHI].
18. Undertake the necessary ground-truthing investigations to ascertain whether ecological predictions are being played out. That is, are observed trends in ecosystems matching the predictions from the models? Other research and investigation priorities include:
a. Threatened species and communities, including mapping of successional processes (e.g. woodland to heathland shifts and changes to hanging swamp boundaries) and wet sclerophyll forest (e.g. Blue Gum Forest, E. oreades) and warm temperate rainforest regeneration;
b. Species composition and structure comparison of those areas burnt in 2002;
c. Species composition and structure comparison of those fires burnt with high frequency;
d. Document / map / audit weed plumes that have occurred after past fires, and similarly for the weed plumes that will already be occurring after the 2006 Grose Valley fire;
e. Build upon current research results to further elucidate how the Grose Valley responded to the ‘94 fire. [CERMB, NPWS, BMCC & BMWHI via ARC Linkage Grant]
19. Initiate appropriate involvement of the broader community in research and particularly Aboriginal people for Aboriginal cultural heritage research, in all relevant research projects. [BMWHI, NPWS, BMCC]
20. Develop mechanisms to effectively and promptly communicate research outcomes to agencies, fire-fighters and communities, and for application of these to risk management planning and human resource planning and assessment during fires. [BFMC]
.
3. Review Processes and Public Communication
.
GOAL:
.
To ensure effectiveness of fire review and debriefing processes and their communication to the public by:
Communicating to the community the results of interagency review processesincluding an analysis of fire strategies and environmental impacts within major debriefs and review
Enabling greater community participation in major fire debriefs and fire reviews.
.
ACTIONS:
.
21 Urgent distribution of the section 44 debrief report to all participants in the forum. [RFS]
22 Greater provision for earlier feedback to and from the community after a major fire, regarding fire control strategies, prior to release of formal report. Also address what the barriers are to increasing community knowledge and what approaches are most effective. [RFS, BFMC]
23 Request the Coordinating Committee to revisit the s44 debrief policy and procedures and/or other appropriate mechanisms to develop an appropriate means for getting feedback from the community via a system that enables issues to be raised and feedback to be provided. The development of a policy and procedural framework for Incident Controllers may assist here. [NCC/NPWS, BMCS]
24 Undertake promotion and community education programs to familiarise the community with the framework that exists for debriefing processes and the arising information flows and decision-making processes. Incorporate this into existing Firewise program. [BFMC, RFS]
25 Encourage a culture of openness, learning and evidence-based decision-making, including understanding by volunteer fire fighters that criticism is of the process not of the implementer. [All organisations represented at forum]
26. Continue to undertake interpretation / education / media and fire-related Discovery activities. [NPWS]
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4. Climate Change and Risk Mitigation
.
GOAL:
To prepare for the more extreme conditions associated with climate change, by addressing the policy and management implications for control strategies and landscape management.
.
ACTIONS:
27. Research priorities include:
Investigate efficacy of current risk mitigation in the Blue Mountains. [NPWS, CERMB]
Climate change impacts on hanging swamps.
Build understanding of underlying shifts in environmental conditions and their effects on fire occurrence and fire behaviour.
Implications of climate change for fire behaviour and invasive species. [CERMB, BMWHI & ARC Linkage project]
Investigate plant dispersal in relation to climate change, quantifying ecological processes and habitat requirements critical to species persistence and their ability to move to new habitats given climate change. [CERMB, BMWHI & ARC Linkage project]
28. The results of this Forum should be used to advocate and lead improved dialogue and action to address the key issues pertaining to climate change and start to influence policy change. [NCC, BMWHI, CERMB, BMCS, NPWS, RFS, BMCC]
29. Investigate opportunities for increased resourcing for risk mitigation and for bushfire behaviour research. [NPWS, RFS, CERMB, BMWHI]
30. Enhance the preparedness, detection and rapid fire response capacity of fire authorities in response to fire ignitions. [Fire authorities]
31. Deliver a presentation about this forum, at the May 2007 conference of the Nature Conservation Council of NSW on bushfire and climate change. [DEC, BMWHI, NCC; 31 May-1 June 2007]
.
5. Resourcing and Investment
.
GOAL:
Increase the availability of resources for fire-related research, planning and fire mitigation.
.
ACTIONS:
32. Formally approach the Environmental Trust to consider the allocation of Environmental Trust funds for use in fire related research including investigation of fire impacts. [NPWS]
33. Raise the needs and investigate the opportunities for increased commitment to rehabilitation following fire with the Catchment Management Authorities. [BFMC]
34. Allocation of additional resources for the BFMC to implement the recommendations in this document, particularly for actions resulting in strengthening risk management objectives. [BFMC members]
.
6. Risk Management Strategies for Multiple Outcomes
.
GOAL:
.
To develop effective fire risk management strategies for mitigation and suppression in large bushland areas through:
Evidence-based plans and strategies;
Ensuring that fire fighters in wilderness and other remote areas have adequate support and training for safe and effective implementation of fire control strategies.
.
ACTIONS:
.
35. Address the issue of risk management planning, including investigating use of corridors for hazard reductions as part of an integrated approach that allows for ecological considerations. [Land managers/NPWS]
36. Seek more funding for community involvement in Local Government Area fire management (i.e. liaison officer position for community engagement prior to release of plan), which will assist administration/enforcement of regulatory processes. [BMCC]
37. Workshops held to provide further information regarding fire suppression in remote/wilderness areas, and BFMC to list potential contractors that could be eligible for such ecologically sound, operational training in fire control strategies for remote/wilderness areas including back-burning and bulldozer lines. [BFMC, NPWS]
.
7. RAFT Capacity
.
GOAL:
.
To improve RAFT (Remote Area Firefigfting Team) capacity to deal effectively with most remote ignitions.
.
ACTIONS:
.
38. Facilitate and support more RFS people to participate in RAFT [RFS]
39. Review and combine NPWS and RFS RAFT policy and procedures, including consideration for nighttime RAFT deployment [NPWS, RFS].
40. Address pre-deployment capacity in context of return on investment i.e. economically model across landscape to see how it meets needs and model against suppression costs [NPWS, RFS].
.
8. Fire Detection Technologies
.
GOAL:
.
To explore the potential of emerging technologies for higher efficiency in fire detection.
.
ACTIONS:
.
41. Consider the new technologies where appropriate and consider the benefits of Blue Mountains piloting new technologies for broad-scale remote surveillance, and evaluate cost effectiveness. [BF Coordinating Committee and NPWS]
.
9. Aerial Attack
.
GOAL:
.
Continue to optimise effectiveness of aerial attack strategies and operations.
.
ACTIONS:
.
42. Practically strengthen record keeping during operations to assist analysis by identifying a system that is capable of catching data in real-time. [DBFMA, BFCC]
43. Identify and use some simple decision rules for aircraft deployment to maximise aircraft cost-effectiveness. [BFMC]
.
10. Role of the Media
.
GOAL:
.
To have better processes in place to ensure accurate presentation of fire incident information through the media.
.
ACTIONS:
.
44. Work with the tourism industry to develop their risk management strategy. [BFMC]
45. Before/during a fire, convey explanations of what control strategies and why, to inform community. [BFMC]
46. Undertake pre-season briefs to journalists; discourage use of sensitised language (e.g. National Parks destroyed, trashed, destruction and horror, fire hell etc). [District Committee, RFS, NPWS, BFMC]
47. Engage local media in communicating exactly which areas are out of bounds, so they people don’t stop coming to remaining open areas. [BFMC]
.
11. Post Fire Recovery
.
GOAL:
.
To adequately fund ecological restoration after a large wildfire.
.
ACTIONS:
.
48. Approach the Environmental Trust regarding the establishment of a delineated fund (possibly from Trust Funds) to support ecological restoration which could be needed for several years post-fire and ensure initiative is appropriately linked to Section 44 state level response and also the SCA for post fire ecological funding to protect catchment values. [NPWS]
49. Ensure a strategic approach to site rehabilitation e.g. by placing an emphasis on rehabilitation of weedy sites that are a threat to natural values downstream. [Land managers]
50. NPWS to consider establishing a new dedicated staff position to coordinate and manage volunteers undertaking rehabilitation projects and activities within the Blue Mountains region of DEC. [NPWS]
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This Forum was a Farce
.
None of these 50 Actions has been acted upon nor implemented since 2007; now five years ago.
.
The entire forum process was a farce from the outset. It only served to allow those responsible to escape accountability and responsibility for incompetence and mass bush arson without reputational blemish.
.
RFS Incident Controller, Mal Cronstedt, relocated himself back to West Australia (Fire & Emergency Services Authority), where he was from. NPWS Blue Mountains Manager, Richard Kindswood, went on extended leave. RFS Commissioner, Phil Koperberg, was seconded by the NSW Labor Party to become Minister for Blue Mountains (i.e. promoted). Bob Debus was seconded by the Federal Labor Party to become Federal Member for Macquarie (i.e. promoted). Blue Mountains Councillor Chris van der Kley stayed on as Chair of the Blue Mountains Bushfire Management Committee.
.
Blue Mountains Bushfire Fighting practice, strategy, management, culture remains ‘RFS Business-as-usual’ status and similarly ill-equipped for the next bushfire catastrophe.
.
No lessons were learnt. More tragically, no lessons want to be learnt.
.
RFS: …’we know what we are doing and how dare anyone criticise us and our hard working bushfire fighting volunteers!
How it all started...as a small ignition ten days prior.
[3] ‘Grose Valley Fire Forum Report – FINAL (BMWHI 20070402).pdf‘, >[Read Report] (4.2 mb)
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[4] Rural Fire Service’s official report of Grose Valley Bushfires, report by Incident Controller Mal Cronstedt, Rural Fire Service, 20070208, >’Lawsons Long Alley Section 44 Report‘
[6] ‘Blue Mountains World Heritage’, by Alex Colley (text) and Henry Gold (photography), published by The Colong Foundation for Wilderness, 2004, Foreward: “This book celebrates one of the greatest achievements of the Australian conservation movement – the creation of the Greater Blue Mountains World Heritage Area” ~ Bob Carr, Premier of New South Wales, March 2004. ^http://www.colongwilderness.org.au/BMWH_book/BMWH_book.htm, ^http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/917
‘Everyone has been to the lookouts. Many have been to the Blue Gum Forest, deep in the valley – but few know the remote and hiden recesses of the labyrinth beyond. Here, an hour or two from Sydney, is a very wild place.
The Grose has escaped development. There have been schemes for roads, railways, dams, mines and forestry (Ed: ‘logging’), but the bulldozers have been kept out. Instead, the valley became the ‘Cradle of Conservation’ in New South Wales when it was reserved from sale in 1875 – an event magnificently reinforced in 1931 when a group of bushwalkers were moved to save Blue Gum Forest from the axe.
This is story of the whole Grose Wilderness, and of the Blue Gum Forest in particular. It is the story of people who have visited the wilderness: Aborigines, explorers, engineers, miners, track-builders, bushwalkers, conyoners, climbers…those who have loved it, and those who have threatened it.’
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[8] ‘Battle for the Bush: The Blue Mountains, the Australian Alps and the origins of the wilderness movement‘, book by Geoff Mosley, 1999, published by Envirobook in conjunction with The Colong Foundation for Wilderness Limited. ^http://themountainjournal.wordpress.com/interviews-profiles/geoff-mosley/
NSW National Parks and Wildlife Service setting fire to native habitat while the weather is calm.
What fauna, it’s an ‘Ecological Burn’?
This week’s hazard reduction burn in Barrington Tops NP, north of Dungog
[Source: Photo by Andy Boleyn, ^http://newcastleonhunter.com/2012/08/npws-burning-down-the-tops/]
Dropping petrol bombs by immoral helicopter pilots
Aerial ‘habitat reduction’ occurs across National Parks and World Heritage Areas
– no habitat is sacrosanct.
It is euphemistically branded ‘Biodiversity Burning’ – fire is good for wildlife – watch them run, watch the Echinas and Wombats burn!
National Parks are deemed by Australian governments as a ‘hazards’!
It is a town park mentality – a bit of greenery for people to enjoy at weekends.
This is Destination New South Wales..
about 90% deforested, or burned, or farmed, or mined, or housed or else deserted
Broadscale Hazard Reduction
‘So when summer comes we should be right – there’ll be nothing left to burn!’
‘Job Done!‘
Woops, the prescribed burn got out of control
That’s ok its only Fraser Island World Heritage – it’ll grow back!
Government-sanctioned arsonists know what they are doing is wrong
– but the Firie peer pressure is too great
